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In the literature, there are a variety of proposed blockchain systems (e.g.,
Bitcoin and Ethereum), each of which with its own design decisions. Both
in the design and the deployment of blockchain systems, many configura-
tion choices and design decisions need to be made. Investigating different
implementation and design choices is neither feasible nor practical on real
blockchain systems. Simulation models emerge as an excellent technique
to study blockchains without either implementing a new system or in-
terrupting an existing one. Despite some attempts in the literature to
utilise simulation models to evaluate specific aspects of blockchain sys-
tems, there is a lack of a general-purpose, flexible, extensible and widely
usable simulation tool for blockchains.
In this thesis, we contribute to the field of blockchain analysis by proposing
BlockSim as a generic framework to build discrete-event dynamic system
models for blockchain systems. BlockSim aims to provide flexible and
extensible simulation constructs to study a variety of blockchains and a
set of design and deployment questions. BlockSim is implemented as a
publicly available simulation tool and thoroughly validated against real-
life systems and measurement studies.
Another contribution of this thesis is an extensive analysis to estimate
the distributions for Ethereum smart contract using data for over 300,000
real transactions. To run realistic simulation studies, we integrate these
distributions into the simulator to generate representative transactions.
Furthermore, this thesis offers two extensive data-driven simulation stud-
ies related to Ethereum smart contracts that demonstrate the applicability
and usefulness of BlockSim. The first study is the analysis of the Ethereum
Verifier’s Dilemma and the proposal of two approaches (parallelisation and
active insertion of invalid blocks) to mitigate its implications. The second
study is the analysis of the uncertainty that miners face about the fee and
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A blockchain is a distributed ledger that records all transactions that have ever oc-
curred in the blockchain network. This ledger is replicated and shared among the
network’s nodes. The main feature of blockchain is that it allows non-trusting par-
ticipants to communicate and send transactions between each other in a secure way
without the need for a trusted third party.
Blockchain is an ordered list of blocks, where each block is identified by its cryp-
tographic hash. Each block references the block that came before it, resulting in
a chain of blocks. Each block consists of a set of transactions. Once a block is
created and appended to the blockchain, the transactions in that block cannot be
changed or reverted. This ensures the integrity of the transactions and prevents the
double-spending problem.
Blockchain systems typically run a peer-to-peer network that comprises a number
of nodes, where every node is connected to several other nodes or peers. A company or
a person can run a node of the peer-to-peer network. The role of such nodes is either
to create and send new transactions in the network or to maintain the blockchain state
by executing unconfirmed transactions and appending new blocks to the blockchain
ledger. Nodes who maintain the blockchain state are often referred to as miners, and
they are usually motivated to behave honestly through some incentives.
Cryptocurrencies emerged as the first generation of blockchain technology. Cryp-
tocurrencies are digital currencies that are based on cryptographic techniques and
peer-to-peer networks. The first and most popular example of cryptocurrencies is
Bitcoin. Other blockchain systems such as Ethereum emerged as the second gen-
eration of blockchain to allow building complex distributed applications beyond the
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cryptocurrencies. Smart contracts are considered as the main element of this genera-
tion [100]. Smart contracts are computer programs that can be enforced and executed
on a blockchain system if the specified conditions are met, without the involvement
of a trusted third party. The Ethereum blockchain is the most popular blockchain for
developing smart contracts.
Every blockchain system in these generations has its own design decisions. During
the design as well as the development of blockchain systems, many architectural,
configurations and design decisions need to be made. However, imperfect design
decisions may negatively impact the performance of the blockchain systems, requiring
changes to the running system. For example, Bitcoin has been forked many times
since its release in 2009 to alter some performance configurations such as the block
size and the block interval time. Litecoin and Dogecoin are two blockchains that
result from those forks, where the block interval has been reduced to improve the
throughput of the blockchain. In addition, Ethereum also has been forked several
times. In 2016, the Ethereum network was flooded by a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack. As a response to this attack, Ethereum was forked to improve its incentive
model.
To eliminate the need of changing the running system to fix imperfect design de-
cisions, it is crucial to adequately investigate the different implementation and design
choices prior to and during the design and the deployment of a blockchain system.
Relying on experimentation or trial-and-error may lead to costly forks or is not even
feasible or practical on real blockchain systems. Simulation is an excellent approach
to study blockchains without either implementing a new system or interrupting an
existing one [19]. With simulations, it is feasible for designers and analysts to explore
design trade-offs and configuration questions for blockchains in a reasonable time.
Despite the importance of simulation to the field of blockchain analysis, there is a
lack of a generic and extensible simulation framework for performance analysis of
blockchain systems.
This research aims to advance the current state of the art of blockchain analysis
by addressing several shortcomings of the current literature through the utilisation
of discrete-event simulation models. That is, the goal of this thesis is to address the
following limitations:
Lack of a generic and extensible simulation tool for blockchains. In the
literature, there are some attempts to utilise simulation models to evaluate various
aspects of blockchain systems. However, all of these attempts utilise simulation mod-
els for specific and limited purposes [7, 16, 50, 51, 75, 78, 91, 102]. Thus, there is a
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lack of a general-purpose, flexible, extensible and widely usable simulation tool for
blockchains, to assist in answering a variety of design and deployment questions.
The core aim of this research is to address this gap by proposing a simulation
framework and tool for blockchain systems that can be applied to a large set of
blockchain systems, easily manipulated to study a particular system while at the same
time easy to use and extend. The intended user of the simulator can be blockchain
designers, analysts and researchers who want to analyse a large variety of blockchain
systems. The proposed simulator can provide means to rigorously analyse perfor-
mance problems and study various solutions to mitigate their implications. Exam-
ples of such analysis problems are the Verifier’s Dilemma and the profit uncertainty
presented in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis, respectively.
Lack of rigorous analysis of the Ethereum Verifier’s Dilemma. In proof-
of-work based blockchains such as Ethereum, verification of blocks is an integral part
of establishing consensus across nodes. However, in Ethereum, miners do not receive
a reward for verifying. This implies that miners face the Verifier’s Dilemma: use
resources for verification, or use them for the more lucrative mining of new blocks?.
This Verifier’s Dilemma is well recognised in the literature, e.g., [71, 94], but has not
been systematically analysed.
This research aims to fill this gap through a rigorous analysis of the implications
of the Verifier’s Dilemma with the help of the proposed simulator in addition to
some closed-form expressions. The analysis considers both current and future imple-
mentations of Ethereum to derive conclusions of when this dilemma can become a
serious problem. The aim is not only to analyse the implications of this dilemma,
but also to propose some mitigation solutions. To conduct this analysis study in a
realistic setting, we feed the simulator with real data about Ethereum smart contract
transactions, that will be gathered from the Ethereum network and from controlled
experiments.
Lack of analysis of the impact of the profit uncertainty in Ethereum. In
Ethereum, miners are uncertain about the rewards and the cost of executing smart
contract transactions. This makes miners unable to make informed decisions about
which transactions to select and execute in their forthcoming blocks in order to max-
imise their profits. This is especially true with the presence of incompatible incentive
model, as reported in the literature [1, 2, 29, 83, 101]. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no work that investigates the impact of the uncertainty problem miners face
when selecting transactions on the profit earned under the incompatible Ethereum
incentive model.
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This research aims to bridge this gap by providing an extensive analysis of the
impact of the uncertainty miners face in Ethereum when selecting transactions with
the help of the proposed simulator. To accomplish this aim, different transaction
selection strategies must be designed to draw conclusions about the impact of such
uncertainty. Similar to the analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma, this analysis aims
to consider both current and future implementations of Ethereum after feeding the
simulator with real data to draw realistic results and conclusions.
1.1 Contributions
The work carried out in this PhD research makes a number of contributions to the
field of blockchain analysis. The main contributions of this research are as follows:
• Conducting a systematic mapping study to explore the current research on
blockchain-based smart contracts. The study aims to provide a survey of the
scientific literature, identify academic research trends and uptake and identify
gaps for further research. We conducted the first study in 2017, then updating
it in 2018 before revising it further in 2020. The results of the mapping study
show a significant growth in research outputs related to smart contracts since
its emergence in 2014, with an emphasis on smart contract applications. Also,
the results suggest two research areas to be further explored, which we utilise
to identify the case studies for the proposed simulator in this thesis (Chapter
3).
• Designing and developing a generic blockchain simulation tool named BlockSim
that is flexible enough to support the analysis of a large variety of blockchains
and a wide set of analysis problems. BlockSim is designed to cross three different
blockchain layers: the incentives layer, the consensus layer and the network
layer [96]. BlockSim provides simulation constructs that are intuitive, hide
unnecessary detail and extensible. At the core of BlockSim is a Base Model
that contains a number of main functional blocks common across blockchains
(e.g., blocks and nodes) that can be extended as required. We implement the
Base Model in Python, extend it to support the implementation of Bitcoin and
Ethereum blockchains and validate it against real-life systems and measurement




• Conducting an extensive analysis to estimate the distributions for Ethereum
smart contract transactions, with respect to different attributes. To determine
these distributions we use publicly available Ethereum smart contract infor-
mation, augmented with experimental data for over 300,000 smart contract
transactions obtained on a test bed. The estimated distributions are then fed
as inputs to the BlockSim simulator to conduct data-driven simulation studies
(Chapter 5).
• Conducting an extensive analysis of the Ethereum Verifier’s Dilemma, using a
data-driven model-based approach that combines closed-form expressions and
discrete-event simulation. We extend the BlockSim simulator with the function-
ality necessary for this analysis. We show that, indeed, it is often economically
rational not to verify. We consider two approaches to mitigate the implications
of the Verifier’s Dilemma, namely parallelisation and active insertion of invalid
blocks, both shown to be effective (Chapter 6).
• Conducting an extensive analysis of the impact of the uncertainty miners per-
ceive in Ethereum when selecting transactions, using data-driven and simulation
approaches. We design different transaction selection strategies for scenarios
with and without uncertainty. We conduct this analysis using the BlockSim
simulator after extending some of its functionalities. We show that such uncer-
tainty has a significant impact on the earned profits (Chapter 7).
1.2 List of Publications
Chapters 3,4,5,6 and 7 have already been published in international conferences and
journals. For papers 2 and 6, which have additional co-authors, we note that the
majority of the work was done by the researcher, including the idea, running the ex-
periments and writing the paper. Co-authors of these two papers contributed through
some discussions and through revising the paper, editing and providing comments.
The following is a list of these publications.
1. Maher Alharby, and Aad van Moorsel. “Blockchain-based smart con-
tracts: A systematic mapping study”. In Proceedings of the 4th Interna-
tional Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology. AIRCC
Publishing Corporation, 2017. (Chapter 3)
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2. Maher Alharby, Amjad Aldweesh, and Aad van Moorsel. “Blockchain-
based smart contracts: A systematic mapping study of academic re-
search (2018)”. In Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Cloud
Computing, Big Data and Blockchain. IEEE, 2018. (Chapter 3)
3. Maher Alharby, and Aad van Moorsel. “The impact of profit uncer-
tainty on miner decisions in blockchain systems”. Electronic Notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, 2018. (Chapter 7)
4. Maher Alharby, and Aad van Moorsel. “BlockSim: A Simulation Frame-
work for Blockchain Systems”. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evalua-
tion Review, 2019. (Chapter 4)
5. Maher Alharby and Aad van Moorsel. “BlockSim: An Extensible Sim-
ulation Tool for Blockchain Systems”. Frontiers in Blockchain, 2020.
(Chapter 4)
6. Maher Alharby, Robin Lunardi, Amjad Aldweesh, and Aad van Moorsel.
“Data-Driven Model-Based Analysis of the Ethereum Verifier’s Dilemma”.
In Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on De-
pendable Systems and Networks. IEEE, 2020. (Chapter 6)
7. Maher Alharby and Aad van Moorsel. “Fitting and Regression for Dis-
tributions of Ethereum Smart Contracts”. In Proceedings of the 2nd
Conference on Blockchain Research & Applications for Innovative Networks
and Services. IEEE, 2020. (Chapter 5)
In addition to these publications, I am a co-author of some research papers that
do not contribute directly to this thesis, but they are relevant. The following is a list
of these papers:
8. Amjad Aldweesh, Maher Alharby, and Aad van Moorsel. “Performance
benchmarking for smart contracts to assess miner incentives in Ethereum”.
In Proceedings of the 14th European Dependable Computing Conference. IEEE,
2018.
9. Amjad Aldweesh, Maher Alharby, Aad van Moorsel. “Performance bench-
marking for Ethereum opcodes”. In Proceedings of the 15th International
Conference on Computer Systems and Applications. IEEE, 2018.
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10. Amjad Aldweesh, Maher Alharby, Maryam Mehrnezhad and Aad van Moorsel.
“OpBench: A CPU Performance Benchmark for Ethereum Smart
Contract Operation Code”. In Proceedings of the 2019 IEEE International
Conference on Blockchain. IEEE, 2019.
1.3 Thesis Structure
• Chapter 2. Background: This chapter introduces background information
related to blockchain technology, smart contracts, modelling and simulation. In
addition, this chapter explains discrete-event simulations as well as the method-
ology for conducting a simulation study. This chapter also discusses related
work on performance evaluation of blockchain systems.
• Chapter 3. Blockchain-based smart contracts: a systematic mapping
study of academic research: This chapter applies the systematic mapping
study approach to explore the current research on smart contracts and to iden-
tify gaps for further work.
• Chapter 4. BlockSim: an extensible simulation tool for blockchain
systems: This chapter introduces BlockSim as a generic simulation model and
tool for blockchain systems. This embraces the design, the implementation and
the validation of the simulation tool. This chapter also provides a simulation
study to show the applicability of the proposed simulator.
• Chapter 5. Data collection and distributions of Ethereum smart con-
tracts: This chapter introduces the data collection exercise conducted to gather
Ethereum smart contract transactions and the analysis performed to obtain dis-
tributions for this data. The distributions are meant to serve as inputs for the
simulator.
• Chapter 6. Analysis of the Ethereum Verifier’s Dilemma: This chapter
introduces an extensive simulation study to investigate the Ethereum Verifier’s
Dilemma and two approaches to mitigate its implications. This embraces the
description of the Verifier’s Dilemma as well as some closed-form expressions to
estimate its implications. This chapter also extends the simulator to support
the analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma and the proposed mitigation approaches.
In addition, it discusses the main results obtained and the validity threats to
the study.
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• Chapter 7. Analysis of the profit uncertainty in Ethereum: This chap-
ter introduces a simulation study to investigate the uncertainty miners face
when selecting transactions, and its impact on the received profits. This em-
braces the description of the uncertainty issue, the design of a simulation model
as well as the design of different selection strategies. This chapter also extends
the simulator to support this study. In addition, it presents the main insights
gained and discusses the threats to the validity of the study.
• Chapter 8. Conclusion: This chapter summarises the main contributions
and findings of our research. In addition, it presents the limitations of our





This chapter covers background information about blockchain technology and simu-
lations. Sections 2.1-2.4 are meant to explain the blockchain technology. Section 2.1
provides an overview of blockchain technology: its definition, characteristics and how
it works. Section 2.2 presents and discusses three different layers of blockchain sys-
tems: Network, Consensus and Incentives. Section 2.3 gives an introduction about
smart contracts and blockchain platforms that support the development of smart
contracts. Ethereum blockchain is explained in more detail in Section 2.4. Basic
simulation concepts are explained in three Sections 2.5-2.7. Section 2.5 provides an
overview of modelling and simulation in general, and a detailed explanation about
discrete-event simulations is provided in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concerns about the
steps of a simulation study. Finally, we discuss work related to performance evalua-
tion and simulation tools for blockchains in Section 2.8 before we conclude the chapter
in Section 2.9.
2.1 Blockchain Technology
Transactions between parties in current systems are usually conducted in a centralised
form, which requires the involvement of a trusted third party (e.g., a bank). However,
this could result in security issues (e.g., unauthorised modifications), reliability issues
(e.g., single point of failure), performance bottlenecks at the central parties and high
transaction fees. Blockchain technology has emerged to tackle these issues by allowing
non-trusting entities to interact with each other in a distributed manner without the
involvement of a trusted third party.
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A blockchain is a distributed ledger that maintains the history of all transactions
that have ever occurred in the blockchain network. All network nodes have a copy of
this ledger making it replicated and backed up. One advantage of a blockchain is that
it allows non-trusting participants to communicate and to securely exchange assets
without the need for a trusted third party. Such a ledger has two main purposes, to
provide an immutable log of all transactions and to make the transactions visible to
anyone inspecting or using the blockchain.
The term blockchain comes from the fact that data about multiple transactions
is grouped into blocks. Each block is uniquely identified by its cryptographic hash,
and each block is attached and linked to the one that came before it. This results in
a chain of blocks. Once a block is generated and attached to the blockchain ledger,
the transactions in that block cannot be modified by any node, since it would require
the node to rewrite all subsequent blocks. This makes blockchain systems immutable
and protected against double-spending attacks [6].
Cryptocurrencies have emerged as the first generation of blockchain technology.
Cryptocurrencies are digital currencies that are based on cryptographic techniques
and a peer-to-peer network. The first and most popular example of cryptocurrencies is
Bitcoin. Bitcoin [77] is an electronic payment system that allows non-trusting parties
to transact digital money with each other in a secure manner without going through a
middleman (e.g., a bank). However, Bitcoin has limited programming capabilities to
support complex transactions. Bitcoin, thus, does not support the creation of complex
distributed applications on top of it. Blockchain-based smart contract systems (e.g.,
Ethereum [25, 49], Hyperledger Fabric [13] and NEO [31]) have then emerged to
permit complex distributed applications through smart contracts. A smart contract
is basically a computer program that can be attached to the blockchain. It embraces
some contractual clauses and it is enforced by the consensus algorithm.
2.1.1 Characteristics and Taxonomy of Blockchain Systems
There are several characteristics or features that can be considered when designing
a new blockchain platform or when adopting an existing one. These characteristics
include, but not limited to, the following items:
• Network Permission. There are two types of blockchains in terms of network
permission, which are public and private [99]. In a public (permissionless)
blockchain, users or nodes do not need to be trusted or even known to each other.
That is, everyone can join the network, read the content of the blockchain, send
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a new transaction, write new blocks to the ledger or verify the correctness of
the blocks. This, however, comes at the cost of performance (low throughput
and high transactions latency), as the network can accept a high number of
non-trusted participants. The consensus algorithm (e.g., Proof-of-Work and
Proof-of-Stake) in public blockchains should be costly as the network opens for
everyone, including malicious writers (see Section 2.2.2). Examples of public
blockchains are Bitcoin, Zcash and Ethereum.
In a private (permissioned) blockchain, only users with permissions can join the
network, write or send transactions to the blockchain. A company or a group of
companies are usually responsible for giving users such grants before joining the
network. The consensus algorithm (e.g., Byzantine Fault Tolerance) in private
blockchains is often much more efficient as most of the participants in the system
are trusted. That is, private blockchains achieve better performance compared
to public blockchains. Examples of private blockchains are Hyperledger Fabric
and R3 Corda. The focus of this thesis will be on public blockchains.
• Consensus Protocol. The consensus protocol of blockchains plays a signifi-
cant role as it defines the rules that can be followed by the network’s nodes to
agree on one global blockchain state. It also resolves potential conflicts that may
occur due to network latency (see Section 2.2.2). There are many consensus pro-
tocols that have been proposed in the literature for both permisionless and per-
missioned blockchains, including Proof-of-Work (PoW), Proof-of-Stake (PoS),
Proof-of-Service, Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) and its variants, Proof of
Elapsed Time and other protocols. Among those protocols, PoW is currently
the most common protocol used in permissionless blockchains, while BFT is
common for permissioned blockchains. We refer to [21, 97] for more detail about
consensus protocols in blockchains.
• Cryptocurrency Support. A cryptocurrency is a form of digital or vir-
tual currency that uses strong cryptography to securely create new coins and
transfer their ownership. It usually works through a blockchain that runs on
a distributed peer-to-peer network to maintain transaction records without in-
volving a central authority. It is worth noting that not all blockchains consider
cryptocurrencies in their design, and not every cryptocurrency must operate on
a blockchain.
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• Smart Contract Support. Smart contracts are computer programs running
on the blockchain network to facilitate and enforce the agreement between par-
ticipants without the involvement of a trusted third party. Smart contracts
can be applied to various applications including Internet of Things (IoT). We
refer to Section 2.3 and Chapter 3 for more detail about smart contracts and
their applications. Ethereum is the most common permissionless platform for
smart contracts, while Hyperledger is a popular permissioned platform for smart
contracts.
• Privacy Support. Privacy and anonymity of transactions are desirable in
some domains that involve sensitive data. In most blockchain systems such
as Bitcoin and Ethereum, every node in the network is identified by a unique
address (i.e. a public key) instead of the real identity. However, this does not
really preserve the privacy of transactions as it is possible to link and trace
all transactions submitted by a node through inspecting the address of the
node [106]. There are some privacy-preserving blockchain platforms that were
particularly designed to make it infeasible to trace the sender and the recipient
of transactions as well as the amount of currencies to be transferred. Examples












Bitcoin Permissionless PoW Yes No No
Ethereum Permissionless PoW/PoS (Casper) Yes Yes No
Zcash Permissionless PoW Yes No Yes
Litecoin Permissionless PoW (Scrypt hash algorithm) Yes No No
Dash Permissionless PoW/Proof-of-Service Yes No Yes




RPCA Yes No No
Monero Permissionless PoW Yes No Yes
MultiChain Permissioned Round-Robin (mining diversity) No No No
Hyperledger Permissioned
Various protocols (e.g., Kafka,
BFT and Proof of Elapsed Time)
No Yes No
Table 2.1: Different blockchain platforms and their characteristics.
In the literature, there are a large number of proposed blockchain platforms, each
with its own characteristics and design decisions. For instance, some platforms are
designed specifically to support rich and complex smart contracts (e.g., Ethereum
and Hyperledger), while others are designed to preserve the privacy of users data
(e.g., Zcash and Monero). We list the most ten open-source popular blockchain
platforms [62] and their characteristics, as depicted in Table 2.1. We note that all
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these platforms support cryptocurrencies, apart from Hyperledger and MultiChain as
they are platforms for creating and deploying private blockchains.
Bitcoin. The first and most widely known permissionless blockchain platform
that is designed as a distributed cryptocurrency system without any central author-
ity. Bitcoin proposes PoW as its consensus protocol to reach a global blockchain state
in a non-trusted environment. PoW requires performing computationally expensive
computations to maintain the blockchain state, thus it is not an energy-efficient pro-
tocol. After the success of Bitcoin, many other alternative cryptocurrencies have been
proposed, some with other consensus protocols.
Ethereum. A permissionless blockchain platform that is mainly designed to
support the creation and the deployment of complex smart contracts on top of
blockchains. Ethereum currently adopts the PoW consensus protocol, aiming to
switch to PoS Casper [26] in future. This thesis mainly focuses on the Ethereum
blockchain, thus we provide more detail about it in Section 2.4.
Zcash. A permissionless blockchain platform that is designed to preserve the pri-
vacy of transactions. Zcash aims to add privacy and anonymity to transactions sub-
mitted in the network by using a zero-knowledge proof algorithm called zk-SNARK.
Data privacy is highly desirable in some domains with sensitive data such as health-
care. Similar to Bitcoin, Zcash uses the PoW consensus protocols.
Litecoin. A permissionless blockchain platform and a distributed cryptocurrency.
Litecoin is based on the Bitcoin software with some modifications. Compared to
Bitcoin, Litecoin provides fast transaction confirmation time (four times faster than
Bitcoin). In Litecoin a block of transactions is created every 2.5 minutes, instead of
every ten minutes as the case in Bitcoin. Litecoin uses the Bitcoin PoW protocol, but
with the “Scrypt” hash algorithm that can mitigate the mining centralisation issue
[62]. Litecoin can be of interest to domain applications that require fast processing
time for transactions and data in a permissionless network.
Dash. A permissionless blockchain platform that provides a privacy-preserving
cryptocurrency. Dash, similar to Bitcoin, uses the PoW protocol to secure the net-
work. It, however, improves the Bitcoin network by introducing an additional network
tier that is powered by a set of masternodes. Those masternodes assure the privacy of
transactions through “PrivateSend” and instant transaction validation through “In-
stantSend” [62]. Dash uses Proof-of-Service protocol to reward those masternodes for
their efforts. That is, Dash can be useful for domain applications that require both
privacy of transactions and fast transaction validation time.
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Peercoin. A permissionless blockchain platform that aims to eventually replace
the PoW protocol by a more energy efficient protocol such as PoS. The Bitcoin PoW
algorithm requires high energy consumption. Peercoin is the first platform that pro-
posed the use of PoS protocol, by combining it with the PoW protocol [97]. It proposes
a metric called “coinage” to determine the stake for nodes in the network [97].
Ripple. A permissionless, but controlled, blockchain platform that acts as a
cryptocurrency and a global settlement network for financial transactions. Ripple
uses the Ripple Protocol Consensus Algorithm (RPCA), a round-based protocol that
is executed by a number of selected validating servers. Since not every node can
become a validator, Ripple provides fast and instant payment and is considered as a
controlled permissionles network [62].
Monero. A permissionless blockchain platform and privacy-preserve cryptocur-
rency. It is based on the Cryptonote protocol that comes with a ring signature al-
gorithm (a kind of zero-knowledge proof) that hides the identity of both the sender
and the recipient of transactions [76]. Also, it adopts a stealth (one-time) address for
transactions, which means that every transaction submitted by a particular node is
signed by a different address [62]. This makes it hard to link and trace transactions
sent by a particular node. Monero currently uses the Bitcoin PoW algorithm. Similar
to Zcash and Dash, it is useful for domain applications where data confidentiality is
a requirement.
MultiChain. A blockchain platform that aims to provide certain features to
create and deploy permissioned blockchains either within or between organisations
[41]. MultiChain does not consider computationally intensive protocols such as PoW
since it operates in a private and controlled network. Instead, it implements a round-
robin consensus protocol that identifies a set of miners in the network and controls
the number of blocks contributed by a miner in a particular time window through a
parameter called mining diversity [41].
Hyperledger. An open-source collaborative project that aims to advance per-
missioned blockchains. It aims to provide an infrastructure of different modules (i.e.,
smart contract engines) and tools for developing blockchain platforms. Different per-
missioned blockchain systems have been implemented as variants of the Hyperledger
project, including Fabric, Iroha, Sawtooth and Indy. Each of these variants has its
own design and consensus protocol. Fabric, which is the first extensible blockchain
system for running smart contracts, uses a consensus protocol named Kafka [13].
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2.1.2 How Do Blockchains Work?
Blockchain systems rely on a peer-to-peer network, where each node in the network
is connected to several different peers. Nodes are responsible for maintaining the
blockchain ledger by continuously appending new blocks, and they are often referred























Figure 2.1: The working mechanism of blockchain systems.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the working mechanism of blockchain systems. Users, aka
nodes, can create a transaction and then propagate it to the blockchain network.
In the blockchain network, a set of miners are responsible for maintaining the
ledger by continuously appending new blocks of transactions. Every miner maintains a
transaction pool to keep pending transactions (uncommitted transactions) submitted
by nodes in the network. To generate and attach a new block to the ledger, miners
first select and execute a number of pending transactions from their pools and then
include them in the block by participating in a consensus algorithm such as PoW. The
generated block will then be propagated to other nodes in the network. The process
of appending new blocks is usually referred to as the mining process. Upon receiving
the newly generated block, every node has to verify the block before adding it to its
local copy of the blockchain. Verifying a block requires checking the correctness of
the block construction (e.g., PoW verification) as well as verifying all transactions
embedded in the block by executing them. This is to verify the miner’s work, and it
is often referred to as the verification process.
If the majority of the nodes in the network accepted the block, appended it to their
local blockchain copies and built upon it, the block will be confirmed and considered
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Consensus Layer
( Consensus protocol (e.g., PoW, PoS etc), transactions execution,
block generation and reception, fork resolution, ...)
Network Layer
( Nodes, network configurations, information to be propagated (e.g.,
transactions and blocks), P2P broadcast protocol, ...)
Incentives Layer
( Incentive model, rewarded elements (e.g., blocks and transactions),
amounts of rewards, reward distribution, ...)
Figure 2.2: Blockchain System Layers.
as part of the global blockchain ledger. The miner that created the block will then
receive some reward for its efforts.
2.2 Blockchain Layers
In this section, we present three layers of blockchain systems, namely, network, con-
sensus and incentives, as depicted in Figure 2.2. We will utilise these layers to struc-
ture our simulator in Chapter 4. The network layer captures the network’s nodes
and the underlying broadcast protocol to propagate information between nodes. The
consensus layer captures the algorithms and rules adopted to reach an agreement
about the current state of the blockchain ledger. The incentives layer captures the
economic mechanisms adopted by a blockchain to issue and distribute rewards among
the participating nodes.
Before going through these layers in more detail, we list and briefly define the
main entities at each layer and the relationship among them. In the network layer,
there are two entities, which are Node and Broadcast protocol. The Node entity is the
main entity in any blockchain whose role is to participate in the network by creating
and submitting new transactions and to maintain the blockchain state by executing
transactions and attaching new blocks to the blockchain ledger through engaging in
a consensus algorithm. The Broadcast protocol entity is responsible for managing the
propagation of information entities (Blocks and Transactions) in the network.
In the consensus layer, there are information entities (Blocks and Transactions)
and blockchain state entities (Blockchain ledger and Transaction pool). The consensus
entities are all maintained by the network nodes. For example, nodes are responsible
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for creating transactions and blocks as well as expanding the ledger and the pool every
time a new block or transaction arrives in the network. Blocks and transactions play
a significant role in updating the blockchain state as follows. The arrival of a new
transaction results in updating the system state by inserting the transaction into
the transaction pool in order for the nodes to execute it in their forthcoming block.
Similarly, the arrival of a new block results in updating the system state by attaching
the block to the blockchain ledger.
The incentives layer has the reward entity. In blockchain systems that offer in-
centives, nodes which maintain the system state by attaching new blocks to the
blockchain ledger are rewarded for their efforts. The rewarded elements (e.g., blocks
and transactions), as well as the calculation and the distribution of such rewards, are
the actions that the incentive model determines.
2.2.1 Network Layer
The network layer in blockchain systems contains the nodes in the network, their
geographical and relative locations and the connectivity among them. It defines
which information is to be propagated as well as the mechanism to propagate such
information.
The main constituent in the network layer is a node. A node can be an ordinary
user who wants to create and submit a transaction to be executed and included
in the ledger or a special node, known as miner, who maintains and expands the
ledger by appending new blocks. A node has a unique identifier and maintains its
balance, a local copy of the blockchain ledger and, if the node is a miner, an individual
transaction pool. The transaction pool keeps the pending transactions received from
other nodes in the network.
Nodes communicate the following information to each other. If a node generates
a new transaction, it cryptographically signs it and propagates it to its peers to have
it confirmed and recorded in the blockchain ledger. In case the node is a miner, every
time it generates a block, it notifies its peers so they can validate it and append it to
their copies of the ledger.
As information propagation mechanisms for blockchains, several protocols have
been proposed, including relay networks and advertisement-based protocols [50]. In
the advertisement-based protocol used in most blockchains [50], the node sends a
notification to its peers about the new data (e.g., a transaction). If the recipient node
responds by requesting the data, the node will send it. Otherwise, the node will not
send it as the recipient node has already had the data.
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2.2.2 Consensus Layer
The consensus layer in blockchain systems defines the algorithms and rules for reach-
ing an agreement about the blockchain’s state among the network’s nodes. Such
rules specify which node is eligible for generating and appending the next block to
the blockchain ledger, how often blocks are generated as well as how to resolve po-
tential conflicts that may occur when nodes have multiple, differing copies of the
ledger.
There are several consensus algorithms such as Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-
of-Stake (PoS) that have been proposed for blockchain systems. In PoW, nodes (i.e.,
miners) invest their computing power to maintain the ledger by attaching new blocks,
while in PoS, nodes invest their stake or money. Regardless of what is required to be
invested by the nodes, the intuition behind such algorithms is to introduce a cost for
maintaining the ledger. The cost introduced should be more than enough to deter
nodes from behaving maliciously [97]. At the same time, nodes are only rewarded for
their efforts if they follow the rules and maintain the ledger honestly (see Incentives
Layer).
To illustrate the consensus layer, we discuss the PoW algorithm here as it is
the most common algorithm for permissionless blockchains, used by Bitcoin and
Ethereum. In PoW, the computing power invested by a miner determines how fre-
quently that miner will generate and append blocks to the blockchain ledger. To
generate a block, the miner has to repeatedly try nonces (random numbers) until
the hash of the nonce combined with the block information will be within a certain
threshold (referred to as the block difficulty). The only way to find the nonce is by
trial-and-error, and thus, the more hash power invested by a miner, the more likely
that miner will find the nonce. This process is a competitive task since all miners
in the network are competing against each other to find the desirable hash value of
the next block. Note that the block difficulty can be dynamically adjusted to control
how often blocks are generated.
Due to the delay incurred by propagating blocks between nodes in the network (see
Network Layer), other nodes might generate the next block before hearing of another
competitive block that has been recently announced. This leads to conflicts, known
as forks, which occur when nodes have multiple, differing views of the ledger. The
task of the consensus layer in blockchain systems is to resolve such conflicts. Different
consensus algorithms use different rules to select which blockchain (fork) should be
accepted as the global chain. For example, the PoW algorithm used by Bitcoin and
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Figure 2.3: The longest-chain rule for fork resolution. Blocks 2b, 3b and 4b are
discarded as stale blocks.
proposals such as GHOST [90] select the fork with the heaviest work. Blocks that
are not considered in the global chain (represented by a grey background colour in
Figure 2.3) will be discarded. These blocks are usually referred to as stale (orphan)
blocks, and they do not contribute to the state of the ledger.
2.2.3 Incentives Layer
The incentives layer utilises the blockchain’s cryptocurrency to establish an incentive
structure, distributing rewards among the participating miners who maintain the
blockchain’s ledger. The incentive model is essential to maintain any permissionless
blockchain system. Incentives should compensate miners fairly for their work and
motivate them to behave honestly [3, 5]. The incentives also protect the blockchain
system from various attacks (e.g., DDoS attacks in Ethereum [24]) and against mali-
cious behaviours of the nodes (e.g., selfish mining strategies [44]).
In most blockchain systems, rewards are associated with generating blocks and
completing transactions, called block reward and transaction fees, respectively. De-
pending on the chain, there are subtle differences in what is rewarded, e.g., Ethereum
also issues a reward for stale (or uncle) blocks, even if they do not make it into the
blockchain when conflicts are resolved. When a miner receives a reward (e.g., through
appending a new block to the ledger), its balance will increase accordingly. The block
reward, in all known blockchains, is set to a fixed amount, while the transaction fee
is calculated as a variable amount of cryptocurrencies, depending on effort as well as

















Figure 2.4: Smart contract system [36].
2.3 Smart Contracts
The theoretical concept of smart contracts was first introduced by Szabo in 1994 [93]
as “a computerised transaction protocol that executes the terms of a contract”. Szabo
proposed translating contractual clauses into computer code that can be self-enforced,
without the involvement of trusted intermediaries. This concept became a practical
reality with the evolution of blockchain technology. Within the blockchain context,
a smart contract is a computer program stored on the blockchain. A smart contract
acts as a trusted third party between non-trusting participants, and it consists of
contract storage, a balance, and program code, as depicted in Figure 2.4. It can
be created and made available for use by any node in the network, simply through
posting a transaction to the blockchain. Smart contract program code is fixed and
cannot be updated once included in the blockchain.
Smart contracts are run by a network of miners who are responsible for maintain-
ing the blockchain. Miners reach consensus on the execution outcome of the smart
contract and accordingly update the blockchain. Once deployed, each smart contract
is assigned to a unique address and is executed whenever a transaction is created
using this address. During the execution of the smart contract, its storage might be
updated (i.e., reading from or writing to the storage). Also, a smart contract can
exchange cryptocurrency between users. Moreover, a smart contract can invoke and
create another smart contract by posting a message, which is not recorded in the
blockchain. This message is used by smart contracts either for creating a new smart
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contract or for calling functions in other smart contracts.
There are two types of smart contracts, namely, deterministic and non-deterministic
smart contracts [30]. A deterministic smart contract is a smart contract that when
it is run, it does not require any information from an external party (from outside
the blockchain). A non-deterministic smart contract is a contract that depends on
information (called oracles or data feeds) from an external party such as the current
weather information, which is not available on the blockchain.
Smart Contract Platforms. Smart contracts can be developed and deployed in
different blockchain platforms (e.g., Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric). Different
platforms offer different features for developing smart contracts. Here, we will only
focus on three platforms, which are Bitcoin, Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric.
Bitcoin [77] is a public blockchain platform that uses a stack-based bytecode
scripting language that is very limited in terms of computing capability [67]. Bit-
coin scripting language cannot support the creation of complex smart contracts that
contain rich logic. For instance, writing a contract that supports loops or withdrawal
limits is not feasible in Bitcoin due to the limitations of its scripting language [25].
Ethereum [25, 49] is also a public blockchain platform that addresses the limita-
tions of the Bitcoin’s scripting language by leveraging a Turing-complete language
that can support complex applications based on smart contracts on the blockchain
(see Section 2.4 for more details).
Bitcoin and Ethereum have scalability challenges in that at most tens to hun-
dreds transaction per second can be processed. Hyperledger Fabric [13] is a private
blockchain that seeks to overcome these challenges. Hyperledger Fabric employs a
traditional Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocol, instead of the Proof-of-Work
protocol used in public blockchains. Hyperledger’s smart contract technology is called
chaincode. It consists of the code that is deployed and executed on the blockchain,
the state database (key/value store) and the mining (endorsement) policies.
Smart Contract Applications. There is a multitude of blockchain-based smart
contract applications in the literature. According to the survey presented in Chapter
3, research on smart contract applications accounts for 64% of all scientific papers
published about smart contracts. Smart contracts have been applied to various do-
mains and topics that rely on a trusted third party, including Internet of Things,












































Figure 2.5: Examples of all different types Ethereum transactions.
other applications. In Chapter 3, we present the survey we conducted to explore
smart contract topics, with a detailed discussion about smart contract applications.
2.4 Ethereum
Ethereum is the second most popular public blockchain after Bitcoin. The currency of
Ethereum is referred to as Ether. Ethereum supports advanced and customised smart
contracts with the help of a Turing-complete programming language. Ethereum smart
contracts are run within the Ethereum Virtual Machine. Using Ethereum, distributed
applications can be developed using different high-level programming languages such
as Vyper and Solidity.
In this section, we discuss different aspects of the Ethereum blockchain such as
accounts, transactions, blockchains and incentive model. We mainly focus on the
aspects that are relevant to the work described in this thesis.
Ethereum account. There are two types of accounts (users), namely, externally
owned accounts (EOAs) and contract accounts. Each account has a unique 160-bits
address to be called at as well as a balance. Unlike EOAs, contract accounts have
some associated code and a storage space additionally. Different accounts can interact
with each other through transactions.
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Ethereum transactions. Transactions play an important role in updating the
blockchain’s state. In Ethereum, transactions are executed in sequence. That means
the final blockchain state depends on the order of the transactions. There are two
types of transactions, namely, transfer and contract transactions. The former is to
move Ether (the Ethereum cryptocurrency) between accounts, while the latter is to
either publish a new smart contract to the blockchain or to invoke an existing one.
To publish a new contract, a contract-creation transaction containing the creation
bytecode for the contract is submitted to the blockchain. Once the transaction is
executed, the contract will be deployed and a unique address will be assigned to it.
To invoke that contract, a contract-execution transaction attaching appropriate input
data is sent to the contract’s address. The input data is the contract’s function to be
executed and its arguments.
Transactions in Ethereum consist of different fields or attributes, which are nonce,
Gas Price, Gas Limit, from, to, value, and data [49], as depicted in Figure 2.5. We
briefly explain these attributes as follows:
• Nonce: A counter that represents the number of transactions submitted by an
account. That is, the nonce is increased by one every time the account sends a
transaction.
• Gas Price: The amount of money (in Ether) the originator of the transaction
is willing to pay for each gas unit consumed by the transaction.
• Gas Limit: The maximum amount of gas units the transaction can consume,
and it is set by the submitter of the transaction.
• From: The submitter address of the transaction.
• To: The recipient address of the transaction. This attribute is set to empty for
contract-creation transactions.
• Value: The amount of currency to be transferred between accounts.
• Data: The creation bytecode or the input data to create a new contract or to
invoke an existing one, respectively. Thus, the data field is only applicable for
contract transactions, and it remains empty for financial transactions.




















Figure 2.6: Ethereum’s uncle inclusion mechanism. Blocks 2b, 3b and 4b are included
in future blocks (Block 3-5) as uncle blocks.
responsible for handling the execution of smart contract transactions (both contract-
creation and contract-execution) [49]. Every node in the Ethereum blockchain has
a copy of the EVM to run contracts independently from other nodes. The EVM
consists of a predefined set of instructions, referred to as opcodes. These opcodes
run on the EVM in sequence. Every opcode the EVM runs has an associated cost,
measured in a unit called Gas. The Gas mechanism will be discussed later on in this
section. Note that a smart contract consists of a number of opcodes.
The Ethereum Virtual Machine has been implemented in different programming
languages such as Python, Parity and Go. In this thesis, we utilised the Python client
to measure the execution time of smart contracts, as we will discuss in Chapter 5.
Ethereum Proof-of-Work (PoW) Algorithm. At the consensus level, Ethereum
uses the PoW algorithm with the longest-chain rule to resolve potential forks that
may occur due to the network propagation delays (see Section 2.2.2).
Ethereum differs from other blockchains such as Bitcoin in the way that stale
blocks can be referenced in future blocks and rewarded for. A stale block that is
referenced in a block is referred to as an uncle block. Transactions embraced in the
uncle block will be neglected, and they do not contribute to the blockchain’s state.
We refer to the process of including uncle blocks in a block as the uncle inclusion
mechanism. In Ethereum, a maximum of two uncle blocks can be included in a single
block. Figure 2.6 shows the uncle inclusion mechanism. Three stale blocks (2b, 3b
and 4b) have been referenced in blocks 3-5 as uncle blocks.
Ethereum blockchain. An ordered list of blocks. Each block has a header, a list of
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transactions and a list of a maximum of two uncle blocks. The block header contains
information relevant to the block such as the hash of the previous block, the block’s
timestamp, block index, block Gas Limit and other fields.
Ethereum incentive model. Ethereum has a built-in incentive model that rewards
miners for maintaining and expanding the blockchain ledger. There are three types
of rewards in Ethereum, which are block reward, block’s transactions fees and uncle
rewards. The block reward is a fixed amount of Ether (currently, 2 Ether) for each
new block. The block’s transactions fees are the fees associated with all transactions
included in the block. The fee for a transaction varies depending on the computational
efforts required to execute the transaction. The uncle rewards are a fraction of rewards
for generating and including a new block that turns into a stale (orphan) block [49].
Ethereum uses the Gas mechanism to calculate the fee for smart contract transac-
tions. Since Ethereum offers a Turing-complete language, users can write a complex
contract that might take a long time to be executed. Ethereum, thus, proposes the
gas mechanism to limit the possible computation. The intuition behind this mech-
anism is not only to restrict the computation but also to provide fair incentives for
miners.
Every opcode of a smart contract has a predefined gas cost, as specified in [49]. The
gas cost for an opcode is determined by the Ethereum foundation, and it depends
on the computational resources required to execute the opcode on the EVM. For
instance, ADD opcode costs three units of gas.
As we discussed earlier, a smart contract can both be published and executed via
a transaction. During the execution of a contract transaction, the EVM tallies the
amount of Used Gas and charges the submitter of the transaction based on the Used
Gas. To avoid non-terminating transactions, the submitter specifies a Gas Limit, and
the EMV stops processing if that limit is reached (in which case Used Gas = Gas
Limit). The submitter also specifies a Gas Price (expressed in Ether) and the miner
then charges the submitter the following transaction fee: Used Gas × Gas Price. The
more opcodes the transaction requires, the more computational effort from the miner,
but also the higher the received reward.
It is crucial to ensure that the Ethereum incentive model is fair in order to keep
miners well-motivated to participate and to maintain the blockchain ledger honestly
[1, 5]. Otherwise, miners may prefer to deviate from the desired behaviour. One issue
of Ethereum and some other blockchains is that there are no miner incentives for
verifying the recipient blocks. As a result, miners might be encouraged to avoid the
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verification process, especially if it tends to be computationally intensive, in favour
of maximising their revenues, as we will discuss in Chapter 6.
2.5 Modelling and Simulation
Modelling is the method of producing an abstract model that represents a real
system of interest, either existing or in design. A system model provides a close
approximation of the system it represents by integrating most of its features while
at the same time is much simpler than the real system. That is, an excellent model
should consider the trade-off between simplicity and realism. A common practice
when developing a model is to start with a simple one and then gradually increase
the complexity of the model. Generally, a model usually comprises mathematical
expressions as well as structural and logical relationships to describe the dynamics of
the system [12].
A system model can be classified as deterministic or stochastic; static or dynamic,
as depicted in Figure 2.7 [65]. A stochastic model contains one or more random
variables or components (e.g., random inter-arrival times for customers in a bank),
while a deterministic model has only fixed variables. A dynamic model represents the
evolution of a system over time (e.g., a manufacturing model), while a static model
represents a system at a specific time. In a static model, therefore, the time is not
a significant variable as opposed to a dynamic model. A dynamic model can further
be classified as continuous or discrete. In a discrete model, the system state variables
change at discrete points in time (not in a continuous manner). An example of a
discrete model is the withdrawal service at a bank.
Simulation is a quantitative method, which ‘executes’ the model to mimic the be-
haviour of the system [12]. It is quite often that experimentation with a real system
is not feasible, impractical or very expensive [72]. Simulation, however, allows ex-
perimentation with a model without having to interrupt the real system (if it exists)
or implementing a new system for that purpose. With simulation, it is possible to
explore different design trade-offs and configuration questions for the system at hand
in a timely manner. Simulation can also be used to predict and describe how different
conditions and scenarios impact the behaviour of the system. Thus, simulation can be
used to answer “What if” questions and to experiment with new designs and policies








Figure 2.7: The taxonomy of the system model [65].
In general, simulations are a useful tool that can be utilised to study the per-
formance of a system (either existing or proposed one) under a variety of design
configurations as well as over a long period of time. Simulation is used before build-
ing a new system or changing an existing one. This is to eliminate potential failures,
avoid unseen problems and bottlenecks and to improve the performance of the system
[72].
Simulation can be classified into two categories, namely, discrete-event simula-
tion and continuous-event simulation [52]. A discrete-event simulation model is both
dynamic and stochastic in which the state variables change at discrete moments in
time. Human-made systems such as digital computer and information systems are
most suitable represented as discrete-event simulation. The focus of this thesis is on
discrete-event simulation. In Chapter 4, for instance, we propose a simulator tool
named BlockSim that is based on a discrete-event simulation approach.
There are two approaches to develop simulation models and tools, namely, general-
purpose programming languages (e.g., C++, Java or Python) and special-purpose
simulation languages (e.g., Arena and GPSS) [65]. The former is more flexible and
familiar, while the latter provides several built-in features (e.g., statistics, event sched-
uler and animation) that reduce the time required to build models. As stated in [65],
there is a debate and conflict about which method is preferable. Also worth noting
are simulation frameworks that enable developing simulation models using general-
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purpose languages, for instance, OMNeT++ and SimPy for developing models in
C++ and Python. We select Python as a general-purpose programming language to
develop and implement the BlockSim simulator (see Chapter 4).
2.6 Discrete-event Simulation
A discrete-event simulation (DES) is meant to model the action of a system as a series
of events that occur at discrete instants in time. The occurrence of an event triggers
an alteration to the system state [20, 88]. The system state remains unchanged
between consecutive events.
In a discrete-event simulation, there are two time-advancing mechanisms, which
are next-event and fixed-increment [65]. In a next-event approach, after executing
an event, we move the simulation time to the time of the next scheduled event. In
a fixed-increment approach, however, we split the simulation time into several small
intervals. Events scheduled in a particular interval are then executed together and
the system state is changed accordingly. A next-event simulation is typically more
efficient as it runs faster than a fixed-increment simulation. This is because not every
time interval has to be simulated as some intervals have no events to occur [73].
Here, we further discuss how a next-event discrete-event simulation works, since
it is the focal approach used in this thesis. Before explaining and discussing how
it works, we briefly identify the major concepts and terminologies, which are: (1)
system state, (2) simulation clock, (3) events, (4) event list and (5) event scheduling
[65].
• System state: A system consists of several entities (e.g., customers and ma-
chines) that interact with each other over some time to achieve some goals. The
state of a system is a set of variables (e.g., the length of the waiting queue) that
maintain the necessary information required to describe the system at a par-
ticular point in time. The system state variables are updated as the simulated
time evolves, for instance, after the occurrence of an event.
• Simulation clock: A variable that represents the current value of the simu-
lated time, and it can be in any suitable measurement unit (e.g., seconds or
minutes). The value of the simulated time is usually set to zero before running
the simulator. Since discrete-event simulations are dynamic (the system state
evolves over time), it is essential to record (keep track of) the current simulation
time.
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• Events: An event is an occurrence whose execution results in a change in some
system state variables. An example of an event is the arrival of a new customer.
Every event has an associated event time (the time at which the event occurs),
an event type as well as any other necessary information required to execute
the event. The occurrence of an event is often instantaneous, and it requires
performing the actions or activities associated with the event. Such actions
depend on the type of event.
• Event list: The simulation maintains a list of future (pending) events that
are waiting to be executed, known as the future event list (FEL). The list is
continuously updated during the simulation by either inserting new events or
removing existing ones. The list is usually organised as a priority queue where
events are sorted based on their associated event time. In spite of the order in
which events are added to the list, the event with the earliest time will always
be executed first.
• Event scheduling: The process of scheduling and recording new (future)
events in the event list. At the start of the simulation model, we usually sched-
ule some initial events to start with as the event list is empty by default. As
the simulation progresses, new events can be scheduled and added to the list.
A next-event discrete-event simulation works as follows. At the start of the sim-
ulation model, we initiate the simulation clock to zero as well as schedule and add
some initial events to the list to start with, as we mentioned earlier. We then scan
the event list to determine and select the event with the imminent or earliest time.
We advance the simulation clock to the scheduled time of the event. We perform
the actions associated with the event, and as a result, we update the system state.
The execution of an event may result in inserting new events into the event list or
cancelling some existing ones. After executing the event, the event is removed from
the list. Then, we select the next event and follow the same procedures until some
terminal conditions are satisfied. The terminal conditions can be set as the end of the
simulation when the list is empty (no more events), exceeding a specific simulation
time or after processing a number of events [65]. Once the terminal conditions have
been met, we end the simulation and prepare the statistics of the final output of the
simulation.
Because the system state variables only change at the event time, we move the
simulation clock to the time of the next event to ignore periods when the system is
inactive. This is what makes next-event simulations an appealing approach.
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2.7 Steps of a Simulation Study
The methodology for conducting and designing a simulation study consists of different
steps [19], as illustrated in Figure 2.8.
• Problem formulation and setting objectives: The first step of a simulation
study is to define and describe the problem to be studied. It is essential that
the problem is well-defined and understood by the participants involved in the
study. Also, this step identifies the aim, research questions and objectives of
the study.
• Model conceptualisation: This step involves designing a simulation model
that represents and abstracts the real system. The inputs, outputs and contents
of the model should be clearly defined. Also, all assumptions and simplifications
about the model need to be stated. The model should also incorporate all math-
ematical expressions and logical relationships that describe how to calculate the
desired output values from the given input values. The complexity of the model
usually depends on the scope and aim of the study. That is, the model should
not contain details more than what is needed to achieve the objectives of the
simulation study.
• Data collection: This step is to gather and collect the data needed to feed the
model. The data can be directly collected (if available) from an existing running
system (e.g., real historical data). In some cases, the data should be obtained
by observing the system or by running some controlled experiments. Data is
often fitted to theoretical distributions such as an exponential distribution, and
then random values are drawn from such distributions during the simulation.
This step can be executed in parallel with the model conceptualisation step
since they are independent of each other.
• Model implementation: This step is to translate the conceptual model into
a simulation program. To achieve this task, the modeller or developer should
decide on whether to use special-purpose simulation languages (e.g., GPSS) or
general-purpose programming languages (e.g., Java), see Section 2.5. The de-
veloper is recommended to start with implementing a portion of the model and

















Figure 2.8: Steps of a simulation study (reproduced after [19]).
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• Verification: This step is to ensure that the conceptual model is correctly
implemented. That is, the verification step is a debugging task that mainly
ensures the simulation program is error-free and can deliver what the model is
intended to do. There are various verification techniques in the literature such as
the continuity test and degeneracy test [55]. In a continuity test, the simulation
program is run multiple times using different values for input parameters. This
is to check if the change in the outcomes is reasonable. A degeneracy test checks
for extreme values for input parameters to identify bugs that have not been
thought of. Additionally, it could be useful to run simplified cases (e.g., with a
short simulation run or a few number of nodes in a network simulator) and then
compare the simulation results with that of the analysis. Often, the verification
process is carried out after implementing each portion of the model to detect
and fix errors in the early stages. Once the whole model is implemented, the
simulation program needs also be verified.
• Validation: This step is to ensure that the model represents the real system
accurately. That is, the simulation program can produce results comparable to
that of the real system. A model can be validated against real-system measure-
ments and theoretical results, where possible [55]. Three aspects of the model
have to be validated, which are the model’s assumptions, the values for input
parameters and output values. If the model is invalid, the modeller should revise
both the model design, the model assumptions and the data collection exercise.
One can start the validation process in conjunction with the model conceptual-
isation step and continue until the model has been successfully translated into
a simulation program.
• Experimental Design and production runs: This step is to design and
run the simulation study. This involves defining the conditions, procedures and
scenarios to be run. Besides, several parameters have to be determined such
as the length and the number of replications per simulation run. Furthermore,
identifying the input factors to include, how those factors can be varied and
whether to use the same or different numbers across different configurations.
• Documentation and Reporting: This step is to analyse, document and
report the simulations results. The results of the study are analysed using
statistical methods (e.g., mean, standard deviation and confidence interval).
The results are then documented, and conclusions about these results will be
drawn.
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The above-mentioned steps are essential for any simulation study. We apply these
steps for the simulation studies conducted in this thesis (see Chapters 6 and 7).
2.8 Related Work
In this section, we first discuss some of the literature conducted on performance
evaluation of both public and private blockchains. Then, we discuss current research
on blockchain simulation models and tools. Finally, we present existing research on
performance evaluation of the Ethereum blockchain, with regard to the Verifier’s
Dilemma and the profit uncertainty problems.
2.8.1 Performance Evaluation of Blockchains
In this section, we survey works on performance measurements, tools and analysis for
both public and private blockchains.
Performance Evaluation of Public Blockchains. Aldweesh et al. [2] pro-
pose a performance benchmark framework named OpBench for Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM) that evaluates the CPU usage required to execute the Ethereum
smart contract operation codes. Its main purpose is to assess and compare the CPU
usage with the gas cost for individual operation codes. It currently supports three
different implementations of the Ethereum Virtual Machine, namely, PyEThAPP,
Go-Ethereum and Parity. Decker and Wattenhofer [35] conduct a performance mea-
surement study on the Bitcoin network to collect data about block propagation delay
and block stale rate by listening to 10000 blocks. Also, they propose a simplified
model that estimates the block stale rate by considering the block creation rate and
the block propagation delay. In [58], the authors use queuing theory to model the
transaction priority mechanism in order to analyse and evaluate transactions latency
in the Bitcoin network. Croman et al. [32] analyse the factors that contribute to
performance bottlenecks in the Bitcoin network. Their results suggest changing two
performance parameters, namely, block size and block creation rate as a first step
towards scaling the Bitcoin network. Gervais et al. [50] analyse the performance of
PoW blockchains under various network parameters (e.g., block size, block arrival
time and propagation mechanism). Papadis et al. [82] propose stochastic models to
evaluate the performance of PoW blockchains. In particular, they analyse the impact
of block propagation delay and the hash power of the nodes on the block creation rate
and block stale rate, using a combination of analytical calculations and simulation
experiments. Yasaweerasinghelage et al. [102] demonstrate the usage of architectural
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performance modelling to predict the latency of blockchain-based systems. Eyal et
al. [43] propose a new protocol named Bitcoin-NG (Next Generation) that aims to
improve the performance of the Bitcoin network.
Performance Evaluation of Private Blockchains. Dinh et al. [39] propose
a benchmark framework named BLOCKBENCH to evaluate and analyse the perfor-
mance of private blockchains such as Hyperledger Fabric, Parity and private Ethereum
environment. BLOCKBENCH aims to measure and assess the overall performance
with regard to latency, throughput, fault-tolerance and scalability through the usage
of a set of micro and macro benchmarks. Hyperledger Caliper [27] is another bench-
mark tool for evaluating the performance of all Hyperledger blockchain variations
such as Sawtooth, Burrow and Fabric. Currently, Hyperledger Caliper supports four
performance metrics: throughput, latency, success rate for transactions and resource
utilisation.
Thakkar et al. [95] conduct an extensive empirical study to evaluate the per-
formance of Hyperledger Fabric blockchain with regard to throughput and latency,
by varying five different performance parameters: block size, number of channels,
resource allocation, endorsement policy and ledger database. Their analysis results
identify several performance bottlenecks and show how to configure these parameters
better. Similarly, Kuzlu et al. [63] evaluate the impact of different network workloads
on the performance of the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain in terms of throughput, la-
tency and scalability. Ampel et al. [11] evaluate the performance of Hyperledger
Sawtooth blockchain using the Hyperledger Caliper benchmarking tool. They test
different parameters such as transaction creation rate, batch size, throughput, la-
tency and resource usage in order to identify performance bottlenecks.
2.8.2 Simulation Models and Tools for Blockchains
In this section, we discuss current research on simulation models and tools for blockchain
systems. This includes the limitations of existing studies and how the BlockSim sim-
ulation tool that we propose in this thesis (see Chapter 4) seeks to address them.
In the literature, there are some attempts to utilise simulation models to eval-
uate various aspects of blockchain systems. In [102], the authors use architectural
modelling and simulation to measure the latency in blockchain systems under differ-
ent configurations. In [7], the authors propose a simulation model to investigate the
impact of profit uncertainty in the Ethereum blockchain. They found that miners
in Ethereum are not able to make informed decisions about which transactions to
include in their blocks to maximise their revenue. In [78], the authors propose a
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simulation model to analyse and evaluate attacks on the Bitcoin network. In [51],
the authors use discrete-event simulation to study the behaviour of Bitcoin miners
(including selfish-mining strategies) when there is a delay in propagating information
among miners.
Besides these proposals, there are some blockchain simulators proposed in the
literature. In [50], the authors propose a Bitcoin simulator to analyse the security
and performance of different configurations in both the consensus and network layers.
Several other Bitcoin-like network simulators are proposed in the literature such as
[16, 75, 91]. However, these proposals utilise simulation-based models to study specific
aspects of blockchain systems. They neither cross different layers nor cover all com-
mon functional building blocks (e.g., blocks and transactions) for blockchain systems.
For instance, neither of these proposals model transactions in the blockchain system
nor capture the incentives layer in more detail.
In Chapter 4 of this thesis we propose and develop BlockSim as a general-purpose,
widely usable, simulation tool for blockchains, to assist in answering a variety of de-
sign and deployment questions. Our discrete-event simulator generalises on the ones
proposed in the related literature by integrating different layers of the blockchain sys-
tem to gain a more comprehensive insight into different aspects such as performance,
security and incentives. In BlockSim, for instance, we take a step further by consid-
ering the functional blocks common across the different implementation of blockchain
systems. We design and structure BlockSim to cross different layers of blockchains.
Furthermore, we model transactions in two different ways, each of which for specific
purposes as well as modelling both Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains.
2.8.3 Performance Evaluation of the Ethereum Blockchain.
In this section, we discuss existing research on performance evaluation of the Ethereum
blockchain, with respect to the Verifier’s Dilemma and the profit uncertainty prob-
lems. We highlight the gaps in current research and discuss how our work presented
in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis aims to addresses these gaps with the help of our
proposed simulator.
Verifier’s Dilemma (Chapter 6). The Verifier’s Dilemma was first identified
by Luu et al. [71], who showed that rational miners would be motivated to skip
the verification process to gain an advantage in the race to mine the next blocks.
Related to this idea is the mining strategy proposed in [85], whereby a malicious miner
purposely designs smart contracts that are computationally expensive to verify, to
slow down other miners. In response, [71, 85] showed the profitability of skipping the
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verification process in scenarios in which computationally intensive smart contracts
were introduced.
This work left several unanswered questions. In particular, it was not known if
the above attack was practical, nor was it clear how different miners with different
hash powers might benefit from not verifying blocks. In Chapter 6 of this thesis,
we address these limitations by evaluating the implications of the Verifer’s Dilemma
using real Ethereum smart contracts transactions. In addition, we assess both current
and future settings of Ethereum, taking into consideration the hash power of miners.
Several solutions in the literature have been proposed to make the verification of
complex transactions a more efficient task in order to avoid the Verifier’s Dilemma. In
[71], the authors proposed a solution in which complex transactions are divided into
various smaller transactions that can be incorporated in various blocks. In [15, 38,
104], the authors proposed solutions for executing and verifying smart contracts in
parallel. They showed that such solutions could speed up the execution/verification
time of contracts compared to that of a sequential solution. In addition, several
off-chain solutions (e.g., YODA [34] and Arbitrum [57], TrueBit [94]) for efficient
computation of computationally expensive smart contracts have been proposed as an
alternative to the protocol used in Ethereum. In these solutions, only a small set
of nodes, instead of all nodes, has to perform the verification of complex contracts.
Those nodes will be rewarded if they perform the verification correctly, or otherwise,
a penalty will be imposed.
In [15, 38, 104], however, the authors did not investigate the parallel verification of
smart contracts as a mitigation solution to the implications of the Verifier’s Dilemma.
In Chapter 6, we propose and evaluate the parallel verification as a solution to reduce
the advantage miners would get from not verifying. Besides, we propose and evaluate
the intentional production of invalid blocks as a new solution to punish non-verifying
miners. We were inspired by the idea of injecting invalid blocks in the network from
[94].
Profit Uncertainty (Chapter 7). Ethereum uses the Gas mechanism to set the
fee for transactions. Yet, the effectiveness of this mechanism depends on whether the
gas cost for each operation code (opcode) is correctly aligned with the computational
cost.
Several studies in the literature have assessed the incentive compatibility of the
Ethereum Gas mechanism by evaluating the alignment of the received fee with the
observed resource usage. At the opcode level, the authors in [1, 2] proposed OpBench
system that assesses the alignment of the gas cost for every opcode with its CPU usage
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and found that some opcodes were mispriced. Similarly, the authors in [29, 83, 101]
found significant inconsistencies for opcodes prices and showed a weak correlation
between the gas costs and the CPU and memory usage for individual opcodes. At
the transaction level, the authors in [3, 10] compared the fee awarded (in terms of
Used Gas) for executing Ethereum smart contract transactions with the invested CPU
usage. They found that the amount of Used Gas is not always proportional to the
CPU usage, which means that some transactions are more profitable than others.
As the Ethereum incentive model does not provide incentives compatible with the
computational costs, the profit a miner would get from executing transactions depends
on which transactions have been chosen. With the uncertainty miners perceive in
Ethereum regarding the fee and cost for transactions, the profit gained by miners
might be impacted. To the best of our knowledge, no work has investigated the impact
of the uncertainty miners perceive when selecting transactions on the profit earned
under the incompatible Ethereum incentive model. That is, our work presented in
Chapter 7 of this thesis is the first investigation attempt on this topic.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce essential background information related to blockchain
technology and simulation techniques. The topics covered in this chapter include
an overview of blockchain paradigm, smart contracts, Ethereum, discrete-event sim-
ulation and the methodology for conducting a simulation study. In addition, we
thoroughly discuss the literature on performance evaluation of blockchain systems,
including related work on simulation models and tools.
The core contribution of this thesis is the design and development of a general
discrete-event blockchain simulator in addition to the study of two data-driven simu-




A Systematic Mapping Study of
Academic Research
Summary
Smart contracts and their underlying technology, blockchain, have gained wide inter-
est and attention in the last few years. In this chapter, we carry out a longitudinal
systematic mapping study of all peer-reviewed technology-oriented research in smart
contracts. Our interest is twofold, namely to provide a survey of the scientific lit-
erature and to identify academic research trends and uptake. We only focus on
peer-reviewed scientific publications to identify how academic researchers have taken
up smart contract technologies and established scientific outputs.
We obtain all research papers from the main scientific databases, and using the
systematic mapping method classified the papers into six categories, namely, secu-
rity, privacy, software engineering, application, performance and scalability and other
smart contract related topics. Among those categories, we find that the majority of
the articles falls into two categories: application (about 64%) and software engineering
(21%).
3.1 Introduction
Blockchain-based smart contracts are computer programs that encode an agreement
between non-trusting participants. Smart contracts are executed on a blockchain
system if specified conditions are met, without the need of a trusted third party.
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The aim of this chapter is to identify and to classify all peer-reviewed research that
has been conducted on smart contract technology. Importantly, we do not attempt
to include all the latest developments in technical, financial or political issues that
were communicated through other channels, particularly the Internet. We also are
interested in longitudinal (year after year) aspects of academic contributions to smart
contracts, to document and analyse the growth in research outputs. To achieve this
aim, we follow the systematic mapping study approach proposed in [84] to look for
relevant papers in the main scientific databases and to generate a classification map.
This is to understand the topics of interest as well as identify gaps for future work.
We conduct the systematic mapping study in longitudinal aspects starting in 2017,
then updating it in 2018 before revising it further in 2020. From the mapping study,
we find that the number of published articles on smart contracts is increasing sig-
nificantly every year, reaching over 2500 papers as of March 2020. The results of
the study also show six different categories for smart contract topics, which are secu-
rity, privacy, software engineering, application, performance and scalability and other
smart contract related topics. The majority of the papers falls into the applications
(about 64%) and software engineering (21%) categories.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, we present the method-
ology used to conduct the systematic mapping study, including the definition of the
research questions. Section 3.3 illustrates the results of searching and screening for
relevant papers as well as the results for classifying all research papers. In Section
3.4, we discuss and answer the research questions. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Research Methodology
We select the systematic mapping study proposed by [84] as our research method-
ology in order to explore the current research related to smart contracts technology.
A systematic mapping approach allows us to identify and classify research topics
relevant to smart contracts. It also helps us to identify research gaps for future re-
search. As depicted in Figure 3.1, the systematic mapping study is divided into five
steps, namely, defining research questions, conducting the search, searching for rele-













Figure 3.1: Steps of the systematic mapping study [84].
3.2.1 Defining Research Questions
The first step in a systematic mapping study is to define the research questions to be
answered by the study. For our study, we define four questions, which are as follows:
RQ1. What are the existing research areas in smart contracts?
RQ2. How does smart contract research evolve year on year in terms of the number
and type of publications?
RQ3. What existing applications are there for smart contracts?
RQ4. What are the research gaps?
3.2.2 Conducting the Search
The second step is to search and gather all research papers related to smart contracts
based on a specific search term. We choose the term ‘smart contract’ for this study
as the main search keyword. Having identified the keyword for the searching task, we
select five different scientific databases to carry out our search. The selected databases
are ACM Digital Library, Springer, IEEE Explore, Scopus and ScienceDirect. We only
focus on gathering peer-reviewed research papers published in journals, conferences,
symposiums, workshops and books.
3.2.3 Screening for Relevant Papers
The third step is to exclude all research papers that are irrelevant to our research
questions. To accomplish this step, we follow the screening approach proposed in
[103]. In this approach, we first attempt to remove irrelevant research papers based
on their titles. If we could not manage to decide on the relevancy of a paper based
on its title, we would run through a second step by evaluating the abstract of that
paper. In addition to title and abstract based exclusion, we also rely on some exclusion
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criteria to remove some papers. We remove papers without English text, without full
text available, with no critical contributions such as popular articles, newsletters or
grey literature. Moreover, we remove duplicate papers and non-technology based
papers.
3.2.4 Keywording using Abstracts
The fourth step is to classify all the relevant research papers based on the keyword
approach proposed in [103]. In this approach, we go through the abstract of all papers
in order to associate crucial keywords and the key contribution. The purpose of doing
so is to classify all research papers under different categories. In some cases where it
is difficult to classify a paper using its abstract, we skim the paper quickly to make
a proper decision about its category.
3.2.5 Data Extraction and Mapping Process
The last step is to collect all information needed to answer the research questions of
our study. We collect various data items embracing the main goal and contributions
from each research paper.
3.3 Study Results
This section discusses the results of the systematic mapping study that we conducted
on smart contracts. We first discuss the results of searching and screening for relevant
papers. Then, we discuss the results of the classification process.
3.3.1 Searching Results
The first step of a systematic study after defining the research questions is to search for
relevant papers. We search for all scientific papers in five different scientific databases
using a specific keyword ‘smart contract’.
Table 3.1 shows the number of research papers on smart contracts that have been
retrieved from the five databases over the years (until March 2020). Research on
smart contracts started in 2014 with the emergence of the Ethereum blockchain, the
most common platform for smart contracts. We note that the number of published
papers has been increasing since 2018, and that the greater number of articles is
contributed to the Scopus database.
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Year IEEE ACM Springer ScienceDirect Scopus All Databases
2014 0 1 0 0 0 1
2015 2 4 3 7 3 19
2016 5 12 21 2 28 68
2017 43 50 75 21 114 303
2018 217 151 224 128 486 1206
2019 421 263 417 292 996 2389
2020 49 33 123 220 184 609
Total 737 514 863 670 1811 4595
Table 3.1: The number of publications on smart contracts per database over the
years.
Before 2016, the total number of papers was only 20. This number possibly
includes duplicate and irrelevant papers. In 2016, the number of scientific papers
increased significantly by 68 papers and since then it further increased dramatically.
In the following year (2017), about 300 papers more were published, to reach nearly
400 papers in total. From 2018 and beyond, the number of papers has been growing
dramatically, for instance, about 2400 papers were published in 2019. The number
of smart contract papers has reached over 4500 by the end of March 2020, with over
600 more papers published in the first three months of 2020.
Interestingly, the number of scientific papers is increasing each year for all the five
databases, as clearly depicted in Figure 3.2. This indicates that the popularity of the
topic of smart contracts grows every year. For that, we expect even a further increase
with respect to the number of papers in the future.
Among the five databases, Scopus dominates the majority of the papers published
on smart contracts. It is almost accounting for 40% of total papers published every
year. This is expected since Scopus is a comprehensive database that contains papers
that are already in other databases. For example, most of the papers in IEEE and
ACM libraries are also in Scopus.
The following sections discuss the screening and classifying results. We note that
we carried these analysis results in May 2017, and then updated them in June 2018.
Due to the significant rise in the number of papers published since the second half of
2018, we have not updated the results. However, the results are valuable and useful
to get insight into the direction and trending topics in the general space of smart
contracts.
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Figure 3.2: The growth in terms of the number of publications per each database
over the years.
3.3.2 Screening Results
In this section we discuss the screening results. By applying the searching phase, we
managed to gather 617 papers in total, on 12 June 2018. We screened these papers
as follow. First, we excluded duplicate papers. We ended up with 407 unique papers.
After that, we went through the title and the abstract for all the 407 papers in order
to exclude irrelevant papers. We managed to exclude 219 irrelevant papers (about
54% of all papers). There are three reasons why we had a high number of excluded
papers. First, many papers were irrelevant to our study, since our focus was to explore
smart contracts from a technical perspective. For instance, many papers discussed the
topic from an economic or legal point of view. Another reason is that some excluded
papers were about cryptocurrencies or blockchain in general (as opposed to smart
contracts), which do not contribute to our research questions. The last reason is that
some papers were excluded as they only discuss grey literature about smart contracts
or discuss the possibility of applying them to different domains such as the Internet
of Things, without providing any technical contribution. Therefore, we ultimately
included 188 papers in our systematic mapping study.
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3.3.3 Classification Results
By applying the Keywording technique, we classified the papers into six categories,
namely, security, privacy, software engineering, application, performance and scala-
bility and other smart contract related topics. Security relates to bugs or vulnerabil-
ities that an adversary might utilise to launch an attack in smart contract systems.
Privacy includes issues related to disclosing contracts information to unauthorised
people. Software engineering refers to any work related to the software development
of smart contracts. Application refers to the utilisation of smart contracts to address
issues in different domains such as the Internet of Things (IoT). Performance and
scalability category refers to the ability of smart contract systems to deliver a reason-
able response time as well as to sustain performance when the number of contracts is
increasing.
Figure 3.3 shows the percentage of scientific papers in each of the six categories.
It is clear that most papers are smart contract applications, accounting for 64% of all
the papers. The second most common category is software engineering, with 21% of
the papers. Security category dominates 6% of the papers. 3% and 2% of the papers
fall into performance and scalability and privacy categories, respectively. It is worth
noting that there are some papers (4% of all papers) fall into other smart contract
related topics.
Figure 3.3: The percentage of scientific papers in each category.
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Security. We found 10 papers that identify or propose solutions to bugs and vulnera-
bilities in smart contract systems. These vulnerabilities include transaction-ordering
dependency, timestamp dependency, mishandled exception, criminal activities, re-
entrancy and untrustworthy data feeds. Some papers present detection tools (e.g.,
Oyente [69] and ReGuard [80]) that can be used by developers to identify common
security bugs. Some papers propose assurance methods and machine learning ap-
proaches to detect security risks and fraud. Furthermore, one of the papers identifies
three types of criminal activities that can be carried out in smart contract systems
[56]. Another paper proposes an adaptive incentive mechanism for smart contract
systems to defend against denial of service attacks [29]. In addition, Atzei et al. [18]
surveyed several vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts and built a taxonomy
for such vulnerabilities.
Privacy. We only found four papers that extend blockchain-based smart contract
platforms to support privacy and confidentiality. Hawk [61], for instance, is a tool
that allows smart contract developers to build privacy-preserving contracts. The
rest of the papers focus on extending Hyperledger Fabric to support private data,
proposing encrypted data feeds for contracts and proposing a system to ensure the
confidentiality of contracts. For example, Zhang et al. [105] propose a Town Crier
(TC) solution that acts as a trusted third party between external sources and smart
contracts to provide encrypted and authenticated data feeds for smart contracts.
Software Engineering. 40 papers fall into software engineering for smart contracts,
covering a wide range of topics. About 20% of the papers focus on verification and
validation techniques (e.g., formal modelling techniques [22]) for smart contracts in
order to assure that smart contracts are functioning as intended as well as error-
free. Six papers are about proposing new platforms (such as Smartdemap [59]) and
languages (e.g., Simplicity [81]) for developing smart contracts. Three papers utilise
analysis techniques to inspect the code of smart contracts. Moreover, there are three
papers that propose solutions to blockchain immutability features by allowing the
modification and termination of already deployed smart contracts. Two papers focus
on optimising the code of smart contracts by identifying and solving programming
patterns with high execution costs.
The rest of the papers focuses on automating the process of developing contracts,
building code classifiers and parsers for contracts, human-centered design of contracts,
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designing templates for developing contracts, profiling smart contract interactions and
identifying common pitfalls in developing safe contracts. Furthermore, there are some
papers that propose frameworks for developing secure contracts, proposing a compres-
sion method to reuse previously deployed contracts and proposing the integration of
a semantic legal layer with the blockchain to support legal contracts.
Applications. We found 120 application-based papers (about 64% of all papers).
We classified these applications into several topics, namely, Internet of Things (IoT),
cloud computing, financial, data, healthcare, access control and authentication and
other applications.
Internet of Things (IoT) Applications: Internet of Things (IoT) refers to physical
devices and appliances connected via the Internet. We found 18 papers that apply
blockchain-based smart contract technology to IoT. Three applications utilise smart
contracts to build an access control system for IoT. Four applications utilise smart
contracts to overcome security and privacy issues in the IoT. The rest of IoT-based
applications utilise smart contracts for the management of IoT devices, electronic
business, data management, data trading, data exchange and data storage.
Cloud Computing Application: We found eight applications that utilise blockchain-
based smart contract to overcome various technical issues in cloud computing. These
applications address the issues of verifiability of outsourced computation [40], data
auditing, resource management of cloud datacentres, negotiation and agreement es-
tablishment, data accountability, trust, access control and service level agreement
(SLA) monitoring.
Financial Applications: We found several applications that utilise blockchain-
based smart contracts for financial purposes such as payment and loan. The identi-
fied financial applications embrace fair payment systems, privacy-preserving incentive
mechanisms, a smart will, taxation-based payment, car insurance, private and con-
current payment channel network, concert tickets and protocols for data trading and
the management of study loan repayment.
Data Applications: These types of applications utilise blockchain-based smart
contract to manage and secure general data and information. These applications
include data sharing, data management, data indexing, data integrity check, and
data provenance and accountability.
Healthcare Applications: We found three blockchain-based smart contract appli-
cations in the healthcare domain. These applications are a secure remote patient
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monitoring system, an access control framework for electronic health records and
trustless medical data sharing among different cloud providers.
Access Control and Authentication Applications: These types of smart contract
applications target approaches to user authentication and management of access right
policies. Several smart contract based access control systems have been proposed in
different domains such as IoT [17], healthcare [33] and cloud computing [92]. With
regard to authentication, there are different proposed applications such as a secure
mutual authentication for industry 4.0, an enhancement of TLS handshake authenti-
cation and a distributed and secure user authentication.
The rest of the applications covers a wide range of different topics including e-
voting, supply chain management, intelligent systems (e.g., intelligent transportation
systems), smart grid systems, energy-based applications, resource management, reli-
able decision making, digital rights management, human resource systems and 2 phase
commit protocol for distributed consensus protocols [45]. Furthermore, other applica-
tions include volunteer time record systems, QoS-aware service composition, logistics
management, trustless intermediation in marketplaces, assessment organisation ser-
vice, Business Process Management (BPM) systems and decentralised applications
(DAPPs).
Performance and Scalability. We found six papers that fall into performance
and scalability topics in smart contract systems. Some papers propose benchmarking
frameworks (e.g., Blockbench [39]) for analysing and monitoring the performance of
blockchain-based smart contracts. To overcome scalability issues in smart contract
systems, some papers propose solutions to execute smart contracts in parallel instead
of sequentially. For more details on the state of the art in performance evaluation of
blockchain systems, we refer to this dissertation’s background discussion in Chapter
2.
Other smart contract related topics. We found eight papers that fall into other
smart contract related topics such as consensus protocols and incentive mechanisms
for smart contracts. Some papers propose new secure consensus protocols for smart
contracts and identify issues in existing protocols. Other papers focus on incentive
mechanisms, system operations and system design for smart contracts.
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3.4 Discussion
This section discusses the study results and answers the research questions that we
defined in Section 3.2.
RQ1: What are the existing research areas in smart contracts?
The study classifies the research topics on smart contracts into six categories,
namely, security, privacy, software engineering, application, performance and scala-
bility and other smart contract related topics. The majority of the research (about
64%) falls into the application category, followed by software engineering (21%). The
applications cover a wide range of domains such as IoT, cloud computing, finance,
healthcare, access control, authentication and others. Most of these applications are
to address technical issues (e.g., security issues) or to get rid of the trusted third par-
ties in existing applications. In the software engineering category, most of the papers
utilise analysis techniques for validation and verification purposes or to propose new
platforms and languages for developing secure smart contracts. For the performance
and scalability category, the papers either propose frameworks for performance anal-
ysis or scalable solutions for the execution of contracts. In the security category,
most papers focus on identifying and tackling security bugs and vulnerabilities. In
the privacy category, most papers focus on the confidentiality of information in smart
contract systems.
RQ2. How does smart contract research evolve year on year in terms of the number
and type of publications?
Research on smart contracts started in 2014 with the emergence of Ethereum.
Since then, the number of publications on smart contracts is increasing significantly
every year, as discussed in Section 3.3.1. For instance, the number of publications was
increased by over 300% in 2018 compared to that of 2017. Since 2018, the number of
papers published every year is at least over 1000 papers, with 609 papers published
in the first three months of 2020.
From the analysis results we discussed in Section 3.3.3, application and software
engineering categories experience the highest number of publications, accounting for
64% and 21% of the total published papers, respectively. This indicates that smart
contract systems widespread very vastly, especially in terms of smart contract appli-
cations and development.
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RQ3: What existing applications are there for smart contracts?
Smart contract applications cover any solution that utilises smart contract tech-
nology to overcome the issues in existing systems or any smart contract tool. We
identify 120 application-based papers that make use of smart contract technology in
existing systems such as IoT. These applications include cloud-based applications,
healthcare-based application, financial applications, data applications, access con-
trol and authentication based applications, e-voting, smart grid systems, digital right
management, intelligent systems and other decentralised applications. In addition,
we identify several smart contract tools that can aid during the process of developing
smart contracts, identify security issues, or provide confidentiality for smart contract
information.
RQ4: What are the research gaps?
From this study, we are able to identify at least two research gaps in smart contract
research. The methodologies used to identify these gaps are by observing issues or
limitations from the papers included in this study and by relying on our knowledge
in smart contract topic.
The first one is the relative lack of research on scaling blockchain-based smart
contract systems. In current systems, smart contracts are executed in sequence,
which leads to low throughput, especially if the number of smart contracts becomes
relatively large. Although we found a few papers exploring parallel execution of
contracts, their proposed solutions are high-level ideas and still not proven to be
working properly in smart contract systems. There are some challenges that face
parallel execution of contracts such as how to execute contracts that depend on each
other at the same time. It is, therefore, essential to conduct research on identifying
and tackling performance issues to ensure the ability of blockchain to scale.
A second area is the relative lack of research on performance evaluation of smart
contract execution. Performance benchmark approaches, for example, can be benefi-
cial to evaluate the fairness of incentive models within smart contract systems. If the
incentive provided by such systems is not compatible with the computational costs,
this could result in security attacks as well as poor incentive and cost models [7],
which impact the reliability of smart contract systems.
Following from these identified gaps, we conduct a performance benchmark ex-
periment to measure the execution time of real Ethereum smart contracts (Chapter
5). Also, we conduct two performance evaluation studies (Chapters 6 and 7) related
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to Ethereum smart contracts. The first one is regarding the impact of sequential
verification of contracts on the revenue for honest miners, and how parallel execution
of contracts can reduce that impact. The second one is regarding the uncertainty
miners face when selecting contract transactions under the unfair Ethereum incentive
model, and its impact on the earned profit.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we conduct a longitudinal systematic mapping study in order to
understand current research areas on smart contracts, to identify research gaps for
future work and to identify academics trends in uptake and emphasis.
The main insights we gained from this study are as follows. First, we observe that
the number of scientific papers on smart contracts is increasing significantly every
year, indicating a broad interest in this topic. In addition, we identify and classify
smart contract research into six different categories, namely, security, privacy, software
engineering, application, performance and scalability and other smart contract related
topics. The Application category dominates the majority of research publications,
constituting 64% of total articles. Furthermore, we manage to identify two research




Simulation Tool for Blockchain
Systems
Summary
Both in the design and deployment of blockchain solutions many performance-impacting
configuration choices need to be made. We introduce BlockSim, a framework and soft-
ware tool to build and simulate discrete-event dynamic systems models for blockchain
systems. BlockSim is designed to support the analysis of a large variety of blockchains
and blockchain deployments as well as a wide set of analysis questions. At the core of
BlockSim is a Base Model, which contains the main model constructs common across
various blockchain systems organised in three abstraction layers (network, consensus
and incentives layer). The Base Model is usable for a wide variety of blockchain
systems and can be extended easily to include system or deployment particulars.
The BlockSim software tool provides a simulator that implements the Base Model in
Python. This chapter describes the Base Model, the simulator implementation, and
the application of BlockSim to Bitcoin, Ethereum and other consensus algorithms.
We validate BlockSim simulation results by comparison with performance results from
actual systems and from other studies in the literature. We close the chapter by a
BlockSim simulation study of the impact of uncle blocks rewards on mining fairness,
for a variety of blockchain configurations.
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4.1 Introduction
In the design as well as the deployment of blockchain solutions, many architectural,
configuration and parameterisation questions need to be considered. Since it is usually
not feasible or practical to answer these questions using experimentation or trial-
and-error, model-based simulation is required as an alternative. In this chapter, we
propose a discrete-event simulation framework called BlockSim [8] to explore the
effects of configuration, parameterisation and design decisions on the behaviour of
blockchain systems.
The main goal of BlockSim is to provide simulation constructs that are intuitive,
hide unnecessary detail and can be easily manipulated to be applied to a large set of
blockchains design and deployment questions. That is, BlockSim has the following
objectives: generality, extensibility and simplicity. BlockSim is intended to be used
by blockchain designers, analysts and researchers to explore and study performance
metrics (throughput and latency), functionality metrics (e.g., stale rates) and system
properties (e.g., mining fairness and mining incentives). We note that BlockSim is
generally designed for performance evaluation, thus it cannot be used for pure security
analysis or formal correctness of consensus protocols and smart contracts.
At the core of BlockSim is a Base Model, which contains model constructs at
three abstraction layers: the network layer, the consensus layer and the incentives
layer [96]. The network layer captures the blockchain’s nodes and the underlying
peer-to-peer protocol to exchange data between nodes. The consensus layer captures
the algorithms and rules adopted to reach an agreement about the current state of the
blockchain ledger. The incentives layer captures the economic incentive mechanisms
adopted by a blockchain to issue and distribute rewards among the participating
nodes.
The Base Model contains a number of functional blocks common across blockchains,
that can be extended and configured as suited for the system and study of interest.
The main functional blocks include Node, Transaction, Block, Consensus and Incen-
tives, as we describe in Section 4.2. These are then implemented through a number
of Python modules, discussed in Section 4.3, and complemented by modules (event,
scheduler, statistics, etc.) that implement the simulation engine.
The public nature of permissionless blockchains provides for particularly powerful
opportunities to validate the simulator. We validate the BlockSim simulation results
by comparing against theoretical results (invariants such as block rate), against data
from the existing public blockchain systems such as Ethereum and Bitcoin and against
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results from the literature. The BlockSim simulation results are within a statistically
acceptable margin of the real-life or published results, as discussed in Section 4.5.
We also demonstrate the use of BlockSim for a simulation study that considers stale
rate, throughput and mining fairness, for a range of possible blockchain configurations
(not all existing in real-life systems). Using BlockSim we can demonstrate that uncle
inclusion (such as in Ethereum) is beneficial for mining fairness.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the core Base
Model of BlockSim including the design objectives behind it. Section 4.3 presents the
implementation of the Base Model. Section 4.4 presents the application of BlockSim
to Bitcoin, Ethereum and other consensus protocols as case studies. Section 4.5
discusses the validation of BlockSim against actual systems and studies from the
literature. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 show a BlockSim simulation study as well as the
evaluation of BlockSim against the design objectives. Finally, we conclude the chapter
in Section 4.8.
4.2 BlockSim Base Model
In this section, we introduce the Base Model underlying BlockSim, which is de-
signed to model any kind of blockchain system, with application specific extensions
as needed. We first define the design principles and goals for BlockSim: generality,
extensibility and simplicity. Then, we discuss the design layer by layer: Network
Layer, Consensus Layer and Incentives Layer. Within each layer we identify the key
functional units (entities) and the actions or activities it executes.
4.2.1 Design Principles
We design a Base Model to fulfill the main design goals for BlockSim, which are:
• Generality: we want to be able to use BlockSim for a large set of blockchain
systems, configurations and design questions.
• Extensibility: BlockSim should be easily manipulated by a designer or analyst
to study different aspects of blockchain systems.
• Simplicity: the above two objectives should be met while making BlockSim
easy to use, both for simulation studies and for extending it.
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The art of designing a tool such as BlockSim is to find a useful trade-off between
generality and extensibility on the one hand, and simplicity to achieve these two
objectives on the other hand. The Base Model is critical in achieving this goal,
aiming to find the optimal trade-off among the above three objectives for the domain
of blockchain systems.





























Figure 4.1: BlockSim Model Entities.
The Base Model identifies the key building blocks (e.g., blocks, transactions, nodes
and incentives) common across all blockchains BlockSim is meant for, see Figure
4.1. The Base Model dictates how general the model class is that is supported by
BlockSim, and particularly how easy it is to build new models. The Base Model will
be translated in software modules and therefore also determines if BlockSim can be
extended easily, for instance, to provide more detailed models of certain processes
that take place in blockchains.
4.2.2 Network Layer
This layer defines two entities Node and the underlying Broadcast protocol, as de-
picted in Figure 4.1. The Node entity is responsible for updating the system state
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variables (e.g., the blockchain ledger and the transaction pool). The Broadcast proto-
col specifies how information entities (e.g., Blocks and Transactions) are propagated
in the network.
Both Blockchain ledger and Transaction pool entities are part of the Node entity
(see Figure 4.1). That is, every node maintains and continuously updates these
entities. We model nodes as objects that have different attributes such as unique ID,
balance, local ledger and transaction pool. The transaction pool and the local ledger
are modelled as array lists that can be extended when new transactions and blocks
are received. These attributes are common across the different implementation of
blockchains. It could, however, be possible to extend this by including more additional
attributes, as we will show in Section 4.4.1.
The propagation of information entities depends on the Broadcast protocol entity,
which can be modelled in detail by accounting for the network configurations, the
geographical distribution of the nodes and the connectivity among the nodes, or it can
be modelled in an abstraction level by only considering a time delay for propagating
information among the nodes. The reason for abstracting the broadcast protocol is
to make our simulator as simple as possible by hiding unnecessary details. This will
alleviate the user of the simulator from configuring many parameters related to the
network configurations such as the broadcast protocol, the geographical distribution
of the nodes and the number of connections per node. Having the propagation delay
as the only configurable parameter will improve both the efficiency and the usability
aspects of the simulator.
4.2.3 Consensus Layer
This layer aims at establishing the rules that nodes can follow to reach an agreement
about the blockchain’s state. This layer includes four entities, namely, Transaction,
Block, Transaction pool and Blockchain ledger, as depicted in Figure 4.1.
The Blockchain ledger entity depends on the Block entity, and the Block entity
depends on the Transaction entity. That is, the blockchain ledger is composed of
blocks and blocks are composed of transactions. The Transaction pool depends on
the Transaction entity, as every transaction created is fed into the transaction pool.
The Node entity maintains these four entities.
Within the consensus layer, there are several activities or actions to be executed by
the entities. The creation of blocks and transactions is an example of such activities.
The flow of these activities is depicted in Figure 4.2. These activities run continuously,
transactions and blocks, for instance, always keep arriving in the network.
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Create a transaction (Ti)
Propagate Ti to other nodes
Append Ti to transaction pool
Execute/add transactions to
the next block (Bi)
Construct Bi and append it to
local blockchain 
Propagate Bi to other nodes








































Figure 4.2: Workflow for the consensus activities within the Base Model of BlockSim.
Transactions are one of the building blocks (entities) common across all blockchain
systems. It plays a significant role in updating the blockchain’s state. The arrival of a
new transaction in the network results in updating the transaction pool by inserting
that transaction.
We model transactions in two different ways, namely, full and light. The full
technique helps to track each transaction in the system (e.g., when a transaction has
been created and included in a valid block). This technique models transactions as in
any blockchain system, and it is useful if one is interested in, for instance, studying
the latency of individual transactions in blockchain systems. However, this type of
modelling consumes an enormous amount of computing resources and time during
the simulation since each transaction has to be tracked. On the other hand, the light
technique does not track each transaction. It is useful when studying the throughput
of blockchain systems without caring about the confirmation time of transactions
within the system.
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In both techniques, we model transactions as objects that have several attributes
or fields such as transaction ID, size, fee, timestamp, contents as well as the submitter
and the recipient of the transaction. These attributes are almost common across all
blockchains, and that some systems have more additional attributes (e.g., Ethereum
has also gas-related attributes such as Gas Limit).
Full modelling Technique: In this technique as we discussed in Section 4.2.2,
we model an individual transaction pool for each node by assigning an array list for
each node as a way to abstract the pool. Each transaction created by a node is
propagated to all other nodes in the network. Upon receiving the transaction, the
recipient node appends it to their pool. Thus, we model transactions in three different
activities labelled from 1 to 3, as depicted in Figure 4.2.
• Creating transactions: This involves generating transactions by the partic-
ipating nodes. The number of transactions to be created per unit of time can
be controlled and configured.
• Propagating transactions: This requires the creator of the transaction to
propagate it to other participating nodes. This is to notify other nodes about
the newly created transactions.
• Appending transactions: This requires the recipient of the transaction to
append it to their transaction pool.
Light modelling Technique: In this technique, we only model a single trans-
action pool to be shared among all nodes in the network. The intention behind
this technique is to provide an alternative and simplified way to model transactions
by omitting the propagation process as well as the needs for nodes to update their
pools continuously. Thus, the light technique is more efficient and faster during the
simulation. However, this technique cannot be used to draw conclusions about the
latency of transactions as transactions are not tracked. Nevertheless, it is useful to
get indicators about the throughput in blockchain systems.
In this technique, we create a set of transactions (N ) and then append it to the
shared pool before the mining process, so miners can access the pool to select several
transactions to include in their forthcoming block. Note that N should be more than
enough for a block, usually enough for two blocks. Once a miner has successfully
generated a block, the pool is reset and then filled up with a fresh set of transactions
to be included in the next block.
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Both techniques could be implemented and then the user would be given a choice
to select which method to adopt based on their own needs. For instance, if one is
only interested in throughput, there is no need for choosing the full technique since
it makes the simulator runs for a very long time.
Blocks are another essential building block (entity) of any blockchain system. Blocks
consist of transactions. The arrival of a new block results in an update in the trans-
action pool and blockchain ledger. The pool is updated by removing all transactions
included in the block, while the ledger is updated by appending the newly created
block.
We model blocks as objects that have several attributes, namely, depth, block ID,
previous block ID, timestamp, size, miner ID and transactions. The block ID is a
unique identifier for the block. The block depth indicates the index of the block in
the node’s blockchain. The miner ID refers to the node that created the block. Each
block can accept a list of transactions as its content. These attributes are common
across blockchains.
We model blocks in the consensus layer as Block Generation and Block Reception,
see Figure 4.2. Block generation specifies when blocks are generated as well as which
node is eligible for appending the next block. It covers all the common actions required
by a miner to create and attach a block to the blockchain ledger. The actions embrace
executing the block’s transactions, constructing and appending the block to the local
blockchain and propagating the block to other nodes in the network. Block reception
specifies how the network’s nodes update their blockchain ledgers upon receiving new
blocks. It covers the common activities taken by a node when receiving a newly
generated block. Upon receiving a valid block, the recipient node will perform three
actions, which are updating the local blockchain if necessary, appending the block to
the local blockchain and updating the transaction pool.
The consensus algorithm is responsible for selecting a miner to build the next
block. The methodology used to choose a miner varies among blockchains, depending
on the adopted consensus protocol. In PoW, for instance, miners are selected based
on solving a mathematical task. Once a miner is chosen to construct and append
a new block to the ledger, the miner would undertake the following actions. Note
that these actions are common across all blockchain systems, and that some specific
systems may include other activities (e.g., including uncle blocks in a future block as
in Ethereum).
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• Executing and adding transactions to the block: This requires the miner
to select several pending transactions to be executed and included in the next
block. Often, miners first sort those pending transactions based on their asso-
ciated fees. Then, miners select the best transaction according to their ranking
criteria, execute it if and only if there is space in the block. The transaction will
then be recorded in the block. After that, miners will select the next transaction
and continue until the block is full or there is no pending transaction.
• Constructing and appending the block to the local blockchain: After
preparing the block content (e.g., transactions), the miner would construct the
block after which the block will be appended to the miner’s local blockchain.
• Propagating the block to other nodes: This is to propagate the block to
other nodes in the network. This is to notify the network’s nodes about the
newly generated block.
Once a node has received a new block, it will check its validity. The block is
considered valid if it was constructed correctly and all embedded transactions were
correctly executed. Beside the block validity, the block must point to the last block
in the ledger (the block’s depth should be higher than that of the last block). We
only model the block depth, and thus, we abstract the validity of the block. If the
depth of the received block is not higher than that of the last block, the block will be
discarded. Otherwise, the node will perform the following actions.
• Updating local blockchain: This requires the recipient node to update its
local blockchain, where necessary, before appending the newly received block.
This is because sometimes the received block is built on different preceding
blocks (a different chain branch) compared to the ones the recipient node has
or because it is built on missing blocks. Therefore, the node has to update all
the preceding blocks (and fetch all missing blocks if any) according to the ones
the received block is following.
• Appending the block to local blockchain: This is to append the received
block to the local copy of the blockchain.
• Updating transaction pool: This requires the recipient node to update its
transaction pool, where necessary, upon appending the newly received block.
This is to remove all the transactions that have already been executed in the
received block from the node’s pool.
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Transaction pool and blockchain ledger are also important building blocks (en-
tities) since they represent the state of blockchain systems. The transaction pool is
updated upon the arrival of a new transaction or block, while the blockchain ledger
is only updated once a block has arrived. Nodes are responsible for updating both
the pool and the ledger, as every node in the blockchain network maintains a local
copy of them (see Section 4.2.2).
The rule of updating the ledger in the case of forks: Nodes at some
point in time may have different views of the blockchain ledger due to the network’s
propagation delay. A significant role of the consensus layer is to define the rules that
can be used by the nodes to resolve the forks. For instance, Bitcoin and Ethereum
use the longest-chain rule to resolve the forks. That is, nodes update their ledgers
every time they receive a block that follows a chain that is longer than their local
chains. By doing so, nodes will have the same view of the blockchain ledger. Other
systems, however, use different rules (e.g., GHOST [90]).
4.2.4 Incentives Layer
The incentives layer is responsible for designing the underlying incentive model by
defining the rewarded elements (e.g., blocks and transactions) as well as distributing
the rewards among the participating miners. This layer has the reward entity, which
depends on the Block entity (see Figure 4.1). That is, the rewards are only given
to the miners upon appending new blocks to the ledger. The calculation and the
distribution of such rewards are considered as actions.
We model the basic incentive model used by most blockchain systems such as
Bitcoin. Our model provides a reward for generating a valid block (block reward)
and a reward for all transactions included in a block (transaction fee). The block
reward is modelled as a fixed amount of cryptocurrency that can be configured and
changed by the end-user. The transaction fee is calculated as the multiplication of
its size and its prize, where the prize is the amount of money the submitter of the
transaction is willing to pay per unit of size. The size and the prize for transactions
can also be configured as fixed or variable (random) values. However, it is possible
to extend the current model to include different rewards (e.g., rewards for uncle
blocks) or change the way how the fee for transactions is calculated. We model the
distribution of rewards by increasing the balance of each miner after having a valid












Figure 4.3: BlockSim Implementation Modules.
We present the implementation of the BlockSim simulator using Python 3.6.41.
The main modules are given in Figure 4.3. The Simulator Module implements the
core engine of the simulator, in particular the event scheduler, which we explain
in Section 4.3.1. The main topic of discussion in that section is the granularity at
which events are handled, since it heavily impacts the performance of the simulator.
This simulation engine module is complemented by the Configuration Module, to
be described in Section 4.3.2, which provides the user with ways to configure the
simulation model and experiments. Section 4.3.3 explains the implementation of the
Base Model, subdivided according to the main layers: Network Module, Consensus
Module and Incentives Module.
4.3.1 BlockSim Simulation Engine and Event Scheduler
As depicted in Figure 4.3, the main Simulation Module contains four classes, which
are Event, Scheduler, Statistics and Main. We start with explaining our design choices
for the event scheduling.
We provide event scheduling at two abstraction levels, the first one considers
blocks as the event ‘unit’, the second considers transactions as the event ‘unit’. We
1https://github.com/maher243/BlockSim.
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explain the block-level events. The class Event defines the structure of events in our
simulator. In the case of a block-level event it has four attributes: type, nodeID, time
and block. The attribute type indicates how to handle the event, in particular whether
the event at hand is to create a new block or to receive an existing block. The nodeID
and time attributes specify the node that handles the event and the time at which
the event takes place. The block attribute contains the necessary information for the
block to be handled.
1 for i in range (p . Runs ) :
2 c l o ck=0
3 i f p . hasTrans :
4 i f p . Ttechnique == ”Light ” : LT. c r e a t e t r a n s a c t i o n s ( )
5 e l i f p . Ttechnique == ”Ful l ” : FT. c r e a t e t r a n s a c t i o n s ( )
6
7 Node . g e n e r a t e g e n s i s b l o c k ( ) # genera te the g en s i s b l o c k f o r
a l l miners
8 Scheduler . g e n e r a t e i n i t i a l e v e n t s ( ) # i n i t i a t e i n i t i a l e ven t s
>= 1 to s t a r t wi th
9
10 while not Queue . isEmpty ( ) and c l o ck <= p . simTime :
11 next event = Queue . g e t nex t even t ( )
12 c l o ck = next event . time # move c l o c k to the time o f the
event
13 Consensus . hand le event ( next event ) # execu te the event (
c r ea t e or r e c e i v e a b l o c k )
14 Queue . remove event ( next event ) # remove the event from
the Queue a f t e r e xecu t ing i t
15
16 Consensus . f o r k r e s o l u t i o n ( ) # re s o l v e the f o r k s
17 I n c en t i v e s . d i s t r i bu t e r ewa rd s ( )# ca l c u l a t e and d i s t r i b u t e the
rewards between the p a r t i c i p a t i n g nodes
18 S t a t i s t i c s . c a l c u l a t e ( ) # ca l c u l a t e the s imu la t i on r e s u l t s ( e .
g . , b l o c k s t a t s t i c s and miners ' rewards )
19
20 # re s e t a l l g l o b a l v a r i a b l e s and the b l o c kcha in s t a t e s f o r
a l l nodes b e f o r e the next run
21 S t a t i s t i c s . r e s e t ( )
22 Node . r e s e t S t a t e ( )
23
24 S t a t i s t i c s . p r i n t t o e x c e l ( ” r e s u l t s . x l sx ” ) # pr in t a l l the s imu la t i on
r e s u l t s f o r a l l t he runs in an e x c e l f i l e
Listing 4.1: The implementation of the Main class in BlockSim.
Scheduler class is responsible for scheduling future events and record them in the
Queue. Queue is an array list that maintains all future events, and it is continuously
updated during the simulation by either inserting new events or removing existing
ones. At the block-level, for instance, once a block is created through a block creation
event, the Scheduler class schedules block reception events for other nodes to receive
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the block. Also, it schedules a new block creation event by selecting a miner to propose
and generate a new block on top of the last one.
The function of the Main and Statistics classes is as one would expect. Main
runs the simulator. It prepares the setup and then triggers the Scheduler class to
schedule some initial events. The setup includes the creation of transactions as well
as the creation of the first (genesis) block, an empty block that will be attached to
the local blockchain for all the nodes in the network. Then, it keeps going through
all the events and executes them one by one until the Queue is empty or the pre-
specified simulation time is reached. The procedures taken to execute the events
are similar to any discrete-event simulator [46], which are depicted in Listing 4.1.
Statistics maintains the results and calculates the statistics of the final output of the
simulation, including block statistics (number of blocks included in the ledger and




Binterval Average time to generate a block in seconds
Bsize Block size in Megabyte (MB)
Bdelay Propagation delay of blocks in seconds
Breward Block generation reward
Transactions
hasTrans Enable/Disabled transactions
Ttechnique Technique for modelling transactions
Tn Rate at which transactions can be created
Tdelay Propagation delay of transactions in seconds
Tfee Transaction fee
Tsize Transaction size in MB
Nodes Nn Total number of nodes in the network
Simulation
Simtime Length of the simulation time
Runs Number of simulation runs
Table 4.1: Input parameters for the simulator.
This module serves as the main user interface, in which users can select from the
available models as well as configuring various parameters related to the participating
nodes, blocks, transactions, consensus, incentives and the simulation setups. Table
4.1 summarises the input parameters to be configured before running the simulator.
We can, for instance, configure the number of nodes, the block interval time, the
volume of transactions to be created per second and other parameters. Besides, our
simulator allows disabling transactions if they are not of interest. This can be done by
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only setting the parameter hasTrans to be “False”, without modifying the code of the
simulator. Furthermore, it allows selecting a suitable technique (either full or light)
for modelling transactions. If we extend the simulator by, for example, including new
consensus protocols, this would be reflected in this module to allow the user of the
simulator to choose the desired protocol.
4.3.3 Base Model Modules
We discuss the implementation of simulation classes that represent the Base Model
of Section 4.2 using the same three layers as before.
Network Module: We implement the network module in two different classes,
namely, Node and Network. Node class defines the structure of nodes in our simulator.
We implement each node as an object in which each node is given a unique ID and a
balance. For each node, we assign two array lists to model the local blockchain and the
transaction pool. It is worth noting that each node maintains a transactions’ pool only
if the full transaction technique is applied. Otherwise, a common pool will be shared
by all the nodes. Network class implements the network latency for propagating both
blocks and transactions between the nodes. Currently, we implement the latency as
a time delay that can be configured by the user of the simulator in the configuration
module. However, it could be possible to extend this class to implement a particular
broadcast protocol.
Consensus Module: We implement the consensus module in different classes,
namely, Transaction, Block and Consensus. Transaction class defines the structure
of transactions in our simulator. We implement each transaction as an object that
has seven attributes, namely, ID, timestamp, submitter ID, recipient ID, value, size
and fee. The end-user can set the size and fee of transactions in the configuration
module as fixed values or random values drawn from general distributions, including
exponential distribution. This class also implements both full and light techniques
for modelling transactions, as we discussed in Section 4.2.3. Block class defines the
structure of blocks in our simulator. We implement each block as an object that
has seven attributes, namely, depth, ID, previous ID, timestamp, size, miner ID
and transactions. This class also implements the processes required by the nodes to
generate and receive blocks, as discussed in Section 4.2.3. Consensus class implements
the consensus algorithm as well as the fork resolution rule. It also implements the
process of selecting leaders, aka miners, to generate and append new blocks to the
ledger. This class is structured to be easy to implement any consensus protocol of
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interest. For instance, to implement PoW algorithm with the longest-chain rule to
resolve potential forks as the case in Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Incentives Module: This module is responsible for setting the rewarded ele-
ments as well as calculating the rewards. Also, it distributes the rewards among
the participating nodes by increasing the balance of each node after calculating the
rewards. It is, however, possible to extend this module by adding more rewarded
elements or changing the way the awards are calculated if required. To make it easier
for the end-user, the rewards (e.g., block rewards) can be configured and changed in
the configuration module.
4.4 BlockSim Case Studies
BlockSim is designed to be used for any type of blockchain, and to demonstrate this
we apply the Base Model of BlockSim to simulate Bitcoin as well as Ethereum. We
also discuss how to extend the BlockSim implementation of the Base Model to support
any consensus algorithm of interest.
4.4.1 Bitcoin in BlockSim
To simulate Bitcoin we introduce the following modifications and extensions to the
core implementation of BlockSim discussed in Section 4.3.
Network Layer. For Bitcoin we abstract the underlying broadcast protocol by
modelling the propagation of transactions and blocks as a time delay, as indicated
in Section 4.2.2. To parameterise the model one can use DSN Bitcoin Monitoring to
obtain the propagation delay of information. The Node module is extended with an
attribute for a node’s hash power, which we add to the configuration module for the
user to set as an input parameter. To distinguish between regular nodes and miners,
we can assign zero as the hash power for regular nodes to indicate that the node
cannot build blocks (only create and propagate transactions).
Consensus Layer. Bitcoin uses PoW with the longest-chain rule to resolve the
forks. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, in PoW miners compete against each other to be
allowed to create the next block. They repeatedly draw a random number, combine it
with info from the new block and generate a hash. If the hash fulfills some property,
the block can be added to the blockchain and forwarded to other nodes. That means
miners execute what amounts to a Bernouilli trial and since the number of trials is
high, the Bernouilli trials process converges to its continuous-time counterpart, the
Poisson Process. That is, the time between successes is exponentially distributed.
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In the configuration module, one can set the block difficulty through the Binterval
parameter, which is the time interval (in seconds) between two consecutive blocks. If
multiple chains have the same depth, Bitcoin uses the longest chain to reach a global
view of the blockchain ledger by resolving the forks.
Incentives Layer. The incentives in Bitcoin for generating blocks and executing
transactions is the same as that of the Base Model. In our main BlockSim implemen-
tation, all rewards will be distributed to miners at the end of each simulation run.
If needed, the Incentives module can be modified to distribute rewards in run-time.
The miner of a block that is finalised and is part of the longest chain receives the
block reward and the fees for all transactions included in that block. The rewards
can be set in the configuration module.
4.4.2 Ethereum in BlockSim
Ethereum is very similar to Bitcoin but introduces a few additional elements asso-
ciated with the handling of uncle blocks as well as attributes required for incentives
associated with smart contracts.
Network and Consensus Layers. Ethereum allows attaching uncle blocks to
a valid block and rewards miners for this. Therefore, we extend the Bitcoin Node
module with an unclechain attribute. The unclechain for a node is modelled as an
array list storing all chains with uncle blocks that occur during the simulation run.
Ethereum allows miners to include a maximum of 2 uncle blocks within the last seven
block generations (e.g., an uncle block with a depth 10 can be referenced in a block
with a depth less than or equal to 17). We include this logic in the configuration
module and allow configuring the maximum number of uncle blocks per block, the
number of generations in which an uncle block can be included as well as disabling
uncle inclusion mechanism if it is not of interest.
Similarly, we extend the Node module when receiving a block. If the block has
a smaller depth or index, the block is appended to the recipient’s unclechain as an
uncle block to be referenced in a future block. Also, when receiving and appending
a valid block to the local blockchain ledger, the miner updates its local unclechain,
where necessary, by removing all the uncle blocks that have already been included in
the received block.
Incentives Layer. The incentive model of Ethereum, similar to that of Bitcoin,
includes block reward and transactions fee. Yet, Ethereum uses the Gas mechanism
to calculate the fee for transactions with smart contracts. To determine the fee
for transactions and blocks, we therefore require some additional attributes related
66
to the gas model. For transactions, we add Gas Limit, Used Gas and Gas Price
attributes. For blocks, we include the attributes of Gas Limit and Used Gas. We
refer to the literature, e.g., [6, 49] for details, but in short, Used Gas multiplied by the
Gas Price corresponds to the fee the miner receives, where Used Gas depends on the
computational requirements of the smart contract [3], but never exceeds Gas Limit.
Ethereum also introduces rewards for uncle blocks. The uncle reward is distributed
between the miner who generated the uncle and the miner who included it in his block,
as follows [49]. The miner who generated the uncle gets a variable reward depending
on when the uncle has been referenced in a main block. The sooner the uncle is
referenced in a block, the higher the uncle reward (Runcle):
Runcle =
(




where Duncle is the depth of the uncle, Guncle is the number of generations in which
the uncle can be included, Dblock is the depth of the block and Rblock is the block
reward. The miner who included the uncle in his block will get a fixed reward, which
is calculated as 1
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* Rblock. All this is implemented in the incentives module, but the
amount of rewards can be set in the configuration module, if required.
4.4.3 Different Consensus Protocols in BlockSim
Thus far we have mainly considered PoW as consensus protocol, but there are many
other, including Proof of Stake (PoS), Proof of Authority or message-based consensus
algorithms such as Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) and its many variants
[14].
A significant difference between these protocols and PoW is that in PoW miners
are not directly selected by the consensus protocol, but instead, miners continuously
invest their computing power to create the subsequent blocks. In PoS, for instance,
miners would be selected by the protocol based on the amount of stake or cryptocur-
rencies they hold. The more cryptocurrencies a miner deposited in the system, the
more chance they would be selected to generate the next block. Other protocols select
miners in a round-robin manner such as Tendermint [64] or based on different metrics
[14].
To support approaches such as PoS, we modify the consensus class by changing
how miners are being selected to generate the next blocks. Other consensus elements
(e.g., transactions, blocks and fork resolution) and modules (simulation, network and
incentives) remain unchanged. In general, as long as the output metrics can be
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truthfully simulated with events scheduled at the granularity of blocks, BlockSim can
be extended in a natural matter. The time consumed by the consensus algorithm
would then be represented by a delay. However, if one wants to analyse the impact
of specific message sequences on the performance of PBFT style consensus protocols,
BlockSim is a less obvious candidate. For efficient (i.e., fast) simulation, one would
study such consensus protocols through simulation tools that operate at message-level
and not mix different levels of abstractions and time granularity.
4.5 BlockSim Validation
A nice feature of the blockchain design is that it offers invariants (such as the block
creation interval) and plenty of publicly available data to validate the results of any
simulator. First we compare BlockSim with existing blockchain systems (Section
4.5.1), then we compare with various peer-reviewed studies (Section 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Comparison with Measurements
We compare the results from BlockSim with the most popular public blockchains,
Bitcoin and Ethereum. These provide certain ‘invariants’ that we know to be true,
such as the frequency of generating blocks and the proportionality between the miner’s
hashing share and the probability to win the Proof of Work competition. Bitcoin and






Table 4.2: Data gathered from Bitcoin and Ethereum, serves as input to the simula-
tion runs used as validation.
Validation of block and transaction metrics. We use the following metrics for
validation: number of blocks created, number of uncle or stale blocks (blocks that will
not be part of the final chain), and the number of transactions completed per time
unit. The results obtained from our simulator and that from the actual systems are
reported in Table 4.3. We report both the average and the 95% confidence interval
values, for a run of the simulation that corresponds to a full month of real time.
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From Table 4.3, we see that our simulator’s confidence interval contains the result
from the measurements. However, our simulator shows a slightly higher throughput
for Ethereum compared to the real data observed. We believe that this is either due
to the small sample of transactions retrieved or the fitted frequency distribution.
Bitcoin Measured Simulated
Bincluded 146 ± 4 143± 5
Stale (uncle) rate 0.025 %± 0.051 % 0.049 %± 0.069 %
Throughput 2.69 ± 0.09 2.66± 0.09
Ethereum Measured Simulated
Bincluded 6083 ± 27 6079± 25
Stale (uncle) rate 12.56 %± 0.43 % 12.55 %± 0.14 %
Throughput 5.99 ± 0.18 6.96± 0.03
Table 4.3: Validation of the simulator results by comparison with measurements
from Bitcoin and Ethereum. Bincluded is the number of blocks included in the main
blockchain per day, the stale (or uncle) rate per day is blocks not in the main chain,
and throughput is the number of transactions processed per second.
To obtain the above results, Table 4.2 shows the data gathered from both Bitcoin
and Ethereum used as input to the validation runs. That is, we use the values
from Table 4.2 for the relevant input parameters given in Table 4.1. We gather
the Bitcoin’s data from blockchain.info 2, while the Ethereum’s data comes from
etherscan.io 3. We collect one month of data for each system as of October 2018.
From these sources, we were able to directly collect all the necessary data, apart from
the block propagation delay and the transactions’ size in Ethereum. However, we
obtain the block delay using DSN Bitcoin Monitoring4 and ETHstats5. To obtain the
size of transactions in Ethereum, we implement a python script that makes use of
etherscan.io APIs to retrieve transactions information. We retrieve the data for the
latest 5,000 transactions and then fit a frequency distribution for transactions’ size to
be used as input in our simulator. For the sake of this experiment, we fit a frequency
distribution with the limited collected data.
Validation of PoW. An invariant we can use for validation is the share of blocks
each miner generates since it is known that share is equal to the miner’s share of the





























































































) Real dataSimulation results
Figure 4.4: Validation of PoW using the fraction of generated blocks given the hashing
share of various miners.
power, it should generate 40% of the total blocks. To validate PoW, we collect the
estimated hash power as well as the fraction of blocks contributed by Bitcoin miners
and miner pools from blockchain.info and input this into our simulator. That is, the
simulation is with miners that have the same share of the hashing power as various
existing Bitcoin miners.
Figure 4.4 shows the results. We simulate four days of the Bitcoin network, a total
of 1000 times and obtain the average fraction of blocks generated by each miner. The
x -axis of Figure 4.4 shows the name of the miners and the y-axis shows the fraction
of blocks contributed by the miners for both the real Bitcoin network (the green bars)
and the simulation results (the grey bars). From Figure 4.4 we see that the simulation
results are very close to that of the real Bitcoin network.
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Input Parameters Stale Rate
Binterval (s) Bdelay (s) Measured (%) Simulated (%)
Bitcoin [50] 600 14.7 1.51 1.69± 0.08
Bitcoin [35] 600 12.6 1.68 1.73± 0.09
Litecoin [50] 150 4.18 1.82 1.88± 0.11
Dogecoin [50] 60 2.08 2.15 2.38± 0.08
Table 4.4: A comparison between BlockSim and previous studies in terms of the stale
rate observed.
4.5.2 Comparison with Peer-reviewed Studies
We also compare the simulator results for the stale rate with that of previous peer-
reviewed studies. Decker et al. [35] run an experiment on the Bitcoin blockchain
by listening to 10,000 blocks. They found the average block propagation delay is
12.6 seconds and the stale rate is 1.69%. Gervais et al. [50] run some simulation
experiments using the configurations of different blockchain systems such as Bitcoin,
Litecoin and Dogecoin. They found that their simulation results matched that of
the actual systems. To validate our simulator against these studies, we use the same
configurations of the block interval (Binterval) and block propagation delay (Bdelay) as
reported in these studies. We simulate each configuration for a total of 10,000 blocks
and report the average results obtained from 10 independent runs, see Table 4.4.
From Table 4.4, we see that the stale rates obtained from our simulator are close to








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.6 BlockSim Simulation Results
To show the applicability of our simulator, we conduct a simulation experiment to
investigate the impact of different consensus and network parameters on the security,
performance and mining ecosystem of blockchain systems. We also show the perfor-
mance of the simulator in terms of run time. We use very similar metrics as in the
validation, but for a wider range of parameter values. The main discussion in this
section is about how the stale block rate impacts mining fairness and how Ethereum’s
approach to reward uncle blocks improves mining fairness.
More precisely, we study the impact of different combinations of block interval and
block propagation delay on the stale rate, throughput and mining fairness. Stale rate
is a security indicator of a blockchain system, and the lower the rate, the better for the
security of the system [50]. Throughput represents the number of transactions that
can be processed per second, thus directly indicating how well the system performs.
Mining fairness indicates that the fraction of blocks a miner includes in the main
ledger is proportional to the hash power of that miner. In other words, mining
fairness means each miner gets a fair reward compared to its hash power.
Table 4.5 shows the results (stale rate, throughput and mining fairness) for 25
different combinations of different block interval Binterval and block delay Bdelay as
well as the run time for every configuration. For ease of presentation, we consider
only five miners (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5) with hash powers ranging from 5% to 40%.
The hash power for a miner is a configurable parameter (see Section 4.4.1). For
all configurations, we set the block size to be 1MB and the average transaction size
to be 546 bytes (as in the Bitcoin network). We simulate each configuration for a
total of 10,000 blocks and report the average results from 10 independent runs. The
confidence intervals are not reported here, but are all within 10% of the average
values.
Stale rate. From the stale rate results reported in Table 4.5, we observe the follow-
ing. First, reducing the block interval, i.e., the time between successive blocks being
created, leads to higher stale rates, especially when the block interval is already small.
For instance, reducing the block interval from 12 to 1 second in the case of 0.5 second
block delay will result in an increase of the stale rate by about sevenfold. When the
block interval is small, other nodes could manage to find the next block before hear-
ing of other competitive blocks due to the network latency, leading to conflicts. Also,
increasing the block propagation delay leads to higher stale rates. For instance, the
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stale rate increases about tenfold when increasing the delay from 0.5 to 16 seconds
in the case of 12 seconds block interval. The block delay includes the block’s trans-
mission time as well as the verification of the block and its embedded transactions
[35]. Thus, the bigger the block size, the more time required to transmit and verify
the block. We note that increasing the block size will result in higher stale rates.
Furthermore, to ensure the lowest stale rate the block delay should be as small as
possible and the block interval as large as possible. For instance, in the case of 600
seconds block interval, the stale rates are minimal since the block delay is only a tiny
fraction of the block interval.
Throughput. From the throughput results reported in Table 4.5, we observe the fol-
lowing. First, reducing the block interval leads to higher throughput. This is because
more blocks will be generated, and thus, more transactions will be processed. We
also observe that the block delay could reduce the throughput significantly, especially
when the block interval is small. The number of transactions that can be processed
per second is reduced from 147 to 92 when increasing the block delay from 0.5 to 16
seconds in the case of 12 seconds block interval. Furthermore, the block delay does
not have a significant impact on the throughput if the delay is too small compared
to the block interval. For instance, in the case of 600 seconds block interval, the
throughput achieved is almost the same even when the block delay is increased from
0.5 to 16 seconds.
Mining fairness. From the mining fairness results reported in Table 4.5, we observe
the following. First and most importantly, we observe a correlation between stale
rates and mining fairness. The smaller the stale rates the better the mining fairness
and vice versa. In the discussion about stale rates, we observe that reducing the
block interval or increasing the block delay can lead to a higher stale rate. That is,
reducing the block interval leads to poor mining fairness. In the case of 1 second
block interval, for instance, miners with a large hash power (e.g., M1) have a higher
fraction of blocks included in the main ledger, and thus gain higher profit, compared
to their hash power invested. On the contrary, small miners have a small fraction of
blocks included in the ledger, and thus gain less profit, compared to their hash power
invested. Similarly, increasing the block delay negatively impacts the fairness of the
mining process. For a better mining fairness, the stale rate should be reduced by
having the block interval relatively larger than the block delay.
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Run time performance. For every combination of configurations, we show the
average time (in seconds) it takes the simulator to perform a single run. To obtain
the run time results, we use a laptop with a 2.30GHz Intel i5 CPU with 16GB RAM
running on Windows 10. From Table 4.5, we observe the following. First, the run time
generally takes seconds to simulate 10000 blocks. We note that in this experiment
there are five miners and increasing the number of miners would increase the run
time since more actions need to be performed in the network. For example, every
new miner has to maintain a ledger and update it every time a new block is announced
in the network. At the same time, increasing the number of non-miners would not
affect the run time that much as they are not participating in maintaining the ledger.
Secondly, the run time increases for higher stale rates (setting with small Binterval or
large Bdelay). This is because miners need to update their ledgers more frequently
than when conflicts are rare. Surprisingly, when the stale rate is high (over 50%) the
run time seems to be decreasing. We believe the explanation for this is that although
more blocks are in the system, miners neglect most blocks as they arrive when the
miner is behind the main chain.
Bitcoin throughput. The current implementation of Bitcoin compromises of 596
seconds block interval and 0.42 second block delay, as reported in Table 4.2. That
means the Bitcoin network experiences a low stale rate as well as a good mining
fairness. However, it suffers from poor throughput as the number of transactions
processed per second is only about 3. We argue that we could securely reduce the
block interval of Bitcoin to 60 seconds to improve the throughput by about a factor
10, without any significant impact on the stale rate or mining fairness.
Ethereum mining fairness through uncle inclusion. The current implementa-
tion of Ethereum compromises of 12.42 seconds block interval and 2.3 seconds block
delay, as reported in Table 4.2. This results in a stale rate of about 12.56% and
imperfect mining fairness, but a better throughput than the Bitcoin blockchain. To
eliminate the negative impact on the stale rate and mining fairness, Ethereum uses
an uncle inclusion mechanism, where stale blocks are included in the main ledger
as uncle blocks and the miners of such blocks are rewarded. However, this does not
guarantee that miners will receive fair rewards compared to their hash power invested
(e.g., a miner with a hash power of 20% should receive 20% of the total rewards dis-
tributed in the network). This is especially true as miners get a lower reward for uncle
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blocks compared to main blocks as well as they are not rewarded for the transactions
included in the uncle blocks.
Fraction of rewards
Miners (%) without uncle inclusion (%) with uncle inclusion (%)
M1 40 41.32 40.2
M2 30 30.28 30.18
M3 15 14.47 14.91
M4 10 9.34 9.85
M5 5 4.6 4.86
Table 4.6: The fraction of rewards gained by each miner (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5),
with and without uncle inclusion mechanism.
We use the same parameters as currently in Ethereum to further explore whether
the fraction of rewards a miner would receive with uncle inclusion mechanism is
proportional to its hash power. We execute 10 independent simulation runs of 10,000
blocks and report the average results in Table 4.6. From Table 4.6, we see that the
fraction of rewards gained by the miners with uncle inclusion mechanism is closer
to their hash power than in the case where the uncle mechanism is not applied.
Thus, Ethereum indeed achieves a better mining fairness using its uncle inclusion
mechanism.
4.7 Discussion: Evaluation of BlockSim against De-
sign Objectives
We evaluate our simulator against the design criteria mentioned in Section 4.2.1,
which are generality, extensibility and simplicity.
Generality. Generality refers to the ability to use BlockSim for a variety of analysis
questions and for a variety of blockchains. The key technology to achieve general-
ity is the BlockSim Base Model, which has been designed in such a way that many
blockchain systems and analysis questions can be answered. The Base Model cov-
ers all common building blocks of blockchains such as nodes, transactions, blocks,
blockchain ledger, fork resolution and incentive models. We have demonstrated the
application of blockchain to analyse Bitcoin and Ethereum, and arguably BlockSim
is well-suited for the full class of permissionless blockchain systems. Furthermore,
BlockSim achieves generality by supporting different properties and metrics such as
performance (both throughput and latency), functionality metrics such as stale rates
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and system properties such as mining fairness and mining incentives. To further
support this criterion, however, we aim to model and implement different consensus
protocols (e.g., Proof-of-Stake) as well as different generic broadcast protocols for the
Network layer in a later version of BlockSim.
Extensibility. Extensibility refers to the ability of the BlockSim tool to be extended
in a natural manner for various systems and analysis problems. This comes down to
the design of the software, which is through modules that can easily be manipulated
and extended to investigate different properties or problems of interest. The user
of the simulator can use common object oriented programming techniques such as
inheritance to extend current modules either by adding new functionalities (classes,
methods or attributes) or modifying (overriding) some of the existing ones.
In Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, we show how we extend the base modules of BlockSim
to support the implementation of Bitcoin and Ethereum. For instance, we extend the
Node module by adding an attribute for a node’s hash power.
In addition, we illustrate how to extend the Ethereum model of BlockSim to
analyse the implications of the Ethereum Verifier’s Dilemma [4] (Chapter 6) and to
study the uncertainty problem miners face in Ethereum when selecting transactions
(Chapter 7).
As another example, we will briefly explain how to extend BlockSim to support
different malicious behaviours of the nodes (e.g., selfish mining strategies). The cur-
rent implementation of BlockSim assumes that all nodes are honest. To support such
behaviours, we can extend the Node module by introducing a new attribute (e.g.,
selfish) for each behaviour. Note that each behaviour needs to be adequately defined
(e.g., by writing a function or a separate class that specifies the procedures involved
in this behaviour). To establish selfish mining behaviour for a node, for instance, we
configure that node to work on its fork without propagating the blocks it generates to
other nodes in the network. Once the behaviours are defined, the user of the simula-
tor has only to access the configuration module and choose which type of behaviours
to be studied when defining the nodes, without modifying the underlying code of the
simulator.
Simplicity. BlockSim achieves this criterion as it has been implemented in different
modules as well as it provides a user interface (a configuration module) that allows the
end-user to set up the input parameters for the simulator. This makes BlockSim easy
to use and understand. Besides, the current version of BlockSim hides and abstracts
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many details. For example, it abstracts all the details of the network layer by only
introducing a configurable time delay for information propagation to model this layer.
Also, it hides details about the validation process of blocks and transactions. By doing
so, BlockSim becomes simple and easy to use and understand. Although hiding and
abstracting details can result in an incomplete model, it is possible to extend BlockSim
to incorporate these details if required.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter proposes BlockSim, a discrete-event simulation framework for blockchain
systems, capturing network, consensus and incentives layers of blockchain systems.
The simulation tool is implemented in Python and is available for general use. We
introduce the design and evaluate it against the design objectives of generality, ex-
tensibility and simplicity.
BlockSim’s results have been validated by comparing it with design properties
and measurement studies available from real-life blockchains such as Bitcoin and
Ethereum. We also demonstrated the use of BlockSim in a study of stale rate,
throughput and mining fairness across a variety of blockchain configurations.
Future work should further demonstrate the extensibility of BlockSim by imple-
menting additional variants of blockchain systems, such as those based on Proof of
Stake as well as blockchains augmented with channels. In addition, one can build on
the current version of BlockSim and extend it with additional reusable classes that




Data Collection and Distributions
of Ethereum Smart Contracts
Summary
To simulate blockchain systems as close to reality as possible, we need accurate esti-
mates of the probability distribution of various variables. In this chapter we obtain
distributions for Ethereum smart contract transactions, with respect to Gas Limit,
Used Gas, Gas Price and CPU Time. To determine these distributions we use publicly
available Ethereum smart contract information, augmented with experimental data
for over 300,000 smart contracts obtained on a test bed. We conclude that Gaussian
Mixture Models are appropriate for distributions of smart contracts with respect to
Used Gas and Gas Price, and use a uniform distribution for the distribution with re-
spect to the Gas Limit. A correlation analysis shows that the CPU Time is strongly
correlated with Used Gas and we therefore apply regression techniques to estimate
the CPU Time conditioned on Used Gas. We experiment with three ensemble re-
gression methods, namely Random Forest, Gradient Boosting Machine and Adaptive
Boosting and conclude that Random Forest is both fast and accurate.
The distributions obtained in this chapter will be used as inputs to the BlockSim
simulator in order to conduct the simulation studies in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis
in a realistic setting. That is, we can draw results that are more representative of the
simulated Ethereum blockchain.
5.1 Introduction
There is a wealth of data available for the analysis of Ethereum smart contracts and
in its own right it is interesting to understand the distribution of smart contracts
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with respect to variables such as Used Gas, Gas Limit and Gas Price (see Section
2.4 for an explanation of these Ethereum specific concepts). Such distributions are
also useful, and even necessary, as input to discrete-event simulations of blockchain
systems, for instance using simulators such as our BlockSim simulator [8, 9]. Discrete-
event simulation is useful to configure, analyse and optimise systems, and realistic
distributions make the results more representative of real blockchain systems.
In this chapter we conduct an extensive analysis of Ethereum data in order to
estimate distributions of smart contracts with respect to the following parameters:
Gas Limit, Used Gas, Gas Price and CPU Time. The basis of our analysis is a
set of over 300,000 smart contract transactions available from the live Ethereum
system through the Etherscan web site. This provides us with data needed to fit
smart contract distributions with respect to Gas Limit and Gas Price. To determine
the Used Gas for a smart contract, we execute the smart contract on a local EVM
(Ethereum Virtual Machine) to tally up the Used Gas needed for each smart contract.
This also provides the CPU Time required for the execution of the smart contract.
The chapter describes the data collection and measurement effort in detail in Section
5.2.
We use Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) to fit distributions with respect to
Gas Price and Used Gas since the logarithmic representation of the data resembles
a normal distribution (see Section 5.4.1). We estimate the distribution of smart
contracts with respect to Gas Limit using a Uniform distribution. A correlation
analysis, reported in Section 5.3, demonstrates that CPU Time needed to execute
a smart contract is strongly correlated with the Used Gas, as one would expect.
Therefore, instead of independently fitting a distribution of smart contracts with
respect to CPU Time, we use regression methods to predict the distribution for CPU
Time given Used Gas. We compare a number of regression ensemble methods, namely
Random Forest, Gradient Boosting Machine and Adaptive Boosting. We discuss the
performance of these regression methods in detail in Section 5.5.1 and conclude that
Random Forest is both fast and accurate.
The structure of this chapter is as follow. Section 5.2 describes our approach to
data collection in addition to our experimental set-up to obtain smart contract at-
tributes (Gas Limit, Used Gas, Gas Price and CPU Time). In Section 5.3, we analyse
the correlation between the attributes of smart contracts. Section 5.4 introduces the
overall approach to obtaining distributions of smart contracts’ attributes. Section 5.5
evaluates the accuracy and performance of the approach proposed in the previous
section. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 5.6.
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5.2 Data Collection
In this section, we describe our approach to data collection. Section 5.2.1 explains
the collection of Ethereum data, and Section 5.2.2 explains our experimental set-up
required to obtain smart contract information about Used Gas and CPU Time.
5.2.1 Ethereum Transactions Data Collection
Smart contracts are both created and executed through a transaction. In this section,
we propose a data collection approach to collect the details (e.g., Gas Limit, Gas
Price, and input data) of contract transactions (both contract-creation and contract-
execution). For contract-execution transactions, our approach also collects the details
of the transaction that created the contract. We make use of the APIs provided by
Etherscan1 to retrieve the details of transactions, and our tool is implemented as a
Python script2.
In our approach, we retrieve the details of transactions by going through blocks.
We distinguish between the different types of transactions from their details by check-
ing the recipient address of the transaction. A transaction that is sent to an empty
account (no recipient address) indicates a contract-creation one. To distinguish be-
tween contract-execution and transfer transactions, we inspect if the recipient address
has associated code or not. Unlike contract-execution transactions, transfer transac-
tions are sent to externally owned accounts who have no associated code.
For contract-execution transactions, we also need to retrieve the details of the
transaction that created the contract in the first place. To do so, we obtain the
details of the first transaction submitted to the recipient address (the contract ac-
count). The first transaction submitted is usually the one that created the contract.
After retrieving the first transaction, we inspect its details. We decide to neglect
any contract-execution transaction that we cannot retrieve or for which we cannot
confirm the transaction that created the contract. In other words, for our work to be
practicable we only consider contract-execution transactions for which we can retrieve
the creation transaction automatically.
In summary, our script determines the type of transactions and distinguishes be-
tween contract-creation and contract-execution, and thus, we can use different ways
to measure each of them. The focus of this chapter is on contract transactions, so












    "Setup": {
        "Accounts": {
                "0f57.....": {
                    "code": ..,
                    "nonce": ..,
                    "balance": ..,
                    "storage": {..}
                }
                .........
        },
        "blockchain": {
            "currentTimestamp": ..,
            "currentGasLimit": ..,
            "previousHash": ..,
            "currentCoinbase": ..,
            "currentDifficulty": ..,
            "currentNumber": ..
        },
    }
}
JSON File Preparation Phase Measurement Phase
Figure 5.1: Design of the measurement system.
the measurement study. We manage to download the details of about 700 thousand
smart contract transactions (for 300 thousand of these we also derived Used Gas and
CPU Time, as described in the following section). We select transactions randomly
from the set to avoid sample bias.
5.2.2 CPU Time Measurement
To determine the Used Gas and CPU Time for contract transactions, we propose a
measurement system that tallies Used Gas and is capable of measuring the CPU usage
for smart contracts transactions. Our system isolates the execution of transactions
from other computation and overhead (e.g., transaction validation and the Proof of
Work overhead)3.
Our measurement system consists of two phases, namely the Preparation Phase
and Measurement Phase, as depicted in Figure 5.1.
In the Preparation Phase, we set up the blockchain, necessary accounts and
blockchain global state. For the blockchain we set the block difficulty, the block gas
3https://github.com/maher243/SmartContractsMeasurment
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limit and the block coinbase and create the genesis block as part of configuring the
blockchain. We initialise a set of Ethereum accounts, where each account has a unique
address and a balance, code and storage. To establish Ethereum’s global state we
map the account addresses to their associated states.
In the Measurement Phase, we construct, send, execute transactions and record
results. We construct a transaction by setting its details or fields using the details for
transactions we collected from Ethereum. Then, we use the accounts we initialised
in the preparation phase to submit and execute the constructed transaction. The
execution of a contract-based transaction requires three tasks. First, checking the
validity of the transaction (e.g., the signature is valid, the submitter has enough
balance and etc). Second, running the input data of the transaction (bytecode)
on the EVM. Finally, updating the state upon successful execution. We place a
timer before and after the execution of the transaction on the EVM. To measure
a contract-execution transaction, we first need to submit and execute a contract-
creation transaction. Once the transaction has been successfully executed, we record
its Used Gas and the CPU Time it takes to run on the EVM. In our implementation,
we use a JSON file to store and read the accounts information as well as the blockchain
information. Results are stored in a separate CSV/Excel file.
The experiments we report on in this chapter were obtained from a single machine
using the Python PyEthApp[42] client. The machine is a desktop PC with a 3.40GHz
Intel i7 CPU with 8GB RAM running on Windows 10. Each transaction is executed
200 times and the average time is then calculated. The 95% confidence interval is
always within 2% of the average value.
Among the 700k transactions, we managed to measure 324k transactions (3915
contract-creation and 320109 contract-execution transactions). The reasons we could
not measure many transactions are as follows. Some contracts call or rely on other
contracts to execute the transaction. In such cases, we cannot measure the transaction
unless we first measure the callee contracts. In addition, some transactions depend on
other transactions. For instance, to measure a transaction that cancels an order, we
need first to initiate a transaction to place the order that we wish to cancel. Finally,
some contracts require the sender of the transactions to be the owner of the contract.
In that case, the only way to measure these transactions is to modify the source code
of the contract.
Before we analyse correlation and obtain distributions, we show some results from
our experiments. Figure 5.2 shows the amount of Used Gas versus the CPU Time in
seconds for contract-execution (left) and contract-creation (right) transactions.
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Figure 5.2: CPU Time (in seconds) versus Used Gas (in million) for (a) Contract-
execution and (b) Contract-creation.
From Figure 5.2, we clearly see a relationship between Used Gas and CPU Time
as the more Used Gas the transaction uses the more CPU Time is required. However,
this relationship is not strongly linear as there are some outliers in both sets and the
fact that we have two distinct groups for contract-execution transactions. Also, we
note that contract-creation transactions are about nine times more profitable than
contract-execution transactions in terms of the amount of Used Gas collected per
CPU usage, as depicted in Figure 5.3. That is, the profit gained from executing
contract transactions varies depending on which transactions have been selected.
In this thesis we only focus on collecting Ethereum smart contracts and obtaining
their CPU time in order to fit the appropriate distributions. Thus, we have not
analysed why the Used Gas for contract transactions is not linearly proportional to
the CPU time required. The main factor that may contribute to this misalignment is
because the gas cost for individual opcodes is not properly set, as reported in various
studies such as [1, 2, 29, 83, 101]. We intend to analyse the reasons behind this
misalignment in future work.
5.3 Correlation Analysis
If parameters are strongly correlated, it would not be appropriate to feed a simulation
with independent distributions. Therefore, in this section, we study the correlation






















Figure 5.3: Box plot for the amount of gas units per CPU usage for both contract-
creation and contract-execution transactions.
We conduct the correlation analysis using both Pearson and Spearman methods.
The Pearson method assesses the linear relationship between the variables. In a linear
relationship, the variables tend to change together at a constant rate. The Spearman
method assesses the monotonic relationship between the variables. The variables in a
monotonic relationship tend to change together, but not necessarily at the same rate.
We refer to the Pearson correlation value as rp and the Spearman correlation value
as rs.
In both Pearson and Spearman, correlation is expressed as a value r,−1 ≤ r ≤
1, with values of r closer to 1 indicating stronger positive correlation, closer to -1
stronger negative correlation and close to 0 no or almost none correlation between
the attributes. Table 5.1 shows the correlation value using the Pearson and the
Spearman methods for each pair of attributes, for both creation and execution sets.
For the creation set, we see a strong correlation (rp= 0.89 and rs= 0.99) between
Used Gas and the CPU Time. The correlation between the two attributes is stronger
if we assume the existence of a non-linear relationship since the Spearman test shows
a yet higher correlation value.
The Gas Limit has a medium correlation with the Used Gas (rp= 0.60 and rs=
0.64). A likely cause of this correlation is that the Gas Limit value for a transaction
in Ethereum is always greater than or equal to the Used Gas. The Gas Limit can
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Creation Set Execution Set
Attributes rp rs rp rs
Gas Limit and Used Gas 0.60 0.64 0.22 -0.18
Gas Limit and CPU Time 0.49 0.62 0.17 -0.05
Used Gas and CPU Time 0.89 0.99 0.66 0.83
Gas Price and Gas Limit 0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.10
Gas Price and Used Gas -0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.03
Gas Price and CPU Time -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.01
Table 5.1: The Pearson (rp) and the Spearman (rs) correlation between the attributes,
for both the creation and the execution sets.
take any value between the Used Gas and the block limit. The Gas Limit shows a
weak to medium correlation with the CPU Time (rp= 0.49 and rs= 0.62). The Gas
Price shows no correlation with any other attribute.
For the execution set, we see a strong correlation (rp= 0.66 and rs= 0.83) between
the Used gas and the CPU Time. The correlation is stronger if we assume a non-
linear relationship between the two attributes, as the Spearman test shows a better
correlation value. The Gas Limit has a weak correlation with both the Used Gas
(rp= 0.22 and rs= -0.18) and the CPU Time (rp= 0.17 and rs= -0.05). The Gas
Price shows no correlation with any other attribute.
Based on the above correlation analysis, we summarise the correlation between
the attributes as follows.
1. The CPU Time attribute has a strong positive non-linear correlation with Used
Gas.
2. Gas Limit has a weak to a medium positive correlation with Used Gas.
3. Gas Limit has a weak to a medium positive correlation with the CPU Time.
This correlation is slightly stronger for the creation set compared to the execu-
tion set.
4. Gas Price is independent of all other attributes, and, indeed, it does not have
any relationship with different attributes.
As a consequence, when distributions are used as input to a simulation, particularly
CPU Time and Used Gas cannot be considered to be independent. Therefore, we use
regression to predict a value for the CPU Time given a Used Gas value.
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5.4 Approach to Obtaining Distributions
In this section we introduce our overall approach to obtaining distributions of smart
contracts with respect to the parameters Gas Limit, Gas Price, Used Gas and CPU
Time:
1. Fit a probabilistic distribution to the Used Gas and the Gas Price values. We
use Gaussian Mixture Models, as we explain in Section 5.4.1.
2. Apply non-linear regression models to predict the CPU Time value from the
given Used Gas value, see Section 5.4.2.
3. Fit a Uniform distribution to the Gas Limit values, where the minimum value
is the Used Gas and the maximum value is the block limit. See Section 5.4.3.
In Section 5.4.4 we provide the overall approach as an algorithmic procedure as
well as implementation details pertaining to the parameterisation of the fitting and
regression models.
5.4.1 Gaussian Mixture Models for Gas Price and Used Gas
When considering the log of the Used Gas and Gas Price data, its shape resembles a
normal distribution or a mixture of normal distributions, as depicted in Figure 5.4.
We therefore decided to select Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) to fit the log of the
data since none of the simple structured distributions fit the data particularly well.
Mixture models are flexible enough to model complex probability distribution
functions, where simple probabilistic distributions fail to represent the characteristics
of the data accurately [107]. Mixture models can fit and represent any arbitrary and
heterogeneous data set with a reasonable accuracy [54, 68, 79]. The most widely used
and well-studied class of such mixture models is Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs)
[107]. In GMMs, instead of fitting one Gaussian distribution to the data, several
Gaussian distributions are used to represent and capture the data set accurately.







D is a sample of n observations of D-dimensional space, p(x|θi) is
the i-th component, θi is the parameter of the i-th component, φi is the weight of the
i-th component. The weight of a component must be non-negative (φi ≥ 0) and the
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Figure 5.4: Histograms for Log Gas Price (top) and Log Used Gas (bottom) for both:
(a) contract-execution and (b) contract-creation.
sum of the weights of all components in a mixture model must be 1 (
∑K
i=1 φi = 1).
For GMMs, the i-th component p(x|θi) is represented as a normal distribution, which
has the parameters θi = {µi, σ2i }. µi and σ2i denote the mean and the variance of the
component, respectively. It is worth noting that in the case of a multi-dimensional
space, the parameters of the i-th component are θi = {µi,Σi}, where µi is the mean
vector and Σi is the covariance matrix.
For any application of mixture models, two issues need to be resolved, namely, the
number of component densities (K) and the parameters of each component (θi) [107].
Selecting a large number of components may lead to a better fit to the data. However,
this can result in a very complex model, and there is a risk of being over-fitted [54].
On the contrary, a model with a small number of components is less complex and
more robust against over-fitting. However, it may not fit the data accurately and
adequately [54].
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In the literature, there are different methods proposed to select the right number
of components. We apply some of the most common and widely adopted methods
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), in
particular, BIC [89]. Both BIC and AIC introduce a penalty term in an attempt to
resolve the over-fitting issue.
There also exist several algorithms to estimate the parameters for mixture models.
We use one of the most common algorithms which is the Expectation-Maximisation
(EM) algorithm [37]. The EM algorithm is an iterative method that finds and es-
timates the parameters of a mixture model using maximum likelihood estimation
techniques.
In Section 5.4.4 we explain specific implementation choices for our application of
GMM to obtain smart contract distributions with respect to Gas Price and Used Gas.
5.4.2 Regression Models for CPU Time
Because of the strong correlation between Used Gas and CPU Time, it might be
possible to derive some mathematical equations to directly estimate the CPU Time
value for a transaction from the given Used Gas value. As mentioned in Section 5.2.2,
however, the relationship between Used Gas and CPU Time is not strongly linear and
there are some outliers that exist in both sets. That is, it is not straightforward to
come up with some equations to derive the value for the CPU Time given the Used
Gas value. Instead, we use regression to obtain a value for the CPU Time, given a
Used Gas value. Regression predicts a continuous output variable from given input
variables by analysing the relationship between the variables. Ensemble learning
methods use a combination of models, instead of a single model, to improve the
accuracy of the predictions. The final prediction result is the average result provided
by all the models. There are different ensemble methods such as Random Forest (RF)
[23], Gradient Boosting Machine (GBM) [48] and Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) [47].
In all the three ensemble methods, multiple trees are constructed to determine
the final prediction results. RF differs from the two other methods in that it uses
a bootstrapping aggregation (bagging) technique to train all the trees at the same
time (independently from each other) using a random subset drawn with replacement
from the original data set. Both GBM and AdaBoost rely on a boosting technique
to train one tree at a time using a random subset drawn without replacement. Each
additional tree is trained to correct prediction errors made by the previous tree. This
is to improve the accuracy of individual observations.
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To predict CPU Time values from the given the Used Gas values, we explore
the following ensemble regression models: RF, GBM and AdaBoost. We extensively
evaluate these models in terms of accuracy and performance. The evaluation results
are discussed in Section 5.5.1. Based on the results, we decided to select RF for
predicting the CPU time values.
In Section 5.4.4 we explain specific implementation choices for our application of
RF regression to obtain distributions of smart contracts with respect to CPU Time.
5.4.3 Uniform Distribution for Gas Limit
Figure 5.5: Used Gas (in million) versus Gas Limit (in million) for (a) execution set
(left) and (b) creation set (right).
For the Gas Limit, it is appropriate to fit a uniform distribution, where the mini-
mum value is the Used Gas and the maximum value is the block limit. This is because
the Gas Limit is specified by the submitter of the transaction and it can take any
value up to the block limit. Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between Gas Limit and
Used Gas for both creation and execution sets, and it is clear that the Gas Limit
value can take any value between Used Gas and block limit. Thus, the Gas Limit
values will be drawn from a uniform distribution as follows:
Gas Limit ∼ Unif(Used Gas, block limit) (5.2)
The current block limit is about 8 ∗ 106 unit of gas.
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5.4.4 Fitting, Regression and Sampling Procedure
Algorithm 1 The fitting and sampling procedure
1: procedure Fit a GMM to log(Gas Price)



















5: procedure Fit a GMM to log(Used Gas)



















9: procedure Fit a RF to(Used Gas, CPU Time)
10: Determine and optimise d, s . Use Grid Search CV
11: T= RF(d, s).fit(Used Gas, CPU Time)
12: procedure Sample attributes(SP , SU , SL, ST )
13: SP= exp(P.sample(n)) . Sample Gas Price
14: SU = exp(U.sample(n)) . Sample Used Gas
15: SL = Unif(low = su, high = 8 ∗ 106, size = n) . Sample Gas Limit
16: ST = T.predict(SU) . Sample CPU Time
The procedure for fitting distributions to the attributes as well as sampling from
such distributions are summarised as Algorithm 1. From top to bottom, it considers
the application of GMM to Gas Price and Used Gas, the application of regression for
the CPU Time, given values for Used Gas, and finally the sampling procedure.
To fit a GMM to the log Used Gas and to the log Gas Price (line 1-8), we have to
determine and estimate parameters such as the number of Gaussian components (K)
as well as the mean (µi), the variance (σ
2
i ) and the weight (φi) of each component.
To determine K, we use the AIC and BIC criteria. We tested a number of K values
ranging from 1 to 100 and then selected the best K according to these criteria. To
determine the parameters for each component, we use the EM algorithm. After
estimating these parameters, we fit the GMM to the data.
To fit an RF model to learn and predict the CPU Time from a given Used Gas
value (line 9-11), we have to determine and optimise the model’s parameters, which
are the number of trees (d) and the number of splits in each tree (s). To fine-tune
or optimise the model parameters, we use a grid search technique with K-fold cross
validation (CV), where K = 10 as suggested by [60]. We search a number of values
ranging from 10 to 500 and a number of values ranging from 1 to 300 to optimise d
and s, respectively. Then, we select the best-tuned values for these parameters to fit
the RF model.
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After fitting distributions to the attributes, we sample (draw) n data points for
Gas Price and Used Gas from the fitted GMMs, where n ≥ 1. Then, we pass the
Used Gas data points to the Uniform distribution and RF model to sample the corre-
sponding Gas Limit and the CPU Time values, respectively. The sampling procedure
is captured in lines 12-16.
The algorithmic procedure is implemented in Python using a machine learning
library called Scikit-learn by utilising different packages such as GaussianMixture,
RandomForestRegressor, GridSearchCV and KFold.
We implemented a Python class named DistFit to fit distributions for the at-
tributes. This class consists of two methods creationFit and executionFit to fit
distributions to the attributes in the creation and the execution sets, respectively.
In addition, we implemented a sampling method that takes as input the number of
data points (transactions) to be simulated and returns the values of the simulated
attributes as a tuple.
5.5 Evaluation of Fitting and Regression Models
In this Section, we evaluate both the accuracy and performance of the fitting and
regression models.
5.5.1 Evaluation of Regression Models
As we explained in Section 5.4, we consider three different ensemble regression models
(RF, GBM and AdaBoost) to predict the CPU Time value for a transaction from a
given Used Gas value. To assess the accuracy of these models, we utilised several score
metrics, namely the mean absolute error (MAE), root mean squared error (RMSE)
and the coefficient of determination (R2). Both MAE and RMSE give an indication
about the prediction error in the same unit as the data set, and thus, the smaller the
error, the better the accuracy [98]. R2 is a goodness of fit score, and it usually takes
a value between 0 and 1, where 1 is the best possible accuracy score [28].
We measure the accuracy of these models for training (seen) and testing (unseen)
data to ensure the generality and the robustness of the model against over-fitting.
To measure the accuracy of a model with training data, we train the model with the
whole data set and then we test it against the same data set. We refer to the accuracy
results of the model with seen data as the training results.
Of course, a critical issue about relying only on the training results is that although
the model may perform well on the training data, the model might not necessarily
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Regression Training Results Testing Results
Model MAE RMSE R2 MAE RMSE R2
Creation Set
RF 34.29 355.12 0.96 78.47 900.20 0.82
GBM 34.30 87.17 1 76.87 941.36 0.76
AdaBoost 171.73 335.89 0.96 202.80 1092.5 0.65
Execution Set
RF 25.73 175.80 0.99 29.64 437.29 0.93
GBM 88.32 180.14 0.99 90.90 459.53 0.92
AdaBoost 315.77 1020.72 0.60 316.53 1056.58 0.52
Table 5.2: Accuracy results of the three regression models (RF, GBM and AdaBoost),
for both creation and execution sets. MAE and RMSE in microseconds.
perform the same when dealing with testing or new data sets. For this reason, we
also measure the accuracy of the model with testing data by applying K-fold cross
validation, where K = 10 as suggested by [60]. Specifically, we split the data randomly
into 10 folds with equal sizes. Then, we train the model with 9 folds and use the last
fold for testing. That means each data point is used 9 times for training and 1 time
for testing. We refer to the performance of the model with testing or new data as the
testing results.
Table 5.2 shows the accuracy training/testing results for the three regression mod-
els for both creation and execution sets. To get an insight into the prediction errors
reported in Table 5.2, we note that the average CPU Time for transactions is 1548
microseconds in the creation set and 1203 microseconds in the execution set. From
Table 5.2, we can see that RF and GBM models outperform the AdaBoost model for
both sets (recall that R2 should be close to 1, while MAE and RMSE should be small).
The RF model shows a better prediction accuracy for both training and testing data
in the execution set, compared to the GBM model. The average absolute error of
the predicted CPU Time value is 30 microseconds for testing data in RF, while it is
91 microseconds in GBM. The GBM model outperforms the RF model in terms of
training data in the creation set, but not with the testing data. We note that the
accuracy results for the testing data is more important than that of the training data
since it shows how the model performs with new data sets that have not been trained
on.
To conclude, the RF and GBM models predict the CPU Time value from any
given used gas value with a small MAE prediction error, with testing or new data.
The average error is always within 8% of the true CPU Time value. In comparison
to GBM, the RF model achieves better accuracy for the execution set.
To assess the performance of these regression models, we evaluate both the training
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Regression Model Training Time Prediction Time
Creation Set
RF 0.015 ± 0.0002 0.003 ± 4.71e-05
GBM 0.063 ± 0.0004 0.007 ± 3.96e-05
AdaBoost 0.092 ± 0.0003 0.769 ± 0.001
Execution Set
RF 2.846 ± 0.005 0.319 ± 0.0002
GBM 12.277 ± 0.272 0.522 ± 0.0006
AdaBoost 11.047 ± 0.018 0.790 ± 0.004
Table 5.3: Performance in seconds of the three regression methods, for training and
prediction, for both creation and execution sets.
and prediction time for both creation and execution sets. Training time is the time
it takes to build and train each model, while prediction time is the time it takes to
predict the CPU Time values from the given Used Gas values. We note that the
creation set has 3915 data points and the execution set has around 320 thousand
data points. Thus, the training and prediction time for the execution set is expected
to be higher than that for the creation set.
Table 5.3 shows the performance results for the three regression models for both
creation and execution sets. We measured the training and the prediction time for
each model 100 times, and then we reported both the average results and the 95%
confidence interval. The training and the prediction time for the execution set are
higher than that of the creation set, for all three regression models. This is because
for the execution set the model needs to take into account a far higher number of
data points compared to the creation set.
From Table 5.3, we draw the following conclusions. First, the training time for the
RF model is considerably less than that of other models, for both sets. For example,
it takes on average about 3 seconds to train the RF model on the execution set,
while it takes on average of about 11 and 12 seconds to train AdaBoost and GBM
models on the same set. Similarly, the RF model outperforms other models in terms
of prediction time. The training time for GBM and AdaBoost is quite similar, while
the prediction time for GBM is much faster than AdaBoost. In conclusion, the RF
model achieves the best performance among the three models for both training and
prediction time.
Based on the accuracy and performance results discussed above, the RF model
outperforms the other two models. The GBM model achieves accuracy results com-
parable to the RF model, but its performance is less strong. The AdaBoost model
achieves poor accuracy results compared to other models, and its performance in
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Figure 5.6: KDE for original and predicted CPU Time for both execution set (left)
and creation set (right).
terms of the prediction time is also poor. Therefore, we selected the RF model to
predict the CPU Time values for both sets.
To further evaluate the accuracy of the RF models, we compare the Kernel Density
Estimation (KDE) of the original CPU Time data with that for the predicted data.
KDE is a non-parametric smoothing approach for data sets. The predicted CPU
Time data is obtained from RF model by passing the Used Gas data. Instead of
using the original Used Gas data that we trained RF model on, we sample new data
for the Used Gas from GMMs (see Section 5.5.2).
Figure 5.6 shows the KDE for the original and the predicted CPU Time for both
the creation and the execution sets. The KDE for the predicted data looks very
similar to that of the original one, and that indicates the accuracy of the RF models.
5.5.2 Evaluation of GMMs
To assess the accuracy of the fitted GMMs, we compare the KDE for the original
Used Gas and Gas Price data with the data sampled from the fitted distributions.
We sample (generate) n data points for both Used gas and Gas Price from the fitted
GMMs, where n equals the data points in the original set. Figure 5.7 and 5.8 show
the KDE for the original and the sampled Gas Price and Used Gas data for both the
creation and the execution sets. The KDE of the sampled data is very similar to that
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Figure 5.7: KDE for original and fitted Used Gas for both execution set (left) and
creation set (right).
Data Fitting Time Sampling Time
Creation Set
Used Gas 0.365 ± 0.012 0.006 ± 0.0002
Gas Price 0.385 ± 0.015 0.005 ± 7.84e-05
Execution Set
Used Gas 25.236 ± 1.517 0.019 ± 0.0004
Gas Price 76.821 ± 3.759 0.022 ± 0.0003
Table 5.4: Performance of GMM fitting and sampling, in seconds, for both creation
and execution sets.
of the original data for both Gas Price and Used Gas. This gives an indication of the
accuracy of the GMMs.
To assess the performance of GMM, we evaluate the fitting and sampling time.
Table 5.4 shows the performance results for the GMMs for both creation and execution
sets. We measured the fitting and the sampling time for each model 100 times, and
then we reported both the average results and the 95% confidence interval.
From Table 5.4, we draw the following conclusions. First, the fitting and the
sampling time for Used Gas and Gas Price in the execution set are higher than that
for the creation set. As for the regression models in Section 5.5.1, this is due to
the higher number of data points in the execution set. Secondly, the fitting time for
GMMs is considerably higher than the sampling time for Gas Price and Used Gas,
again for both sets. The fitting time depends on the number of different components
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Figure 5.8: KDE for original and fitted Gas Price for both execution set (left) and
creation set (right).
(distributions) used to fit the data. Increasing the number of components improves
the model accuracy, but at the cost of performance. For example, we use 26 more
components to fit the Gas Price compared to the Used Gas and it indeed takes about
77 seconds to fit the model for the Gas Price, while it only takes 25 seconds to fit the
model to the Used Gas.
The sampling time is low compared to the fitting time, for both Used Gas and
Gas Price. The sampling time is also not impacted by the number of components.
For instance, both Gas Price and Used Gas in the execution set have almost the same
sampling time, although the number of components is different.
5.6 Conclusion
Based on publicly available data about Ethereum smart contract transactions, we
derived smart contract distributions with respect to their Used Gas, Gas Limit, Gas
Price and CPU Time. For Used Gas and CPU Time we augmented the data with
that obtained from executing smart contracts on our own test bed. In total, we used
complete data of about 324 thousand smart contract transactions.
The resulting distributions are of interest in their own right, but predominantly
served as input for discrete event simulations of blockchain architectures. We will
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use these distributions as inputs to the BlockSim simulator to conduct the simulation
studies in the following chapters realistically.
We used Gaussian Mixture Models for the independent distributions with respect
to Gas Price and Used Gas (and a Uniform distribution for Gas Limit). Because of
strong correlation between Used Gas and CPU Time, we used ensemble regression




of the Ethereum Verifier’s
Dilemma
Summary
In proof-of-work based blockchains such as Ethereum, verification of blocks is an
integral part of establishing consensus across nodes. However, in Ethereum, miners
do not receive a reward for verifying. This implies that miners face the Verifier’s
Dilemma: use resources for verification, or use them for the more lucrative mining of
new blocks?.
In this chapter, we provide an extensive analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma, us-
ing a data-driven model-based approach that combines closed-form expressions and
discrete-event simulation. To establish a data-driven study, we feed our simulations
with distributions for real Ethereum smart contract transactions, see Chapter 5. Our
analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma shows that, indeed, it is often economically rational
not to verify, in particular for miners with less hashing power. We consider two ap-
proaches to mitigate the implications of the Verifier’s Dilemma, namely parallelisation
and active insertion of invalid blocks, both will be shown to be effective.
6.1 Introduction
Blockchains depend on miners to operate the chain correctly and to jointly guarantee
consistency and correctness of the blockchain data and the executed transactions.
In public, permissionless, blockchains collaboration of miners is based on incentive
mechanisms that provide miners with a certain amount of cryptocurrency for their
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efforts. It is clearly important to award fees in such a manner that correct and
desired behaviour is encouraged. Well-balanced incentives, together with the miner’s
interest to keep the system running well, should guarantee the correct behaviour of
the blockchain.
Within Ethereum, there is one interesting aspect of the consensus algorithm that
is not incentivised directly, namely the verification of transactions and blocks. This
leads to an interesting dilemma: should miners verify transactions within blocks if
they do not receive a specific fee for it? If all blocks are valid, the verification would
not have been necessary and the time spent on verifying could have been used to mine
new blocks (which are rewarded by a fee). This Verifier’s Dilemma is well recognised,
e.g., [71, 94], but has not been systematically analysed. In this chapter we conduct
that systematic analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma in Ethereum.
The analysis is involved, and combines a number of analysis techniques to establish
the fees miners would collect under different decisions about participation in the
verification. We pursue a model-based approach so that we are able to analyse a
range of possible scenarios. It is not practical or even possible to obtain insights about
the Verifier’s Dilemma solely based on observations of the actual Ethereum system.
A model-based approach, correctly intertwined with data-driven parameterisation, is
the only reasonable approach.
We combine the following techniques. At the core of the analysis is the Ethereum
model of BlockSim simulator that we introduced in Chapter 4. We extended it with
the functionality necessary for the analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma under various
scenarios. Secondly, to run realistic simulation studies, we parameterise the simula-
tor with distributions for Ethereum smart contract transactions that we derived in
Chapter 5. As a third and final element in our study, we obtain a number of closed-
form results for base scenarios. In these base scenarios no invalid blocks are present,
and under that assumption we are able to derive expressions for the rewards miners
receive if they do or do not verify blocks.
The conclusion of the above analysis is that under certain conditions it pays off for
miners not to verify. Obviously, not verifying blocks puts the correct functioning of
the blockchain at risk, since the consensus approach in Ethereum assumes verification
to take place. To mitigate this risk, we consider two approaches. First, we consider
parallel verification (as proposed in [38]), to decrease the time it takes to verify blocks
and therefore decrease the time verifying miners would have to spend before they can
mine a new block. Secondly, we consider the idea of injecting invalid blocks on
purpose, to penalise miners that do not verify. The reasoning behind that approach
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was identified in [94]. By injecting invalid blocks, a non-verifying miner would more
often pass on chains with invalid blocks that will be rejected by other miners, which
in turn would imply that the non-verifying miner does not receive the block award.
To summarise, the results of our analysis are as follows. It is clear that there
are many scenarios in which miners would benefit from not verifying blocks. This
is especially true if (1) all or almost all blocks are in fact valid, and (2) if the block
limit (the number of transactions in a block) is large. In addition, the impact of
verification on the expected reward is larger for miners with less hashing power, who
may therefore be tempted more to omit verification. For Ethereum, currently the
impact is small but the Verifier’s Dilemma will become more important when the
block limit increases, as is anticipated [71]. As mitigation approaches, both parallel
verification and injecting invalid blocks improve the situation. That is, both make it
less lucrative for miners to avoid verifying.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the problem space and
providing an explanation of the Verifier’s Dilemma. Section 6.2.2 provides the closed-
form expressions for the gain in rewards both verifying and non-verifying members
could get for the base model, i.e., the case that all transactions are valid. Section
6.3 introduces the two mitigation approaches, namely parallelisation and injecting
invalid transactions. Section 6.4 describes how we used the BlockSim simulator and
enhanced it to suit our study. The results of the simulation study are provided in
Section 6.5, for various scenarios as well as for the two mitigation strategies and the
insights gained and conclusions drawn are further discussed in Section 6.6. Finally,
we conclude the chapter in Section 6.7.
6.2 Verifier’s Dilemma in Ethereum
We first present and discuss in Section 6.2.1 the Verifier’s Dilemma in general terms
and then we derive in Section 6.2.2 closed-form expression for the rewards received
by non-verifying miners. These closed-form expressions hold for scenarios in which
all blocks are valid, which we will call the base model.
6.2.1 Problem Description
Luu et al. [71] pointed out that verification of blocks consumes computation resources
and time, and thus, delays miners in the race of mining the next block. Not only it
delays miners, but also it does not provide incentives (a free task) to miners. This
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is especially true in smart contract based blockchains since verification of smart con-
tracts involves repeating the execution of the smart contract to check the outputs. [71]
also points out that these concerns exacerbate when the block size or limit increases
since that increases the number of transactions to verify.
As a result, miners might consider skipping the verification process. Skipping
verification allows the miners to turn to the profitable mining of new blocks. The risk
of skipping verification is that the miner adds its newly mined blocks to a blockchain
that contains invalid blocks. If other miners verify these blocks they will disregard
these and the new block and the non-verifying miner will not receive a reward for its
new block. The miner needs to decide the following: should I support the blockchain
honestly and verify all blocks, possibly at the cost of personal rewards, or shall I skip
verifying blocks and instead spend the time on the lucrative mining of new blocks,
thus increasing personal rewards? [71] calls this the Verifier’s Dilemma.
The Verifier’s Dilemma has received some attention, we refer to the discussion on
related work in Section 2.8. However, there has not been a rigorous analysis of the
dilemma using probabilistic modelling techniques such as in this chapter.
6.2.2 Ethereum Base Model
In Ethereum, miners are expected to verify received blocks by executing their trans-
actions in sequence. In this section, we use closed-form solutions to investigate the
Verifier’s Dilemma in Ethereum and its impact on the fee received by miners. We
consider current and likely future configurations of Ethereum in terms of block limit
and block interval time.
There are important model assumptions that will hold throughout the chapter.
The consequent limitations of these assumptions will be discussed in Section 6.6. We
assume that miners can be either solo miners or mining pools, and not miners joining a
mining pool. Miners, in particular small miners, within a pool might not be impacted
by the Verifier’s Dilemma as if they are solo miners. This is because they do not have
to do all the verification process by themselves alone. We also assume that miners
always follow one static behaviour by either committing or skipping the verification
process. That is, our model does not capture dynamic behaviours where miners can
change their behaviours, for instance, as a response to the behaviour of other miners.
We also assume that miners fill each block by executing as many transactions as they
can in order to maximise their revenue. In the real system, miners can generate full,
non-full, or even empty blocks, but this is not critical for the analysis of the Verifier’s
Dilemma. If needed this can be added to the model. All transactions in the network
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are assumed to be contract-based transactions, thus ignoring the additional financial
transactions that may take place. Such financial transactions take less time to verify
and therefore do not impact the Verifier’s Dilemma as much, but these can of course
easily be added. We also ignore the time it takes to check the hash outcome of the
PoW, since that check is almost immediate. Finally, we do not explicitly consider
block propagation delay between nodes since this does not affect the issue of the
Verifier’s Dilemma.
In this section, we derive closed-form results for scenarios in which all miners are
honest when executing transactions. That is, all transactions included in a block are
valid. The closed-form solutions are to estimate the fraction of fee received by both
verifying and non-verifying miners as a function of block limit, block interval time
and fraction of hash power. The block limit dictates the number of transactions that
can fit in the block. That is, the larger the block limit the more transactions can
be included, and thus the more time required to verify the block and its embedded
transactions. Of course, the block verification time T v depends on the speed of the
machine used. The block interval time T b dictates how often blocks are generated in
the network. The fraction of hash power α for a miner dictates the fraction of blocks
and rewards a miner can get.
It is worth noting that a miner only verifies blocks that are generated by other
miners, not the ones it generates itself. Thus, the average block verification time
decreases with the increase of hash power α of the miner, since then there are less
blocks generated by others. For instance, a miner with α = 0.30 of total network
hash power is expected to verify 70% of the total generated blocks, which means that
it spends on average (1− α) T v for verification per block.
Assume that αv is the fraction of hash power of all verifying miners. Then the
extra time δ verifying miners spend per block to perform the sequential verification
process is:
δ = (1− αv) T v (6.1)




T b + δ
αv (6.2)
That is, the amount of reward that verifying miners would lose by committing the
verification process is l = αv −Rv = δ/(T b + δ)αv, which non-verifying miners would
collect as extra rewards. Assume that αs = 1−αv is the fraction of hash power of all
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non-verifying miners. Then, the fraction of the expected rewards Rs for non-verifying
miners is increased from αs to
Rs = αs + l (6.3)
Results from this closed-form solution will be validated and discussed in Sections
6.4.2 and 6.5, but to illustrate the implications, assume 10 miners, each controlling α
= 0.1 of the total network hash power. Among those miners, assume there is only one
miner who does not verify. Assume T v = 3.18 and T b = 12 seconds. We calculate the
slow down of performing the verification as δ = 0.318. The fraction of fee received
by the nine verifying miners is reduced from 0.9 to 0.877. Thus, the non-verifying
miner would gain 0.023 more rewards (increase from 0.1 to 0.123, ≈ 23% more than
its invested α).
6.3 Mitigation Solutions to the Verifier’s Dilemma
We discuss two mitigation solutions for the Verifier’s Dilemma, namely parallel veri-
fication of transactions and intentional production of invalid blocks.
6.3.1 Mitigation 1: Parallel Verification
Parallel verification was proposed by [38] to speed up the verification process, thereby
minimising the lost time to miners. By speeding up the time it takes to verify transac-
tions, a miner would lose less time. Transactions that do not have read/write conflicts
with other transactions in the same block can be verified in parallel. The remaining
conflicting transactions must still be verified in sequence.
We propose parallel verification as a solution to mitigate the implications of the
Verifier’s Dilemma. To implement parallel verification in a real system, the Ethereum
Virtual Machine needs to support multi-threading. Miners then attach an execution
schedule to their proposed blocks. The schedule details which transactions can be pro-
cessed in parallel (no read/write conflicts) and which must be executed in sequence.
We assume miners provide a correct schedule and are well motivated to include the
schedule in their blocks.
To obtain a closed-form expression for the received reward, two parameters are
added to the parameters of the Ethereum base model (Section 6.2.2), namely the con-
flict rate and the number of processors. Note that we still assume that all blocks are
valid, as in the base model. The conflict rate c is the percentage of conflicting trans-
actions in a block. For example, c= 0.4 means that 40% of the block’s transactions
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are in conflict with other transactions in the same block. We note that according to
[38], the number of conflicting transactions in real blockchains is not very high since
there are thousands of different contracts. The number of concurrent processors p is
the number of machines the miner has available in parallel. With p processors and





The fraction of rewards for verifying and non-verifying miners is based on the
same equations as in Section 6.2.2.
Apply the parallel verification to the previous example, with c = 0.4 and p = 4.
Then, the slow down of performing the parallel verification is δp = 0.1749. The
fraction of fee received by the nine verifying miners is reduced from 0.9 to 0.887.
Thus, the non-verifying miner would gain 0.013 more rewards (≈ 13% more than its
invested α). In other words, the fraction of rewards obtained by the non-verifying
miner increases from 0.1 to 0.113.
6.3.2 Mitigation 2: Intentional Invalid Blocks
In this section, we introduce a solution whereby Ethereum could allocate a special
node for intentionally generating invalid blocks as a way to punish non-verifying
miners. This special node is assigned a particular hash power (e.g., α = 0.04) of the
total network hash power. The hash power of the special node simply represents the
fraction of the invalid blocks to be purposely generated in the network. We assume
this node to verify all blocks generated by other miners, and thus, it always works
on the valid branch of the blockchain. The rationale behind this approach is that
miners benefit from not verifying because all (or almost all) blocks are valid anyway.
However, if incoming blocks could be invalid, the non-verifying miner could end up
working on new blocks on top of the invalid ones. Consequently, the non-verifying
miner would lose the rewards for those new blocks since other verifying miners will
reject the blocks because they were built on top of invalid ones. Since this scenario
includes non-valid blocks, we have no closed-form insights for this scenario. However,
we will extensively study the result of injecting invalid blocks in the simulation results
in Section 6.5.
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6.4 Simulator and Validation of Closed-Form Ex-
pressions
At the core of our model-based approach to analysing the Verifier’s Dilemma is the
publicly available BlockSim simulator, which we extended to be able to study the
Verifier’s Dilemma. In this Section we report in Section 6.4.1 on how we extended
the Ethereum model of BlockSim and in Section 6.4.2 on the use of the simulator to
validate the closed-form solutions derived in Section 6.2 and 6.3.
6.4.1 BlockSim Simulator Extension
To support the analysis of both the Ethereum base model and the solutions of parallel
verification and intentional production of invalid blocks, we introduced the following
modifications:
The attributes of transactions: We extended the Transaction module to in-
clude several attributes required by the model, which are Gas Limit, Used Gas, Gas
Price, and CPU Time. Thus, each transaction created in our simulations has these
attributes.
The distribution fitting class (DistFit): We defined a new class named Dis-
tFit to fit probability distributions to the transaction attributes. This follows the
procedure introduced in Chapter 5. We execute the distribution fitting once. During
the simulation, when creating new transactions, we sample random values for these
attributes from the fitted distributions.
The number of processors (p): This dictates the number of processors a miner
could use to verify transactions in parallel. To add this feature to the simulator, we
extended the Node module by adding a new attribute named processors.
The rate of conflicting transactions (c): This dictates the fraction of trans-
actions that depend on other transactions in the system. To add this feature to the
simulator, we introduced a new input parameter called conflict rate. We also extended
the Transaction module by adding a new attribute named dependency for transac-
tions, to distinguish between conflicting and non-conflicting transactions. Each trans-
action created will be assigned to a random value (True or False) for the dependency
attribute based on the conflict rate parameter.
Parallel verification of transactions: To add this feature to the simulator,
we modified the execution of the block receiving event as follows. Upon receiving a
new block, we distribute non-conflicting transactions between the different processors,
after which the conflicting ones will be executed sequentially on a single processor.
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Hence, we count the time required to verify transactions in parallel by checking the
CPU time attribute for transactions. Prior to starting the verification, the time for
all processors is set to 0 (all processors are idle). During the verification process, we
keep recording the time when each processor finishes the transaction at hand and
pass a new transaction to start afterward.
The intentional production of invalid blocks: To add this feature to the
simulator, we first extended the Block module by adding a new attribute named
validity for blocks, to distinguish between valid and invalid blocks. Each block created
will be assigned to a value (True or False) for the validity attribute. Then, we set
one of the miners to be the network node that always generates invalid blocks. The
hash power of this node can be changed to reflect the fraction of invalid blocks to be
generated in the network.
6.4.2 Validation of Closed-Form Expressions
To validate the closed-form solutions from Sections 6.2.2 and 6.3.1, we need first to
estimate the average time it takes to verify a block and its associated transactions.
The verification time depends on which transactions are included in the block. In
particular, different transactions take different time as well as blocks may have a very
different number of transactions depending on the gas used by these transactions.
Hence, we utilised the simulator to simulate different configurations of block limits
(the limit is expressed in million (M) units of gas). For each configuration, we sim-
ulated 10000 blocks and the statistical results related to the block verification time
are given in Table 6.1. The table gives the minimum (min), the maximum (max), the
mean, the median, and the standard deviation (SD) for the block verification time,
all in seconds.
Block verification time (T v)
Block limit min max mean median SD
8M 0.03 0.35 0.23 0.24 0.04
16M 0.16 0.65 0.46 0.47 0.06
32M 0.51 1.09 0.87 0.87 0.06
64M 1.06 2.08 1.56 1.56 0.19
128M 2.5 3.75 3.18 3.19 0.19
Table 6.1: The statistical results for the block verification time (T v) in seconds for
different block limits.
To validate the closed-form expressions (Equations (6.1) to (6.4)) for both the
Ethereum base model and the parallel verification solution, we compare the simulation
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results with that of the equations. We configured the simulator as follows. We set
the block interval time to be 12.42 seconds, which is the minimum observed interval
between blocks according to Etherscan1. The attributes (Gas Limit, Used Gas, Gas
Price, and CPU Time) for transactions are generated from distributions, as discussed
in Chapter 5. We set the number of miners to 10, where each miner controls 10% of
the total network hash power. Nine miners follow the protocol honestly by executing
the verification process upon receiving a newly generated block, apart from one miner
who skips the verification process. For the parallel verification, we set the number
of processors to 4 and the conflict rate of transactions to 0.4. Then, we record the
fraction of fee each miner receives at the end of the simulation.
We run simulation experiments with different configurations of block limits (rang-
ing from 8M to 128M). For each configuration, we simulated the equivalent of 3 days
of running time of the Ethereum network and repeated this to have 100 independent
runs. Figure 6.1 shows the validation of both the Ethereum base model and the par-
allel verification by presenting the results from the closed-form solutions as well as
from the simulation. The vertical axes show the percentage of the received fee the
non-verifying miner receives. One sees from Figure 6.1 that the non-verifying miner
always wins, since in this scenario all blocks are valid, so the miner is never penalised
for not verifying. The gain can be a full percentage point or more as the block limit
increases. Various additional results will be discussed in Section 6.5.
We note that the simulation results slightly differ from that of the closed-form for
the larger block limits. The closed-form expressions slightly overestimate the gain
miners get from not validating blocks, but the differences are small. Several elements
are modelled in more detail in the simulation than in the closed-form expressions, and
these may contribute to randomness that causes a difference between closed-form and
simulation. We believe that it is fair to conclude from Figure 6.1 that the closed-form
expressions are close to the simulation results.
6.5 Results
In this section, we present the main findings from our analysis of the Verifier’s
Dilemma, under the Ethereum base model as well as under the proposed mitiga-
tions of parallel verification and intentional production of invalid blocks. Our main
metric of interest is the fee gained or lost by non-verifying miners in various scenarios.
We summarise the main findings that follow from our discussion upfront:
1https://etherscan.io/chart/blocktime
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Figure 6.1: Results from the closed-form expressions and the simulation in the fraction
of fee received by a non-verifying miner who has 10% of hashing power, for (a) the
Ethereum base model and (b) the parallel verification solution.
• The smaller the hash power a miner controls, the more advantage the miner
would gain from skipping the verification process.
• In today’s Ethereum, miners gain relatively little from skipping the verification
(less than 2% of the invested hash power). This is because the block limit in
Ethereum is currently small.
• In the future, the Ethereum block limit is expected to increase. In that case,
skipping verification becomes considerably more lucrative. This is under the
assumption that most miners honestly verify and invalid transactions are rare.
• Parallel verification reduces the benefits miners would get from not verifying
blocks. This is especially true if the conflict rate is small and the number of
parallel processors is large.
• The mitigation approach to purposely introducing invalid blocks in the network
can significantly reduce the benefits of non-verifying miners. This is especially
true if the rate of invalid blocks is large or the block limit is small. In this case,
miners may be better off to verify.
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Figure 6.2: The percentage of fee increase for a non-verifying miner with the Ethereum
base model: (a) different block limits and (b) different block interval time.
6.5.1 Ethereum Base Model
Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of fee increase a non-verifying miner would gain, for
different block limits and different block interval times. The four curves in each of the
two plots of Figure 6.2 indicate different fractions of the total hash power owned by
the non-verifying miner. In Figure 6.2(a), we consider a block interval time of 12.42
seconds. In Figure 6.2(b), we consider a block limit of 8M, which is the block limit
currently used in Ethereum.
From Figure 6.2 we conclude that for the current implementation of Ethereum
(block limit = 8M and block interval time is between 12 and 15 seconds), the per-
centage of fee increase is small (less than 2% of the invested hash power). Yet, this
percentage increases significantly with the block limit or the reduction of the block
interval time. For instance, a non-verifying miner with α = 0.05 would increase its
gain from 1.7% for small blocks to a remarkable 22% when the block limit is pushed
from 8M to 128M. In addition, we can see that the smaller the hash power a miner
controls the larger the increase the miner gets when not verifying blocks. For exam-
ple, a miner with α = 0.05 can increase its fraction of fee to 24% when the block limit
is 128M, while it only increases its fraction to about 14% if α = 0.40. This is because
a miner has to verify all the blocks that were mined by others, which amounts to
(1 − α) of the network blocks, as we discussed in Section 6.2.2. In other words, in
Ethereum, small miners spend more time on verification than large miners because
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Figure 6.3: The percentage of fee increase for a non-verifying miner with parallel
verification: (a) different block limits, (b) different block interval time, (c) different
number of processors and (d) different conflict rates.
they receive more new blocks from other miners. Therefore, small miners have more
to gain from stopping with verifying.
6.5.2 Parallel Verification
Parallel verification of transactions is a solution that we proposed in Section 6.3.1
to minimise the advantage non-verifying miners would gain by reducing the overall
time required for the verification process. Figure 6.3 shows the percentage of fee
increase that a non-verifying miner would gain, for different block limits, different
block interval times, different number of processors and different conflict rates for
transactions. As in Section 6.5.1, the different curves represent different hash powers
111





















0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08












Figure 6.4: The percentage of fee increase for a non-verifying miner with the inten-
tional production of invalid blocks: (a) different block limits and (b) different rates
of invalid blocks.
for the non-verifying miner.
From Figure 6.3 we see that although the percentage of fee increase rises with
the block limit or the reduction of the block interval time, the advantage is reduced
almost to half that of the Ethereum base model (see Figure 6.2). This is for modest
parallelisation, with only 4 processors and a conflict rate of 0.4. In addition, from (c)
and (d) we see that the advantage decreases further with the increase of the number
of processors or with a small rate of conflicting transactions. For instance, assume an
8M block limit and 0.4 conflict rate. Then the increase a non-verifying miner with
α= 0.10 would get goes down from about 1.2% to 0.7%, when increasing the number
of processors from 2 to 16. To summarise, the advantage a miner would gain by
skipping the verification is minimised when shifting from the Ethereum base model
to the parallel verification solution. The degree of reduction depends on the conflict
rate and the number of concurrent processors.
6.5.3 Production of Invalid Blocks
The idea behind intentionally introducing invalid blocks (Section 6.3.2) is to punish
non-verifying miners. To assess if this approach can be useful, we modify the BlockSim
simulation classes to account for the possibility of having invalid blocks. We run
simulation experiments with different configurations of block limits and different rates
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of invalid blocks. The rate of invalid blocks refers to the hash power of the special node
that only generates invalid blocks. For each configuration, we simulated 1 day of the
Ethereum network and reported the average results obtained from 100 independent
runs. For these experiments, we considered a block interval time of 12.42 seconds.
Figure 6.4 shows the percentage of fee increase that a non-verifying miner would
gain given some fraction of invalid blocks in the network, for different block limits and
different rates of invalid blocks. The different curves represent different hash powers
for the non-verifying miner. In Figure 6.4(a), we consider a block interval time of
12.42 seconds and an invalid blocks rate of 0.04. In Figure 6.4(b), we consider a block
interval time of 12.42 seconds and a block limit of 8M.
From Figure 6.4 we see that the fee increase for non-verifying miners is significantly
reduced when inserting invalid blocks in the network. For instance, the fee increase
a non-verifying miner with α= 0.10 would get decreased from about 22% to 13.6%,
when the rate of invalid blocks is 0.04 and the block limit is 128M.
Even more interesting, non-verifying miners might get less reward than one would
expect based on their hash power. That is, we establish a situation in which verifying
is preferred over not verifying. This is especially pronounced when the block limit is
small or when the rate of invalid blocks is large. For example, a non-verifying miner
with α= 0.10 would lose about 5% fee when the block limit is 8M and the rate of
invalid blocks is 0.04. That means that conducting the verification process in that
case is more profitable than skipping it.
We also note that miners with large hash powers (e.g., α ≥ 0.20) are affected more
when not verifying blocks, compared to miners with small hash powers. For example,
a non-verifying miner with α = 0.05 can lose about 3% of its expected fraction of fee
when the block limit is 8M and the rate of invalid blocks is 0.04, while it would lose
about 24% of its expected fraction of fee if α = 0.40.
To summarise, purposely introducing invalid blocks into the blockchain could dis-
courage miners from not verifying received blocks. The degree of deterrence depends
on the rate of invalid blocks in addition to other blockchain configurations such as
block limit.
6.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the impact of the assumptions made and the internal
validity threats to our evaluation of the Verifier’s Dilemma. Also, we present the
limitations and challenges of applying the proposed mitigation solutions.
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6.6.1 Assumptions
We made several assumptions in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 to evaluate the Verifier’s Dilemma.
Here, we discuss the assumptions that may impact the analysis results, which are as
follows.
Miners and mining pools. We assume that miners can be either solo miners
or mining pools, but we do not distinguish miners within a pool. Miners, especially
those with less hashing powers, often join a mining pool to get more stable rewards
than if they act as solo miners [66]. Miners within a pool collaborate with each other
to complete the verification process. That means miners within a pool tend to spend
less time on verification individually. However, our analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma
is for a pool as a whole and not for the individual miners that constitute a pool.
Static mining behaviours. We studied the Verifier’s Dilemma assuming that
miners always follow one behaviour (commit or skip the verification process). That
is, we have not considered the case where miners switch between the two behaviours
and the case where miners dynamically change their behaviours according to the
behaviour of other miners. It is possible to find miners who verify some blocks and
skip others in order to reduce the risk of accepting invalid blocks (e.g., verifying a
block in every ten blocks). It is also possible for miners to adjust their behaviours
based on the behaviour of other miners. Instead of only considering a static analysis,
it would be nice to study the Verifier’s Dilemma as a game theoretic analysis that
considers dynamic mining strategies as future work to obtain rich analysis results.
Different types of transactions. We studied the Verifier’s Dilemma if transac-
tions are contract-related. However, there are many financial transactions in Ethereum
and since these can be verified very quickly the advantage of not verifying blocks may
not be as large as in Section 6.5. In that sense, our analysis should be considered a
worst case analysis. We believe the main insights derived from our analysis remain
valid, even if exact values and results may be different.
Full blocks of transactions. We assume that blocks are filled with transactions,
but in the real system it is possible to have non-full or even empty blocks. In that case
verifying blocks takes less effort. However, by design the block reward is decreasing
over time and is expected to be removed eventually [53], only leaving transaction fees
as an incentive. Without block rewards, miners will be encouraged to fill up their
blocks with transactions to maximise their rewards.
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6.6.2 Threats to Validity
We discuss two threats to the internal validity of our evaluation, namely, the selection
of contract transactions and the instrumentation used.
Selection of contract transactions. This can impact the analysis results,
and thus, it acts as a potential threat to correctness. To mitigate this threat, we
base our evaluation on a large data set that constitutes over 300 thousand contract
transactions. Also, we select transactions from the Ethereum network randomly to
avoid sample bias. We believe in doing so we establish the most reliable representation
of the real system.
Instrumentation. The CPU time to verify each transaction is based on the mea-
surements obtained from a particular machine. Since we base parameter values in
this chapter on experiments on a selected machine, the outcomes may not generalise
for other architectures. In reality, miners will use different, typically more powerful
machines and the specifications of machines are expected to further improve in the
future. Also with more powerful machines and/or increased PoW difficulty, the Veri-
fier’s Dilemma will be a problem when the block limit reaches a particular threshold
or if more complex contracts are permitted. Of course, the analysis approach in this
chapter can be applied using data from different machine, and run simulations with
different parameter values.
6.6.3 Limitations of the Proposed Solutions
Although we show the effectiveness of the two proposed solutions, there are some
limitations and challenges to the adoption of these solutions.
Parallel verification of transactions. Parallel verification discourages skipping
verification. However, the implementation of parallel verification on a real blockchain
system is challenging [6, 101] and requires multi-threading support in the EVM.
Complications arise because a miner needs to attach a table to its block in order for
the verifier to know which transactions can be run in parallel. Producing the table is
challenging since it requires knowing conflicting and non-conflicting transactions [38].
Moreover, one trusts the miners to produce the correct table.
Intentional insertion of invalid blocks. Inserting invalid block not only make
skipping the verification a less beneficial strategy, it often makes verifying the pre-
ferred strategy. Although this solution can be easily adopted in Ethereum, its intro-
duction would likely face some challenges. Producing invalid blocks in the network
decreases the overall performance of the system and honestly verifying miners as they
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are expected to verify those invalid blocks and then reject them. In practice, one
would expect Ethereum to be very hesitant adding such overhead to the system.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides an extensive analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma, following a data-
driven, model-based approach that combines closed-form expressions with discrete-
event simulation and utilises machine learning techniques to parameterise and con-
figure probability distributions used by the simulator. This is the first extensive
analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma we are aware of. The insights we gained in this
chapter can be of assistance in anticipating the implications of the Verifier’s Dilemma
under future developments, e.g., when the block limit increases in Ethereum, or when
Proof of Work is replaced. Of particular importance for the fairness of blockchain
systems is that our analysis shows that small miners are more impacted by the ver-
ification demands, and will be more tempted not to verify. Our results also indicate
that, counter-intuitively, problems associated with the Verifier’s Dilemma exacerbate
if there are less invalid transactions. This leads to the insight that future blockchain
systems may operate better if designers or operators assure that some transactions
are invalid. We suggest that similar analysis as reported in this chapter should be
carried out for future system designs and operational developments, to anticipate the
consequences of the Verifier’s Dilemma.
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Chapter 7
Data-Driven Analysis of the
Impact of Profit Uncertainty in
Ethereum
Summary
In Ethereum, miners face uncertainty about the fee and the cost of individual trans-
actions. That is, they are not able to make a proper decision of which transactions
to select to maximise their revenue. In addition to the uncertainty miners face, the
Ethereum incentive model is not incentive-compatible as the award miners would get
from executing transactions is not proportional to the computational costs. That
means some transactions are more profitable than others. With the lack of incentive
compatibility the implications of the uncertainty problem can even exacerbate.
We provide an extensive analysis of the impact of the uncertainty problem on the
received profit, using data-driven and simulation approaches. We design a model to
simulate different transaction selection strategies for scenarios with and without un-
certainty. We show that the uncertainty miners perceive when selecting transactions
has a significant impact on the per block profit. Also, we show such uncertainty could
negatively impact the PoW profit (the fraction of blocks a miner would generate) in
future implementations when the block limit becomes relatively large.
7.1 Introduction
In Ethereum, users send transactions to the network to transfer cryptocurrencies,
deploy a new smart contract or to invoke an existing one. Miners execute these
transactions in blocks, and in turn, they collect their associated fees. Each block has
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a limit on how many transactions it can have, and thus, miners usually prioritise
transactions by selecting the most profitable ones [74].
However, several studies have shown that the Ethereum incentive model is not
proper as the award miners would get from executing transactions is not proportional
to their computational costs. That means some transactions are more profitable than
others. In addition to the imperfect incentive model, miners do not know the exact
income and cost of transactions beforehand. The only information available to the
miners before selecting a transaction is the maximum income they can get from it.
Since miners face uncertainty about the income and the cost of transactions, they are
not able to make informed decisions of which transactions to select and execute to
maximise their profits.
In this chapter, we conduct an extensive analysis of the uncertainty problem min-
ers perceive in Ethereum when selecting transactions and its impact on the received
profits. To accomplish this analysis, we combine the following techniques. First,
we design a simulation model to simulate the decisions of miners when selecting
transactions and design different transaction selection strategies for scenarios where
miners are both certain and uncertain about the income and the cost of transac-
tions. Secondly, we extend the Ethereum model of the BlockSim simulator with the
functionality necessary to support the implementation of the model and the selection
strategies. Thirdly, to obtain realistic simulation results, we feed the simulator with
the distributions for real transactions (see Chapter 5).
We run simulation experiments to compare the profits (block profit and PoW
profit) earned by uncertain miners with that of certain miners to draw conclusions
about the implications of the uncertainty problem. With ‘certain’ miners we mean
hypothetical miners that would have available all information about costs and rewards
of all transactions. The main conclusions of our evaluation are as follows. First, the
uncertainty miners face has a significant impact on the received block profit, especially
if the pool size (the number of pending transactions in the network to select from)
is large enough. With the lack of such uncertainty, miners can get four times as
much block profit compared to the case where uncertainty is present. Furthermore,
although there is no significant impact on the PoW profit in today’s Ethereum, the
effect will become serious in future settings when the block limit goes beyond 32
million units of gas.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 introduces the uncertainty
problem in Ethereum and proposes a model to investigate the problem. In Section 7.3,
we establish different selection strategies for transactions to study the implications of
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the uncertainty problem. Section 7.4 describes how we used the BlockSim simulator
and enhanced it to suit our simulation study. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 present the main
findings and discuss the insights gained and conclusions drawn. We conclude the
chapter in Section 7.7.
7.2 Uncertainty Issue in Ethereum
We first present and discuss in Section 7.2.1 the uncertainty issue in general terms
and then we propose in Section 7.2.2 a model for studying this issue by simulating
the selection decisions for miners.
7.2.1 Problem Description
As stated in Section 2.4, Ethereum uses the Gas mechanism to calculate the fee
for smart contract transactions. Each opcode of a smart contract uses a predefined
amount of gas, as specified in [49]. The EVM tallies the amount of Used Gas and
charges the submitter of the transaction based on the Used Gas. To avoid non-
terminating transactions the submitter specifies a Gas Limit, and the EVM stops
processing if that limit is reached (in which case Used Gas = Gas Limit). The
submitter also specifies a Gas Price (expressed in Ether) and the miner then charges
the submitter the following transaction fee: Used Gas × Gas Price. The more opcodes
the transaction requires, the more CPU effort from the miner, but also the higher the
received reward.
The profit a miner can get from executing a transaction takes into account the
income (transaction fee) and the cost (CPU and storage costs) of the transaction [74].
The fee offered by the originator of the transaction is considered as an income from
a miner’s perspective. The computational work required by the miner to execute
a transaction is the cost of the transaction. In blockchain systems, each miner can
select any subset of transactions from their pool to execute and include in their block.
Since each block has a limit of how many transactions it can have, miners usually
priorities transactions by selecting the most profitable ones [74].
In [3], the authors showed that the Ethereum incentive model is not incentive-
compatible as the rewards a miner would receive from executing transactions related
to smart contracts are not proportional to the computational costs. For instance,
some transactions consume extensive CPU Time, while they offer a small fee and
vice versa. That means the profit miners would gain varies depending on which
transactions miners would execute and include in their blocks. In addition to the
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lack of incentive compatibility, the only information provided to the miner about the
profit of executing a transaction is the maximum income (Gas Limit and Gas Price).
Miners do not know the exact income (Used Gas) they can obtain from a transaction
before executing it. Not only this but also miners do not know in advance the cost
of executing the transaction. This makes miners uncertain about the profit they can
gain from executing a transaction. Thus, they are not able to make informed decisions
about which transactions to include in their blocks to maximise their block profits.
Furthermore, in PoW-based systems like Ethereum, miners compete against each
other to maximise their PoW mining profits by generating more valid blocks. With
such uncertainty, miners might select complex transactions that take a long time to
run, delaying them from starting the PoW task earlier. As a result, miners generate
fewer blocks (gain less profit) than expected.
7.2.2 The Model
In Ethereum, miners face uncertainty during the selection of transactions. In this
section, we propose a model that simulates the decisions that miners take to select and
include transactions in their block in order to analyse the impact of the uncertainty
issue.
There are important model assumptions that will hold throughout the chapter.
The consequent limitations of these assumptions will be discussed in Section 7.6.
We assume that miners can be either solo miners or mining pools, and not miners
within a mining pool. Individual miners within a pool might be less impacted by the
uncertainty problem as they collaborate with each other. We consider an optimisation
analysis where we evaluate the profit gained by miners given the transaction selection
strategy. That is, we do not consider the behaviour of all miners in the network and
the potential impact of it on the system. For instance, what impact can be on the
system if all or some miners follow one or multiple strategies. We also assume that
miners fill each block by executing as many transactions as they could to maximise
their block profit. However, in a real blockchain system, miners can generate full,
non-full or even empty blocks. We assume full blocks of transactions to study the
uncertainty issue under worst case scenarios, but of course, one can introduce non-full
blocks to the model if required. We also assume that all transactions in the network
are contract-based transactions, thus ignoring financial transactions that may take
place. Financial transactions take less time to execute (less complex) compared to
contract transactions, but they can be added to the model if needed. The intention
here is to study the uncertainty issue under the worst case scenarios. We neglect the
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block propagation delay by assuming that blocks are received immediately by other
nodes, as it does not affect the uncertainty issue. Finally, as a first approximation,
we assume that the CPU Time required to execute a transaction is representative of
its cost.
The proposed model is divided into three main parts, namely, model inputs, model
contents and model outputs.
Model inputs: The model takes the miner’s pool as an input. The pool has several
pending transactions that are waiting to be executed. Each transaction has the fol-
lowing attributes: Gas Limit, Used Gas, Gas Price and CPU Time (see Section 2.4 for
details about gas-related attributes). In Chapter 5, we explained the data collection
exercise for gathering these attributes. We collected real Ethereum transactions data
and then fitted the appropriate distributions. To study the uncertainty problem more
realistically, we will feed the model with the fitted distributions.
Model Contents: The model contents describe all steps and formulas needed to cal-
culate the model outputs given the model inputs. To model the decisions that miners
take to select and execute transactions in a block, we first sort pending transactions
and then select a subset of these transactions to execute in the block.
• Sorting transactions: The first step is to sort all pending transactions in the
miner’s pool based on their profits. In Section 7.3, we will design five different
sorting strategies.
• Selecting and executing transactions: After sorting all pending transactions, the
miner selects the first transaction and then checks if it can fit in the block or
not. If it does not fit, the miner can select the next one. Otherwise, the miner
executes it and then check if the block still has space for other transactions or
not. If the block does have space, the miner can select the next transaction.
The miner repeats this process until the block is full (no more transactions can
fit in the block).
After executing every transaction, the income and the cost of the transaction are
calculated and recorded. The income is the transaction fee (Gas Price X Used Gas),
while the cost is assumed to be the CPU Time required to execute the transaction.
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The block income is calculated as the sum of the income gained from all transac-
tions in the block




where F i is the income (fee) of the ith transaction and n is the total number of
transactions executed in the block.
The block cost is calculated as the sum of the CPU Time required to execute all
transactions in the block




where T i is the CPU Time consumed by the ith transaction and n is the total number
of transactions executed in the block.
The block profit that miners can get from executing all transactions in the block





To model PoW profit, the model should support the essential elements of a PoW-
based blockchain such as block generation and block reception. After filling a block
with transactions, the miner will engage in solving the PoW task to form the block.
Upon a successful task, the block will be propagated to other nodes to have it con-
firmed and included in the blockchain ledger. The details about these elements can
be found in Chapter 4.
The PoW profit that miner i can get is simplified as the fraction of blocks that





Where Bi is the fraction of blocks contributed by miner i and Btotal is the sum of
the blocks contributed by all miners.
Model outputs: The model has two main outputs, namely, the block profit and the
PoW profit. These outputs have been explained in the model contents.
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Group Strategy Information Selection Criteria Income Cost
Baseline S1: Gas Price Gas Limit Gas Price NO NO
S2: Maximum income Gas Price Gas Limit * Gas Price NO NO
Optimised S3: Exact income Used Gas Used Gas * Gas Price YES NO
Gas Price











Table 7.1: The strategies of the baseline and the optimised groups.
7.3 Transactions Selection Strategies
To investigate the impact of the uncertainty issue, we will compare the profit gained
for scenarios where miners are uncertain about the income and the cost of transactions
with the case when certainty is present. This can be accomplished by evaluating
different strategies for selecting and including transactions in the block to be created.
In this section, we establish five different strategies to simulate the decisions that
miners can take to select a subset of transactions to execute and include in their
forthcoming block. We classify these strategies into two groups, namely, baseline
and optimised. The baseline group is to simulate the decisions of miners under the
Ethereum condition, where miners are uncertain about the income and the cost of
transactions. The only information available to the miners in the baseline group
is the maximum income (Gas Limit and Gas Price) they can get from executing
transactions. The optimised group is to simulate the decisions of miners with the
absence of such uncertainty. Table 7.1 illustrates the strategies in both the baseline
and the optimised groups. The “Information” column specifies which transactions’
attributes are available to the miners before selecting transactions. The “Selection
Criteria” column states the decisions that miners take to sort and select transactions.
The last two columns show the differences between the five strategies in terms of
income and cost certainty. For example, miners are certain about both the income
and the cost of transactions in the exact profit strategy.
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7.3.1 Baseline Group
In the baseline scenarios, there are two possible strategies that miners can use to
select transactions from their pools, which are as follows.
• Gas Price strategy: In this strategy miners sort transactions based on the Gas
Price attribute. That is, miners select transactions that offer the highest Gas
Price values.
• Maximum income strategy: In this strategy miners sort transactions based
on the maximum income they might get from executing transactions. That
is, miners select transactions that offer the maximum income, which can be
calculated as follows:
Maximum income = Gas Limit ∗Gas Price (7.5)
7.3.2 Optimised Group
In the optimised scenarios, we assume miners know the income and/or the cost of
transactions, thus we evaluate three optimised strategies for selecting transactions,
which are as follows.
• Exact income strategy: This strategy is to see whether the certainty about the
income of executing transactions would help miners increase their profit. In
this strategy, we assume miners know the exact income (fee) they can get from
transactions in advance, but not the cost. That is, miners select transactions
that offer the highest exact income, which can be calculated as follows:
Exact income = transaction fee = Used Gas ∗Gas Price (7.6)
• Exact cost strategy: This strategy is to see whether the certainty about the
cost of executing transactions would help miners increase their profit. In this
strategy, we assume miners know the exact cost (CPU Time) of transactions in
advance, while they are still uncertain about the exact income of transactions.
That is, miners select transactions that offer the highest expected income per






• Exact profit strategy: This strategy is to see whether the certainty about both
the income and the cost of executing transactions would help miners increase
their profit. In this strategy, we assume miners know both the exact income and
the exact cost of transactions in advance. That is, miners select transactions





7.4 BlockSim Simulator Extension
This section reports on how we extend the BlockSim simulator to support the analysis
of the uncertainty issue miners face in Ethereum, described in Section 7.2.1. In
particular, we extend and modify the Ethereum model of the BlockSim simulator to
incorporate the model we propose in Section 7.2.2 as well as the selection strategies
we design in Section 7.3. The modifications we made to the BlockSim simulator are
as follows:
• We extend the Transaction module to include the CPU Time as an attribute
in addition to other attributes such as Gas Limit, Used Gas and Gas Price.
• We define a new class named DistFit to fit probability distributions to the
transactions’ attributes (see Chapter 5 for more detail). We fit these distri-
butions before starting the simulator. Then, when we want to create new
transactions, we can sample random values for these attributes from the fit-
ted distributions.
• We extend the Node module to include different sorting strategies that miners
can use to sort pending transactions in their pool. We explain the details about
these strategies in Section 7.3. The current implementation of the BlockSim
simulator assigns the default sorting strategy to all miners. In the default
strategy, transactions are sorted based on the value of the Gas Price attribute.
• We slightly modify the Consensus module of BlockSim to support the time it
takes miners to execute transactions in a block. The current implementation
omits this detail by only accounting for the PoW time, as explained in Chapter
4. Therefore, we modify the time it takes a miner to create a block to account
for the PoW time plus the time required to execute all the transactions in the
block.
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• We extend the Statistics module to calculate and print the model outputs,
which are the block income, the block cost, the block profit and the PoW profit.
For convenience, we print the results in an Excel file.
7.5 Results
In this section, we present the main findings from our analysis of the uncertainty
miners face in Ethereum when selecting transactions. Our main metrics of interest
are the block profit and the PoW profit gained by miners in various scenarios, with
and without the presence of such uncertainty. The block profit dictates the ratio
between the income and the cost of transactions included in a block. The PoW profit
dictates the fraction of blocks accepted in the blockchain ledger, which reflects the
mining rewards.
We consider current and likely future configurations of Ethereum in terms of block
limit and pool size. The block limit dictates the number of transactions in a block,
and it is expected to increase in the future to scale the system. The pool size refers
to the number of pending transactions in the network that miners can select from.
The pool size fluctuates over time but might increase significantly in the future when
Ethereum becomes more popular than now. Etherscan shows the pool size of the
Ethereum network at every minute for the last four days. By looking at the data
in Figure 7.1 (5-9 July 2019), we can see the pool size varies between about 4,000
and just over 25,000 transactions. That is, it would be valuable to consider different
configurations for both block limit and pool size to study the uncertainty issue.
For all experiments in this chapter, we set the number of miners as 5, where each
miner controls 20% of the total network hash power. We assign each miner to one
of the five transaction selection strategies that we described in Section 7.3. In this
section, for the ease of reference, we will refer to the five strategies as S1, S2, S3, S4
and S5. S1 and S2 represent miners in the baselines strategies, while S3-S5 represent
miners in the optimised strategies.
We summarise the main observations that follow from our discussion upfront:
• Impact of uncertainty on the block profit. The uncertainty miners per-
ceive in Ethereum about the income and the cost of transactions has a sig-
nificant impact on the block profit miners can get (up to a factor 4). This is
especially true when the pool size increases as it means that more transactions


























Figure 7.1: Pool size of Ethereum’s transactions.
• Impact of uncertainty on the PoW profit. The uncertainty miners face
has only an impact on the PoW profit when the block limit increases beyond 32
million units of gas. That is, there is no impact on the current implementation
of Ethereum as the block limit is small (8 million units of gas).
7.5.1 Impact of Uncertainty on the Block Profit
In this section, we present and discuss the impact of the uncertainty on the block profit
gained by miners. Table 7.2 summaries the results for 25 different configurations of
different block limits and pool sizes for all the five strategies. The results are the block
income (BI) in Ether, the block cost (BC) in seconds and the block profit (BP). For
each configuration, we report the average result from 1000 independent simulation
runs. The confidence interval is not reported here, but it is within 2% of the average
result.
From Table 7.2, we can see a significant difference between the five strategies in
terms of the block income, the block cost and the block profit. It is clear there is a
trade-off between the block income and the block cost. For instance, S1, S2 and S4
achieve the highest block income, while incurring the highest block cost. However,
maximising the block income does not mean maximising the block profit as the profit
should consider both the income and the cost imposed by executing transactions.
Thus, we will compare, in more detail, the block profit gained by miners in the
baseline strategies with that of the optimised strategies to get insights about the
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Block Pool S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
limit size BI BC BP BI BC BP BI BC BP BI BC BP BI BC BP
8M
4k 0.39 0.24 1.65 0.43 0.24 1.85 0.15 0.06 2.78 0.35 0.22 1.55 0.2 0.06 3.85
8k 0.47 0.24 2.01 0.5 0.22 2.34 0.17 0.05 3.85 0.41 0.21 1.98 0.23 0.04 5.8
16k 0.55 0.23 2.43 0.59 0.22 2.75 0.19 0.05 4.96 0.48 0.19 2.49 0.27 0.03 8.09
32k 0.65 0.22 3.03 0.69 0.22 3.36 0.22 0.04 6.58 0.54 0.18 3 0.33 0.03 11.45
64k 0.76 0.22 3.64 0.81 0.22 3.95 0.25 0.03 8.53 0.59 0.17 3.51 0.41 0.03 15.54
16M
4k 0.69 0.49 1.44 0.71 0.49 1.49 0.25 0.12 2.32 0.62 0.47 1.33 0.35 0.1 3.57
8K 0.85 0.48 1.82 0.86 0.48 1.84 0.28 0.1 2.91 0.75 0.43 1.74 0.37 0.07 5.56
16k 1.01 0.46 2.23 1.01 0.45 2.28 0.3 0.09 3.79 0.9 0.4 2.28 0.44 0.06 8.04
32k 1.19 0.45 2.7 1.18 0.44 2.72 0.36 0.08 5.66 1.04 0.38 2.76 0.53 0.05 11.36
64k 1.38 0.43 3.25 1.38 0.43 3.27 0.42 0.06 7.81 1.11 0.35 3.17 0.67 0.05 14.74
32M
4k 1.06 0.95 1.12 1.04 0.91 1.16 0.42 0.24 1.88 1 0.95 1.05 0.62 0.26 2.45
8k 1.4 1 1.41 1.34 0.97 1.39 0.44 0.2 2.3 1.3 0.95 1.37 0.64 0.16 4.13
16k 1.71 0.99 1.76 1.63 0.98 1.68 0.47 0.2 2.5 1.5 0.84 1.78 0.67 0.1 6.58
32k 2.05 0.9 2.29 1.92 0.96 2.02 0.53 0.18 3.35 1.85 0.78 2.38 0.8 0.09 9.35
64k 2.41 0.88 2.75 2.28 0.9 2.56 0.65 0.14 5.64 2.11 0.74 2.86 1 0.08 12.51
64M
4k 1.48 1.7 0.88 1.42 1.53 0.93 0.96 0.73 1.37 1.39 1.81 0.77 1.17 0.78 1.55
8k 2.13 1.92 1.11 1.98 1.78 1.11 0.76 0.44 1.84 2.02 1.92 1.05 1.16 0.46 2.57
16k 2.81 2.02 1.39 2.56 1.92 1.34 0.83 0.38 2.27 2.64 1.91 1.38 1.24 0.3 4.33
32k 3.42 2.02 1.71 3.14 1.98 1.59 0.86 0.39 2.23 3.01 1.67 1.81 1.24 0.18 7.17
64k 4.13 1.81 2.29 3.72 1.97 1.89 0.98 0.35 3.02 3.73 1.54 2.43 1.52 0.15 9.88
128M
4k 1.96 3.12 0.63 1.89 3.05 0.62 1.9 2.63 0.73 1.85 3.46 0.53 1.91 2.56 0.75
8k 2.94 3.39 0.87 2.74 3.05 0.9 1.89 1.42 1.35 2.78 3.64 0.77 2.34 1.56 1.53
16k 4.23 3.85 1.1 3.8 3.52 1.08 1.43 0.86 1.72 4.05 3.84 1.05 2.24 0.87 2.58
32k 5.6 4.09 1.37 4.94 3.84 1.29 1.58 0.73 2.18 5.3 3.82 1.39 2.34 0.55 4.37
64k 6.86 4.07 1.69 6.14 4.01 1.53 1.64 0.78 2.12 6.02 3.31 1.82 2.37 0.32 7.43
Table 7.2: A summary of the experiment’s results for different configurations of block
limits and pool sizes for all the five strategies (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5).
impact of the uncertainty miners face when selecting transactions.
Since the block income and the block cost for the two baseline strategies (S1 and
S2) were almost the same, the block profit gained by miners in these strategies is the
same. That is, there is no difference between the two baseline strategies in terms of
the block profit.
In the first optimised strategy (S3), miners can get up to 1.4 times more block
profit compared to miners in the baseline strategies. That is, the certainty about
the income of transactions can help miners to increase their block profit significantly.
This is a bit surprising since miners in this strategy still uncertain about the cost of
transactions. However, this might be because miners in this strategy select transac-
tions that offer the highest income (fee), which are more likely to be contract-creation
transactions.
In the second optimised strategy (S4), however, miners are not able to achieve
any significant improvement in terms of the block profit compared to miners in the
baseline strategies. That is, the certainty about the cost of transactions does not help
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Figure 7.2: Block income (left), block cost (middle) and block profit (right) for dif-
ferent block limits.
miners increase their block profit. This might be due to the impact of the uncertainty
miners perceives in this strategy about the block income.
In the third optimised strategy (S5), miners can get up to four times as much block
profit compared to miners in the baseline strategies. That is, the certainty about both
the income and the cost of transactions can help miners to maximise their block profit
significantly. Also, miners in this strategy can gain more block profit compared to
other optimised strategies since they are certain about both the income and cost of
transactions.
Impact of the block limit growth. Figure 7.2 shows the block income (left),
block cost (middle) and block profit (right) for different block limits for all the five
strategies. The pool size here is 32,000 transactions. The x-axis shows the block limit
in millions of gas units, while the y-axis shows the result of interest. The five curves
represent the five selection strategies.
From Figure 7.2, we can see that when the block limit increases, both the block
income and the block cost also increase for all the five strategies, at roughly the same
pace. This is expected since increasing the block limit means more transactions can
be included. Regarding the block profit, it is unclear whether the increase of the
block limit can lead to a rise in the block profit. This is because when the block limit
increases both the income and the cost also increase, leading to roughly the same
block profit. Therefore, the impact of the uncertainty miners face does not grow with
the rise of the block limit. For instance, miners with certainty (e.g., S5 strategy) can
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get up to four times as much block profit compared to uncertain miners regardless of
the block limit.
It is worth noting that the block profit in Figure 7.2 seems to be decreasing when
the block limit increases for all the five strategies. This is because we are using the
same pool size over different configurations of block limits. When the pool size is
small compared to the block limit, the profit is expected to be less since there will
not be many choices of transactions for miners to select from.
Impact of the pool size growth. Figure 7.3 shows the block income (left), block
cost (middle) and block profit (right) for different pool sizes for all the five strategies.
The block limit here is 32 million units of gas. The x-axis shows the pool size, while
the y-axis shows the result of interest.
From Figure 7.3, we can see that when the pool size increases, the block income
also increases for all the five strategies. This is expected since increasing the pool size
means more choices of transactions are available to miners to select from. However,
the rate of increase is different among the strategies. Uncertain miners (S1 and
S2) can get 1.2 times more block income when the pool size increases from 4000 to
64000. Miners with S4 strategy can almost achieve the same increase rate as uncertain
miners. On the contrary, certain miners with strategies S3 and S5 can only increase
their block income by up to 60%. This is because they aim at maximising their block
profit by considering both the block income and the block cost.
Regarding the block cost, we can see different behaviours between the five strate-
gies when the pool size increases. The block cost for uncertain miners (S1 and S2)
remains almost the same, even when the pool size increases. On the contrary, the
block cost for certain miners (S3-S5) decreases with different degrees. For example,
the block cost decreases by 22% for S3, 41% for S4 and 69% for S5, when the pool size
increases from 4,000 to 64,000. This is because when the pool size increases, miners
with certainty can select the best (cheap) transactions, compared to uncertain miners
who do not know the cost of transactions beforehand. That is, miners with certainty
can decrease the block cost significantly with the rise of the pool size, while uncertain
miners maintain roughly the same block cost.
Regarding the block profit, we can see that when the pool size increases, the
block profit also increases for all the five strategies. However, we observe differences
between the five strategies in terms of the degree of increase. Miners with certainty
(e.g., S5) can get four times more block profit when the pool size increases from 4,000
to 64,000, while miners with uncertainty (e.g., S1) can only get 1.2 times more block
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Figure 7.3: Block income (left), block cost (middle) and block profit (right) for dif-
ferent pool sizes.
profit. This indicates that although with uncertainty, miners can increase their block
profit when the pool size increases, the increase can even be larger with the absence
of such uncertainty.
To summarise, the impact of the uncertainty miners face becomes even more
obvious with the growth of the pool size. With the lack of uncertainty, miners can
better optimise their selection of transactions when the pool size increases, leading
to a significant increase in their block profit as apposed to uncertain miners.
7.5.2 Impact of Uncertainty on the PoW Profit
In this section, we present and discuss the impact of the uncertainty on the PoW profit
gained by miners. The PoW profit here dictates the fraction of generated blocks (the
fraction of fee received). Table 7.3 summaries the PoW profit results for 25 different
configurations of different block limits and pool sizes, for all the five strategies. For
each configuration, we simulate one day of the Ethereum network and then report
the average results from 10 independent runs. The confidence interval is not reported
here, but it is within 5% of the average result.
From Table 7.3, we can see some differences between the five strategies in terms of
the PoW profit, especially when the block limit goes beyond 32 million units of gas.
For the baseline strategies, our simulation results show that the average PoW profit
for both strategies was almost the same. That is, that there is no difference between
the two baseline strategies in terms of the PoW profit.
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Block limit Pool size S1 (%) S2 (%) S3 (%) S4 (%) S5 (%)
8M
4k 20.027 20.009 19.91 19.656 20.397
8k 20.027 20.218 19.701 19.978 20.075
16k 20.062 20.129 19.99 19.643 20.173
32k 20.08 19.912 19.812 19.913 20.282
64k 19.788 19.674 20.199 20.172 20.166
16M
4k 19.917 19.778 20.245 19.598 20.465
8k 19.736 19.523 20.035 20.006 20.704
16k 19.885 19.7 20.074 19.868 20.474
32k 19.55 19.899 20.092 19.998 20.462
64k 19.47 19.79 19.943 20.298 20.499
32M
4k 19.603 19.395 20.724 19.629 20.65
8k 19.316 19.843 20.563 19.483 20.796
16k 19.754 19.427 20.432 19.462 20.925
32k 19.616 19.489 20.386 19.803 20.705
64k 19.484 19.718 20.12 20.024 20.655
64M
4k 19.329 19.401 21.286 19.398 20.586
8k 19.233 19.469 21.062 18.942 21.298
16k 19.208 19.182 21.102 19.368 21.145
32k 19.166 19.019 21.1 19.221 21.489
64k 19.017 19.144 20.55 19.503 21.788
128M
4k 19.641 20.158 20.356 19.117 20.725
8k 19.169 18.856 22.082 18.807 21.088
16k 18.293 18.578 22.363 18.196 22.57
32k 17.996 18.2 22.445 18.535 22.824
64k 18.956 18.128 21.962 18.261 22.694
Table 7.3: A summary of the PoW profit (the fraction of generated blocks) for different
configurations of block limits and pool sizes for all the five strategies (S1, S2, S3, S4,
S5).
Similar to the block profit discussed in Section 7.5.1, certain miners in the op-
timised strategies (S3 and S5) are able to obtain higher PoW profit as opposed to
uncertain miners. In the first optimised strategy (S3), miners can get more PoW
profit compared to miners in the baseline strategies when the block limit increases
beyond 32 million units of gas. That is, the certainty about the income of transactions
can help miners to increase their PoW profit by up to 25%. In the second optimised
strategy (S4), however, miners are not able to achieve any significant improvement
in terms of the PoW profit compared to miners in the baseline strategies. That is,
the certainty about the cost of transactions does not help miners increase their PoW
profit. In the third optimised strategy (S5), miners can get more PoW profit com-
pared to miners in the baseline strategies when the block limit increases beyond 32
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Figure 7.4: PoW profit for different block limits (left) and different pool sizes (right).
million units of gas. That is, the certainty about both the income and the cost of
transactions can help miners to maximise their block profit by up to 30%.
Impact of the block limit growth. Figure 7.4 (left) shows the PoW profit for
different block limits for all the five strategies. The pool size here is 32,000 transac-
tions. The x-axis shows the block limit in millions, while the y-axis shows the PoW
profit. From Figure 7.4, we can see that when the block limit increases, the impact of
the uncertainty on the PoW profit also increases. For the current implementation of
Ethereum, all uncertain and certain miners receive roughly the same fraction of fee.
Thus, there is no impact of such uncertainty on the PoW profit. However, when the
block limit goes beyond 32 million, the effect will become visible. For instance, miners
with certainty (e.g., S5) can generate up to 27% more fee than uncertain miners (e.g.,
S1) when the block limit reaches 128 million.
Impact of the pool size growth. Figure 7.4 (right) shows the PoW profit for
different pool sizes for all the five strategies. The block limit here is 32 million units
of gas. The x-axis shows the pool size, while the y-axis shows the PoW profit. From
Figure 7.4, it is unclear whether the increase in the pool size can have an impact
on the PoW profit. We showed that in Section 7.5.1, the rise in the pool size could
help miners to increase their block profit since miners will have more options for
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transactions to select from. However, this is not the case for the PoW profit as the
pool size can only help miners to increase their per block profit by offering more
choices of transactions to select from.
7.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the impact of the assumptions made and the internal
validity threats to our evaluation of the uncertainty problem. Also, we discuss the
limitations of our analysis.
7.6.1 Assumptions
We made several model assumptions in Section 7.2.2 to evaluate the uncertainty
problem in Ethereum. Here, we discuss four assumptions that can impact the analysis
results, which are as follows.
Miners and Mining pools. Similar to the study of the Verifer’s Dilemma in
Chapter 6, our analysis is applicable for miners and mining pools as a whole. That
is, our analysis of the uncertainty problem has not considered individual miners that
constitute a pool. Miners within a pool might be less impacted by the uncertainty
problem depending on how the pool works and how tasks are distributed among the
participating miners.
Type of transactions. Similar to the study of the Verifer’s Dilemma in Chapter
6, we studied the uncertainty problem considering only contract-related transactions
with the aim of providing a worst case analysis. That is, we neglected financial
transactions as they are trivial to execute. We believe the results are still valid even
that it might be less intensive if we introduced financial transactions,
Full blocks of transactions. Similar to the study of the Verifer’s Dilemma in
Chapter 6, we studied the uncertainty problem considering only full blocks of trans-
actions with the aim of providing a worst case analysis. The impact of uncertainty
should be different if we introduce non-full or even empty blocks. However, we believe
miners are more encouraged to fill their blocks to maximise their transactions fees,
especially when the block reward is eventually removed [53].
Real cost of transactions. To study the uncertainty problem, we need to
feed the model with the cost of transactions. As a first attempt to explore the
uncertainty space, we assume that the CPU Time required to execute a transaction
is representative of its cost. However, the real cost of a transaction should be related
to the actual energy cost, or at least consider other overhead (e.g., memory usage)
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beyond the CPU usage. Although the main insights derived from our analysis remain
useful, more accurate and reasonable results can be obtained by feeding the model
with the real energy cost.
7.6.2 Threats to Validity
We discuss three threats to the internal validity of our evaluation, which are as follows:
Selection of contract transactions. Similar to the study of the Verifer’s
Dilemma in Chapter 6, the selection of transactions can be a threat to the correctness
of our analysis. However, we base our evaluation on a large number of transactions
that have been selected in a random way, see Chapter 5. That is, we establish the
most reliable and less bias representation of the real system.
Instrumentation. Similar to the study of the Verifer’s Dilemma in Chapter 6,
the CPU time to execute each transaction is based on the measurements obtained
from a particular machine. That is, the outcomes may not generalise for other archi-
tectures. However, it is possible to reproduce the analysis results using CPU Time
data from different machines.
Ethereum incentive model. The effect of uncertainty problem only holds on
the current implementation of the Ethereum Gas mechanism as it does not provide
the right incentives for miners. We expect Ethereum to improve its Gas mechanism
to properly and adequately set the fee for transactions. In that case the uncertainty
miners face would have no impact on the received profit as miners would always gain
rewards that are compatible with the efforts spent, regardless of whether they face
uncertainty or not.
7.6.3 Limitations
We discuss two limitations of our analysis, which are as follows.
Analysis of collective behaviour. Our analysis of the uncertainty problem
is a classic optimisation analysis, where we compare the profit a miner would get
by following each of the five transaction selection strategies. That is, our analysis
does not consider the selection of such strategies given the behaviour of other miners.
One way to address this limitation is by considering a game theoretic analysis that
accounts for the behaviour of other miners.
As our analysis has not considered the behaviour of other miners in the network,
we cannot draw conclusions about the impact on the system if, for instance, all or some
miners follow one strategy of selecting transactions. Assume that miners follow the
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best strategy (e.g., strategy S5) by selecting transactions based on the ratio between
rewards and cost. In this case, transactions that offer a small reward or incur a high
cost will wait for long time to be selected or even worse they might never be selected.
We intend to extend this optimisation analysis to a game theory by considering the
behaviour of all miners as future work.
Number of miners. In our analysis presented, we only consider five miners,
each following a different strategy. The number of miners in our current optimi-
sation analysis does not really matter. This is because our aim is to compare the
profit a miner may get when there is certainty about the rewards and/or the cost
of transactions (optimised strategies) with the current Ethereum case where miners
are uncertain about both rewards and costs of transactions. However, the number of
miners might matter if we consider a game theoretic analysis that accounts for the
behaviour of others miners. For example, an uncertain miner who follow the baseline
strategy S1 might be impacted more if there is a large number of miners following
the best strategy S5. We note that one can easily change the number of miners in
the network in the simulator and then run the desirable analysis.
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides an extensive analysis of the uncertainty problem miners per-
ceive in Ethereum when selecting transactions, following a data-driven approach and
discrete-event simulation techniques. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
analysis attempt of the uncertainty problem we are aware of.
The main insights we gained from this analysis are as follows. First, the un-
certainty miners face can significantly reduce the earned block profit (up to a factor
four), especially when there are a large number of pending transactions to select from.
Besides, such uncertainty can have a considerable impact on the PoW profit in future
implementations when the block limit becomes relatively large.
We suggest that similar analysis as reported in this chapter should be carried out
for future developments, e.g., when Proof of Work is replaced or when Ethereum has
adjusted its incentive model. Also, we suggest reproducing the analysis results after
feeding the model with the real energy cost for transactions as opposed to the CPU
time metric we used in this chapter.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
Summary
In this chapter, we first introduce and list the main contributions of this research.
Then, we provide a summary of the work presented in this thesis and point to some
directions for future work.
8.1 Thesis Contribution
In this thesis, we contribute to the field of blockchain analysis as follows. First and
most important, we propose BlockSim as a framework and tool for blockchain systems
to address the limitations of existing simulation tools proposed in the literature.
Unlike existing tools, BlockSim simulator is designed to be generic, extensible and
easy to use. BlockSim can assist blockchain designers, analysts and researchers to
explore various performance and system properties.
Another contribution of this thesis is two extensive data-driven simulation studies
related to Ethereum smart contracts, regarding the Verifier’s Dilemma and the profit
uncertainty problems. We provide (to the best of our knowledge) the first data-
driven rigorous analysis of these problems using probabilistic modelling techniques
with the help of our BlockSim simulator. Thirdly, to run these studies realistically,
we collect real Ethereum smart contracts data and then transform it into distributions
to parameterise the simulator. Finally, we conduct a systematic mapping review to
understand research trends on the general domain of smart contracts, and to identify
areas for future research. In this section, we provide a summary of these contributions
as follows:
1. Conducting a systematic mapping study to explore the current research on
blockchain-based smart contracts. From the mapping study, we provide a survey
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of the scientific literature, identify academic research trends and uptake and
identify gaps for further research (Chapter 3).
2. Designing and developing a generic blockchain simulator named BlockSim that
is flexible enough to support the analysis of a large variety of blockchains and a
wide set of analysis problems. BlockSim covers different blockchain layers, and
provides simulation constructs that are intuitive, hide unnecessary detail and
extensible. At the core of BlockSim is a Base Model that we extend to support
the implementation of Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains. BlockSim is imple-
mented in Python, and it is validated against real-life systems and measurement
studies from the literature (Chapter 4).
3. Conducting an extensive analysis to estimate the distributions for Ethereum
smart contract transactions, with respect to different attributes. To determine
these distributions, we use publicly available Ethereum smart contract infor-
mation, augmented with experimental data for over 300,000 smart contract
transactions obtained on a test bed. The estimated distributions are then fed
as inputs to the BlockSim simulator to conduct data-driven simulation studies
(Chapter 5).
4. Conducting an extensive data-driven analysis of the Ethereum Verifier’s Dilemma,
using a data-driven model-based approach that combines closed-form expres-
sions and discrete-event simulation. We show that, indeed, it is often economi-
cally rational not to verify, in particular for miners with less hashing power. We
consider two approaches to mitigate the implications of the Verifier’s Dilemma,
namely parallelisation and active insertion of invalid blocks, both shown to be
effective (Chapter 6).
5. Conducting an extensive analysis of the impact of the uncertainty miners per-
ceive in Ethereum when selecting transactions, using data-driven and simula-
tion approaches. We show that such uncertainty has a significant impact on the
profits miners can gain (Chapter 7).
8.2 Thesis Summary
In this section, we summarise the work that has been carried out in this thesis,
highlighting the main contributions and results obtained.
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8.2.1 Academic Research on Smart Contracts (Chapter 3)
Blockchains and smart contracts have received increasing attention in recent years,
also in academic circles. One contribution of this thesis is to identify and to classify
all peer-reviewed research that has been conducted on smart contract technology,
with the aim to document the growth of research outputs and to identify gaps for
future work.
We conduct a systematic mapping study in longitudinal aspects to document and
analyse the growth in research outputs related to smart contracts. From the mapping
study, we find that the number of published papers on smart contracts increases
significantly every year, reaching over 2500 papers as of March 2020. The results
of the study also show six different categories for smart contract topics, which are
security, privacy, software engineering, application, performance and scalability and
other smart contract related topics. The majority of the papers falls into application
(about 64%) and software engineering (21%) categories.
From the systematic study, we identify at least two research areas that can be
further explored, and we base our work (Chapters 5-7) on these identified areas.
8.2.2 BlockSim Simulation Framework (Chapter 4)
A major contribution of this thesis is the proposal of a discrete-event simulation
framework called BlockSim to explore the effects of configuration, parameterisation
and design decisions on the behaviour of blockchain systems. BlockSim aims to
provide simulation constructs that are intuitive, hide unnecessary detail and can be
easily manipulated to be applied to a large set of blockchains design and deployment
questions (related to performance, reliability, security or other properties of interest).
That is, BlockSim has three design objectives, namely, generality, extensibility and
simplicity.
At the core of BlockSim is a Base Model, which includes model constructs at three
abstraction layers: the network layer, the consensus layer and the incentives layer [96].
The Base Model includes a number of functional blocks (e.g., Block, Transaction and
Node) common across blockchains, that can be extended and configured as suited
for the system and study of interest. The Base Model of BlockSim is implemented
through a number of Python modules and complemented by modules (event, sched-
uler, statistics, etc.) that implement the simulation engine. To illustrate the exten-
sibility of BlockSim, we extend and modify the Base Model of BlockSim to support
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the implementation of both Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains. We validate Block-
Sim against existing public blockchain systems such as Ethereum and Bitcoin and
results from the literature. We show BlockSim can produce statistically acceptable
simulation results.
To demonstrate the usefulness of BlockSim, we conduct a simulation study that
considers stale rate, throughput and mining fairness, for a range of possible blockchain
configurations (not all existing in real-life systems). Using BlockSim we can demon-
strate that the Ethereum uncle inclusion mechanism is beneficial for mining fairness.
Also, we show that the block interval (i.e. the time between two consecutive blocks)
for Bitcoin can be securely reduced to improve the throughput by a factor 10.
8.2.3 Data Collection and Distributions (Chapter 5)
Another contribution of this thesis is the collection of Ethereum smart contract data
and the application of appropriate distributions to transform the data into inputs
suitable for the BlockSim simulator. This contribution can be divided into several
parts, as follows:
Data collection approach. We propose a data collection approach that is capable
of collecting the details (e.g., Gas Limit, Gas Price and input data) of Ethereum smart
contract transactions. Our approach makes use of the APIs provided by Etherscan
explorer, and it is implemented as a Python script and made available to the public.
Measurement system. We also propose a measurement system that tallies the
Used Gas and is capable of measuring the execution time of Ethereum smart contract
transactions. Currently, our system is implemented on top of the Ethereum Python
client but can be applied to other clients if required.
Approach to obtaining distributions. Using our data collection approach and
the measurement system, we manage to collect the details of over 300,000 smart
contract transactions with respect to the following attributes: Gas Limit, Used Gas,
Gas Price and CPU Time. Then, we conduct an extensive analysis to estimate the
distributions for these attributes. We use Gaussian Mixture Models to fit distributions
to Used Gas and Gas Price since the logarithmic representation of the data resembles a
normal distribution. We use Uniform distribution to estimate the distribution of Gas
Limit. Due to the correlation between Used Gas and CPU Time, we apply regression
methods to predict the CPU Time needed to execute a contract transaction, given the
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Used Gas. We compare a number of regression ensemble methods, and then consider
Random Forest as it is both fast and accurate.
The resulting distributions have been evaluated in terms of accuracy and per-
formance, and are implemented as a Python class that can be integrated with the
Ethereum model of the BlockSim simulator in order to generate representative and
realistic smart contract transactions.
8.2.4 The Ethereum Verifier’s Dilemma (Chapter 6)
Within Ethereum, miners do not receive incentives for verifying the received block and
its associated transactions. This leads to an interesting dilemma: should miners verify
transactions within blocks if they do not receive a specific fee for it? If all blocks are
valid, the verification would not have been necessary and the time spent on verifying
could have been used to mine new blocks (which are rewarded by a fee). This Verifier’s
Dilemma is well recognised, e.g., [71, 94], but has not been systematically analysed.
Our fourth contribution is an extensive model-based analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma
in Ethereum.
We combine the following techniques to conduct our analysis of the Verifer’s
Dilemma. At the core of the analysis is the Ethereum model of BlockSim simula-
tor that we extend with the functionality necessary for the analysis under various
scenarios. Secondly, to run realistic simulation studies, we feed the simulator with
distributions that we obtain for smart contract transactions, see the previous section.
Finally, we derive a number of closed-form expressions to estimate the rewards miners
receive if they do or do not verify blocks for base scenarios where no invalid blocks
are present.
The conclusion of the analysis results is as follows. There are many scenarios in
which miners would benefit from not verifying blocks. This is especially true if (1) all
or almost all blocks are in fact valid, and (2) if the block limit is large enough. Within
the current implementation of Ethereum, the implications of the Verifier’s Dilemma
are small but the impact will become more important when the block limit increases.
To mitigate the implications of this dilemma, we consider two approaches. First,
we consider parallel verification to decrease the time verifying miners would have to
spend before they can mine a new block. Secondly, we consider the idea of injecting
invalid blocks on purpose, to penalise miners that do not verify. By injecting invalid
blocks, a non-verifying miner would more often pass on chains with invalid blocks that
will be rejected by other miners, which in turn would imply that the non-verifying
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miner does not receive the block award. Both approaches improve the situation by
making it less lucrative for miners to avoid verifying.
We recommend the Ethereum foundation to seriously consider some solutions to
mitigate the implications of the Verifier’s Dilemma before scaling the system. In this
thesis, we suggest two effective mitigation solutions for Ethereum to consider, which
are parallel verification and active injection of invalid blocks.
8.2.5 The Impact of Profit Uncertainty (Chapter 7)
In Ethereum, miners face uncertainty about the fee and the cost of individual trans-
actions. That is, they are not able to make an informed decision of which transactions
to select to maximise their revenue. In addition to the uncertainty miners face, the
Ethereum incentive model is not incentive-compatible (i.e. the award miners get from
executing transactions is not aligned with the computational cost), which exacerbates
the implications of the uncertainty problem. Our fifth contribution is an extensive
analysis of the uncertainty miners face during the selection of transactions, and its
impact on the received revenue in terms of block profit and PoW profit.
We combine the following techniques to conduct our analysis. First, we design
different transaction selection strategies for scenarios where miners are both certain
and uncertain about the income and the cost of transactions. Secondly, we extend
the Ethereum model of the BlockSim simulator with the functionality necessary to
support this analysis. Thirdly, to obtain realistic simulation results, we feed the
simulator with the distributions for real transactions.
The conclusion of the simulation results is as follows. The uncertainty miners face
has a significant impact on the received block profit, especially when the pool size is
relatively large. Within the current implementation of Ethereum, the impact on the
PoW profit is negligible, but it will become severe in future settings when the block
limit is relatively large.
To eliminate the impact of such uncertainty, we suggest the Ethereum foundation
to adjust its Gas incentive model to provide fair transaction rewards before scaling the
system. With a proper incentive model, the uncertainty miners face would have no
impact on the received profit as miners would always gain rewards that are compatible
with the efforts spent, regardless of whether they face uncertainty or not.
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8.3 Future Work
In this section, we introduce a number of opportunities for future research that can be
explored to improve and extend the work presented in this thesis. These opportunities
are as follows.
1. Extending BlockSim Simulator: In Chapter 4, we propose BlockSim as
a general and extensible simulation framework and tool for blockchains. The
current version of BlockSim is designed to model public blockchains and con-
tains models for the most popular public blockchains (Bitcoin and Ethereum).
One opportunity is to extend BlockSim to support the analysis and study of
private blockchains such as Hyperledger. Secondly, as BlockSim currently only
models the PoW algorithm used in Bitcoin and Ethereum, another way to ex-
tend BlockSim is by considering different consensus algorithms such as PoS and
variants of PBFT. In addition, BlockSim can be extended by modelling the un-
derlying broadcast protocol for the peer-to-peer network, instead of modelling
the propagation of information as a time delay. That would help in the decision
of selecting the right and optimal broadcast protocol.
2. Data Collection and Fitting: In Chapter 5, we collect data about Ethereum
smart contracts and transform it into distributions in order to provide inputs
for the simulator. There are several ways to improve the work presented in
this chapter, as follows. First, it would be nice to try more additional dis-
tributions and regression methods to fit fast and more accurate distributions
to the data. For instance, one can consider different kinds of mixture models
such as Phase-type using HyperStar tool [86, 87], as an alternative to GMM,
to fit distributions to the Used Gas and Gas Price attributes. Secondly, as
our measurement data shows that the received fee (in terms of Used Gas) for
contract transactions is not well-aligned with the CPU usage, another potential
future work is to analyse and understand the factors (e.g., individual opcodes)
that contribute to this. This thesis only focuses on collecting and fitting dis-
tributions to contract data, and thus we have not considered the analysis of
the reasons behind this misalignment. Furthermore, the experiment we per-
form in this chapter to obtain the Used Gas and the CPU Time is based only
on a single machine running the Python Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).
However, there are several implementations of the EVM that miners can use to
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run smart contracts, as mentioned in Section 2.4. Conducting the same experi-
ment using different machines running on different EVM clients would provide
more insightful (and possibly different) results about how well the received fee
is aligned with the computational efforts. Finally, future work may extend the
proposed measurement system to consider computational effort beyond CPU
usage such as memory usage, and relating the effort directly to the real energy
cost.
3. The Verifier’s Dilemma Problem: In Chapter 6, we conduct an exten-
sive data-driven analysis of the Ethereum Verifier’s Dilemma using closed-form
expressions and discrete-event simulations. There are some opportunities to
improve this work in the future. First, we only study the Verifier’s Dilemma
under the PoW algorithm as currently implemented in Ethereum. However,
since Ethereum and other blockchains are planning to move to more efficient
protocols such as PoS [26, 97], studying the impact of this dilemma under dif-
ferent consensus protocols is of interest. Secondly, we have not derived closed-
form expressions for scenarios where invalid blocks are present. We leave this
for future work as with expressions one can get insightful results very quickly
compared to simulations. Thirdly, our analysis has not considered dynamic
mining behaviours and collective behaviour of miners. Future work may extend
our analysis by proposing a game theoretic analysis that covers both dynamic
and collective mining behaviours. Furthermore, the two proposed mitigation
solutions (parallelisation and injection of invalid blocks) face some limitations,
as discussed in Section 6.6. That is, addressing these limitations to enable the
application of the proposed solutions in the real system would be valuable to
the community. Finally, future work may consider different mitigation solu-
tions such as Sharding [70] and study their effectiveness in comparison with the
solutions we proposed.
4. The Profit Uncertainty Issue: In Chapter 7, we conduct an extensive data-
driven analysis of the profit uncertainty miners face when selecting transactions.
There are various aspects that can be improved as future work. First, we
assumed the CPU usage is representative of the cost of a transaction. However,
the cost should be related to the actual energy cost. That is, further research
is required to feed our model with the actual energy cost for transactions to
study the impact of such uncertainty. Similar to the Verifier’s Dilemma, we
study the uncertainty issue under the PoW algorithm, and that future work
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may consider different consensus algorithms. Instead of a typical optimisation
analysis, considering the collective behaviour of miners in the network is of
interest as future work. Furthermore, proposing a run-time system that allows
miners to choose the best (most profitable) transactions could be of interest.
Finally, our results show the impact of the profit uncertainty under the current
Ethereum incentive model, where the fee of transactions is not proportional to
the computational cost. Thus, enhancing the Ethereum incentive model would
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